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Meanwhile, on September 14, 1948, India had sent its army across the borders of Hyderabad and had begun the reoccupation of the strategic positions which it had held prior to the conclusion of the stand-still agreement. The Nizam shortly thereafter dismissed his Government, pledged his full cooperation with the Indian authorities, placed extensive powers in the hands of the Indian military governor, and ordered his delegation in Paris to withdraw the complaint from the Security Council. Pakistan took special interest in Hyderabad's case and representatives of Pakistan subsequently sought to bring about further Security Council consideration of the case.
The situation was again discussed by the Council on September 27 and 28. The Representative of India reported briefly on the state of affairs in Hyderabad and reiterated the intention of the Government of India to assure the people of the State full opportunity to determine the relationship of Hyderabad to India and to decide upon the form of government within the State. There was further general discussion, but no action was taken to remove the matter from the agenda of the Council.
On December 6, 1948, information was made public that the Nizam of Hyderabad had issued a decree calling for the preparation of electoral rolls as the first step toward the summoning of a constituent assembly which would frame a constitution for Hyderabad and which would be expected formally to decide the question of accession to India.
The dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia was brought to the attention of the Security Council by Australia and India following military action taken by the Netherlands forces against the Republic on July 20, 1947. At that time, by a resolution adopted on August 1, 1947, the Council called on both parties to cease hostilities and to settle their dispute by arbitration or other peaceful means. Thereafter, pursuant to a further resolution, a Committee of Good Offices, consisting of representatives of the United States, Australia, and Belgium was established, which began its work in Indonesia in October 1947. Its function was to assist the parties in reaching an agreement on truce arrangements in accordance with the Security Council's cease-fire order, as well as on the larger question of their political differences.
As a result of protracted negotiations held aboard the U. S. S. Renville under the auspices of the Good Offices Committee, a detailed program
for a military truce and a set of principles to serve as a basis for a political settlement were worked out. This program became the
basis for the Renville agreement, which was accepted by both parties on January 17, 1948.
The Renville agreement consisted of three parts: a truce plan, 12 principles designed to serve as a basis for a further political agreement, and 6 additional principles proposed by the Committee and formally accepted by the parties. The political principles provided for the establishment of a sovereign, democratic, federal United States of Indonesia, of which the Republic was to be a component part, and for the transfer of Netherlands sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia at the end of a “stated interval”. During the interim, sovereignty was to remain in the Netherlands and all States were to be granted fair representation in a central interim government. Plebiscites or elections were to be held in the various territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra to determine whether those areas desired to form a part of the Republic or another State within the United States of Indonesia. Following this delineation of States, a constitutional convention, based upon proportional representation, was to be held to frame the constitution of the United States of Indonesia. Upon formation, the United States of Indonesia was to be linked in equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a NetherlandsIndonesian Union. The political principles provided that the Good Offices Committee should continue to assist the parties in arriving at a final political agreement in accordance with these principles.
The Good Offices Committee immediately undertook to bring the parties together to negotiate a final political agreement. It was some weeks, however, before either party submitted any formal proposals. When eventually working papers were submitted by both parties to the negotiations held under the Committee's auspices, it was apparent that there were wide areas of disagreement on implementation of the Renville principles. When it become apparent that no progress was being made in the negotiations, the representatives of the United States and Australia, in an effort to break the impasse, submitted informally to the Netherlands Delegation and the Republican Delegation a plan for an over-all political settlement. The principal feature of the United States-Australian plan was a provision for elections in Java, Sumatra, and Madura to a constituent assembly which would have the two-fold task of selecting an interim government for the exercise of executive authority prior to the transfer of sovereignty and the drafting of a constitution for the United States of Indonesia. This plan was accepted by the Republic of Indonesia as a basis for further negotiations but was rejected by the Netherlands.
