merely resuscitated Scholasticism, to reserve their judgment until they are sure they have a full and complete comprehension of the system. It is difficult to comprehend: this ought to be frankly admitted. This difficulty, however, is due, not so much to the system itself, as to the fact that much of the terminology in which it is expressed has, in recent centuries, been so wrested from its proper use and meaning as to be now almost incapable of conveying truth. This is especially true with regard to such terms as subject, object, intuition, perception, intelligence, feeling, etc., which in the mouths of most modern thinkers have little or no intelligible meaning. For years I found it very difficult to enter into Rosmini's thought, and I feel quite sure that no one, without a most careful study of his terms, will be much more fortunate than I was. With a view to facilitating this study, I have included in my notes as many definitions as possible, and have placed an index of them at the end of the volume. As the whole of the work, with the exception of the translation of the Sistema and a few parts of the Bibliography, was written in a remote village of the Piedmontese Alps, where I had access to few books beyond that portion of my own library which I had been able to transport thither, a few quotations and references had to be taken at second hand. For any inaccuracy that may occur in these I must crave the reader's indulgence. In conclusion, I beg to return my most sincere thanks to the members of the Rosminian Order for numerous acts of kindness and courtesy displayed to me in the course of my researches into the life and philosophy of their Founder, and to say that, though they have encouraged me in the publication of this work, they are in no way responsible for any opinion expressed by me in reference either to the doctrines of Rosmini or to the views and purposes of those who have attacked these doctrines. I am informed, on good authority, that they intend soon to publish an English translation of Rosmini's first important work, the New Essay on the Origin of Ideas. I have further to thank my friend, Dr. J. BurnsGibson, for reading over the proofs of the work. LONDON, February 27, 1882. § 2. Ultimate grounds.-Formal, real, and moral grounds 9 II ... ... 15 16 § 7. Philosophy the restorer of repose of intellect § 8. Difference between demonstration and persuasion.-Direct, popular, § 9. The first questions put by philosophy and their consequences. -Philo- sophy, regressive and progressive. Four starting-points distin- § 10. Ideology and Logic.—Rosmini's chief merit in philosophy § 11. Internal observation the method of Ideology.-Philosophy does not begin with an hypothesis, as Hegel thought § 12. Objection to the validity of observation answered § 13. Human cognitions, though innumerable, have a common element. § 14. Cognition of real entities is an internal affirmation or judgment.- Synthesis must precede analysis. Kant and his synthetic judg- § 15. The notion of being in general is a necessary condition of the cog- nition of particular real beings.-Real and ideal being. Ideal § 16. Being in general is known by intuition. Two great classes of PAGE Order of the two classes.-Universality; its nature ... ... § 20. What this formula presupposes. It is feeling that constitutes the reality of being.-Subject and object. The ancient meaning differs § 21. In what sense the essence of being is universal.-Principle and term 64 § 22. Examination of the objections to the identification of reality with § 28. Ideas which make known the negation of being. § 29. In respect to quantity, the essence of being and beings perceived by us are different, not identical.— Contingency ... § 30. The identity between the essence of being and real beings exists between them only in so far as they are known § 31. It is only as known that real being identifies itself with ideal being. Perception not less true on that account.-Universality not derived 32. Why we think we do not know the ground of things.-The intellect knows things in an absolute mode. Passion and action. Intel- $33. Why being, as a means of cognition, is called ideal.-Rosmini's system not idealism. Means sub quo $ 34. The essence of being is self-intelligible and forms the intelligibility of all other things. The idea of being is the light of reason, is inborn, and is the form of intelligence.-The idea of being not derived from external sensation, feeling of our own existence, reflection or the act of perception. It is, therefore, innate. Mean- § 35. Meaning of the word form. Two senses of the word form. In ject and their relation. Kant's forms not objective, but subjective. ... PAGE § 36. All intelligence is reducible to thinking being as realized in a cer- tain manner, with certain limits.—Though the soul is finite, its § 39. Ideality a mode of being incapable of being confounded with reality 110 § 40. Differences between ideas and the things known by means of them § 41. Essence known through idea; subsistence, through affirmation on occasion of a feeling.-Contingent things have two inconfusible § 43. Objection to calling intellective perception a judgment. Answer. The objection does not touch the fact, but only the propriety of the term.-Difference between Rosmini and Kant. Reid $44. Is this affirmation a judgment? No judgment is possible without § 45. In intellective perception, it is not intelligence, but nature, that unites the terms of the judgment. This judgment produces its § 46. The term judgment does not express the nature of affirmation, but a subsequent reflection analyzes it.—The terms of a judgment are § 47. Reflection, in analyzing a judgment, distinguishes, but does not sepa- rate, its elements. Subject and predicate do not exist prior to § 48. Difference between primitive affirmations and other judgments. The nature of the primitive judgment further illustrated.—The § 49. The primitive judgment may also be called the primitive synthesis. § 51. Solution of the problem of the origin of ideas.-The Light of § 52. New Essay and Restoration of Philosophy.-Logic the link be- |