On September 10 the United States representative on the Good Offices Committee again took the initiative to assist in bringing the
parties together and submitted informally a working paper in the form of a draft agreement on the basis of which it was hoped that negotiations would be promptly resumed. The United States draft agreement was designed to carry forward the principles of the Renville agreement. It provided for a free and democratic election to a constituent assembly which would draft a constitution and establish a representative, democratic, federal government. The Republican Government notified the United States Delegation of its acceptance of the United States draft agreement as a basis for the resumption of negotiations. The Netherlands Government notified the United States Delegation of its acceptance but attached to its acceptance amendments of such a nature as to alter the fundamental structure of the plan. At the same time, as a condition to the resumption of negotiations the Netherlands insisted that the questions of infiltrations into Netherlands territory and truce violations should be the first matters discussed. In the meantime, the Netherlands Parliament adopted legislation authorizing the setting up of a provisional federal government in Indonesia within a definite framework. The Republican Government was thus faced with a crystallized situation wherein a government would be formed without their having participated in the creation of it. In November Dutch officials went from The Hague to Indonesia to hold conversations looking toward the resumption of negotiations. On this occasion, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Dirk U. Stikker, and the Republican Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Hatta, had a number of conversations which it was hoped would provide a basis for the resumption of negotiations. The results of these talks were reported by Mr. Stikker to his Cabinet at The Hague, and Mr. Stikker and other high Netherlands officials returned to Indonesia to resume the discussions. The conversations broke down on the basic question of the powers that should reside in the High Commissioner of the Crown in the interim government. There seems to have been some misunderstanding of Dr. Hatta's position, and in an effort to clarify it the Republican Prime Minister confirmed and elucidated his position in a series of papers to Mr. Stikker. Throughout this difficult period Merle Cochran, the United States Government's third representative on the Good Offices Committee, exerted every effort to bring the parties together. His efforts failed, however, when on December 18 the Netherlands Government instituted military action. In a few days the Netherlands Government occupied the major cities in the Republican territory in Indonesia and imprisoned the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and other high government officials.
On December 19 the United States requested an emergency session of the Security Council to deal with the Indonesian situation as being one likely to threaten international peace and security.
On December 22, Dr. Jessup, our Representative in the Security Council, spoke on the Indonesian situation expressing the concern of this Government that hostilities had been resumed in Indonesia without adequate notification either to the Good Offices Committee or to the Republic of the termination of the truce as provided for in the Renville agreement. Dr. Jessup declared further that "after carefully studying the material thus far made available by the Committee, my Government fails to find any justification for renewal of military operations in Indonesia. This is particularly true in light of the fact that there has been a resort to force following a period of seven months in which the resources of the Committee of Good Offices have not been utilized."
Indication of this failure to utilize the procedures of pacific settlement available through the Committee of Good Offices was further substantiated by letter to the chairman of the Netherlands Delegation in Batavia from our representative on the Committee of Good Offices. “In the light of the above record,” said Dr. Jessup, “and in view of the recent events in Indonesia, my Government is unable to conclude that the Netherlands has either consistently or conscientiously endeavored to exhaust all possibilities of resuming negotiations under the Committee's auspices."
Our Representative to the Security Council stated that the United States Government considered "that the Council today is faced with at least as grave a situation as that of August 1947 and we believe that the Council must act accordingly.
It is hardly necessary for me to emphasize again the seriousness with which my Government views the failure, by either party, to comply with the Council's ceasefire order. It is our considered view that the renewed outbreak of hostilities in Indonesia may prove to be a grave threat to international peace. Accordingly, in concert with Colombia and Syria the United States has submitted a draft resolution to the Council.
This resolution called upon the parties to cease hostilities at once, to release political prisoners, and to return their troops to the status quo line agreed to in the Renville agreements, and called upon the Good Offices Committee to make further reports, including an assessment of responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities. Except for the paragraph dealing with the withdrawal of troops this resolution was adopted by the Council on December 24. On December 28 the Council passed another resolution noting that the Netherlands had not so
far released the President of the Republic and all other political prisoners and called upon the Netherlands Government to set these political prisoners free forthwith and to report to the Security Council within 24 hours of the adoption of the resolution. On the same day the Council requested the consular representatives in Batavia to inform the Council of the situation in the Republic concerning the observation of the cease-fire order and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation.
The Netherlands Government advised the Council that hostilities in Java would cease by December 31 and, because of special circumstances, within a few days thereafter, in Sumatra. The Republican representative advised that in view of the imprisonment of his Government he could not advise the Council of his Government's response to the Security Council resolution. The situation at the year's end was still before the Council with the continued noncompliance by the Netherlands with its resolutions.
As the result of a seizure of political power during a cabinet crisis in Czechoslovakia from February 20 to 25, 1948, a new government was formed, and there was concluded the process through which that country was brought under complete Communist domination. The Governments of the United States, France, and Great Britain issued a statement on February 26, 1948, in which they noted that, by means of a crisis artificially and deliberately instigated, the use of methods already tested in other places had permitted the suspension of the free exercise of parliamentary institutions and the establishment of a disguised dictatorship of a single party under the cloak of a government of national union; and they announced that they could but condemn a development the consequences of which could only be disastrous for the Czechoslovak people.
On March 10 Jan Papanek, who had been named Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations by the Government of that country prior to the coup, addressed to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations a communication requesting that the Czechoslovak situation be brought to the Security Council for consid ation as endangering peace and security. Mr. Papanek asserted that the Communist minority which had assumed control of the Government of Czechoslovakia had been encouraged by promises of help from the U.S.S.R.; that representatives of the Government of the U.S.S.R. led by V. A. Zorin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, had come to Praha for that purpose; and that the political independence