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ing thus settled satisfactorily, to themselves, what God ought to do, they conclude he has done it." Again, "It is syllogistically argued that the notion of a God is in the world,-that such notion would never have entered it, but through a revelation; the Bible gives such a revelation, therefore the Bible is true." These statements are most shameful misrepresentations of the positions of "the advocates of christianity." It is true, that they hold, and on the principles of sound reason, that a knowledge of the mortal attributes of God could not be attained by man but by a direct revelation from God himself: they further hold, that the works of creation constitute a revelation of the being, the wisdom and the power of God. They hold that the first principle of natural religion is the existence of God. They further hold, that a divine revelation does not prove his existence, but that this is done by the universal consent of all nations, and by the works of creation, especially the existence of mind, or spirit, in man demonstrates his truth. The Bible does not reveal that there is a God, but it goes upon the supposition that there is one, and it declares that Jehovah is the only true and living God. The question at issue between the Christian and the Deist is-is that declaration true?

The questions at issue between the Christian and Atheist are, 1st. Does man possess mind or spirit? and, 2d. Is there such a being as an infinite, self-existent Spirit? If the Infidel succeed in proving the non-existence of spirit in man; or that no infinite Spirit exists, the controversy is at an end, and the Bible is proved to be an imposition upon the credulity of mankind. But if the advocate of Revelation succeed in establishing the truth of his positions, that man possesses spirit, and that there is a God, who is an infinite and uncreated SPIRIT, then the way is open to examine the question-are the declarations that JEHOVAH is the only true and living God; or is the Bible a revelation of him and of his will, supported by sufficient testimony?

SECTION II.

DOES man possess mind or spirit, and is the mind immaterial? The materialist can view man in no other light than the highest order of animals, or, an animal gifted with reason. If this view of man be correct, with equal propriety it may be said, that an animal is man without reason, and that those plants which seem to form a transition

tion. It is true that man has, physically, many things in common with the animal, yet he differs wholly from it; he is no more a mere continuation of the animal, than the animal is a mere continuation of the vegetable, the difference is perceptible both physically and mentally.

Man has the same physical functions that the animal has, but they are more perfect and more delicate. The body of the animal is either covered with scales or feathers, with fur, wool or bristles. All of these approach more or less nearly to the nature of vegetables. These insensible substances, interposed between the skin and the elements that surround and affect living beings, deprive animals of the more tender and delicate sensations, at the same time that, like conductors, they preserve them from the inclemency of the seasons. The body of man is covered with a thin, highly sensitive and beautiful skin, which is not concealed under a vegetable and lifeless veil, but unveiled exhibits the presence of the blood, the pulsations of the heart, and the utterance of animation over the whole body. Beauty and spirit are shed over the face of man; he has not claws, but hands, which are susceptible of many different positions, by which he handles the chisel, which pours life and beauty over the hard, cold marble; the pencil, which animates the canvas; the instrument, from which he draws [forth sweet music; and the iron, from which he forms the weapons denied him by nature. His body is so formed, that he must walk upright; his legs are much longer than his arms; his knees bend forward; his eyes are in front, and not at the sides; the ligaments of the neck are weak, and not capable of supporting the head when hanging down; the arms are at a great distance from each other, and the chest is broad and full. A horizontal position would drive the blood into the head with such violence that stupor would ensue. Man can turn his head from the earth to the sky, from the right to the left, so that he can view, not only the crawling insect beneath his feet, but the millions of stars above his head. The face of man is strikingly superior to that of the animal; with the latter the mouth is the most prominent part, but with the former the upper part of the face. The mouth of the animal serves only physical purposes; but the mouth of man serves not only the body but the mind. According to Hailer's calculation, the muscles of the human mouth are so movable, that it may pronounce, in one moment, fifteen hundred letters. The animal is directed to its food by instinct, by constitution and appetite, as the magnet to the pole; but man selects his food from all the kingdoms of nature, and he prepares it by fire.

The psychological difference between man and the animal is most striking. The animal has, in common with man, sensation and perception. Sensation signifies an internal motion or activity produced in a sensitive organ by something external. The organ can be seen externally, but the internal activity, or motion, cannot be observed; it can only be felt. Although the animal, in common with man, has sensation, there is this difference; in the animal, one sense prevails over all the others, and these are subservient to it. In the eagle, the eye predominates. This one sense always has reference to the means of subsistence which the animal seeks under its guidance, so that while it may be extremely acute, and successful, in finding its prey, it may be dull and stupid in respect to other objects, of which man receives the most accurate sensations through the same sense. As one sense prevails in animals, the others are found less active. The lion, for instance, has an excellent scent, but his sight is weak. The animal, therefore, is under the dominion of one sense, while the harmonious and equal strength of all the senses, place man above them, and makes him master of them all. Which of the senses prevails in the animal, depends upon the species to which it belongs, but wherever one sense predominates, the others must subserve, and be directed by it. In man, no sense being more acute than another, none reigns, but all are co-ordinate with each other, and subordinate to the understanding. The animal possesses a sentient life, man an intelligent nature; hence when infuriated animals no longer distinguish one object from another, but trample under their feet every thing that opposes their course, we do not say they are insane, but mad.

Perception is more than sensation. The latter is in contact with the object by which it is called forth, and consequently is dependent on it. The sensation of hearing cannot be without the vibration of the air; that of seeing cannot be without the presence of light. Sight and light, hearing and sound, cannot be the one without the other. Without the eye there would be eternal night; without light the eye could not see. If there were no ear, the winds might blow, and the thunders roar, but to us all nature would be silent as the grave. Man cannot avoid admitting a sensation when the element that excites it acts upon the organ. As we cannot have a sensation of light unless it falls upon the eye, so we must have it when the eye is affected by it. We cannot taste salt until it is brought in contact with the tongue, but when it is brought in contact with it, we must have such a sensation as its specific nature is capable of exciting. In sensation,

therefore, we depend wholly on the presence of external objects, and are determined by them; but after we have once had a sensation of them, we may have perceptions of the objects of sensation, and these perceptions are possible without the objects of sensation. This is evident from the fact that one who in the latter part of his life becomes blind, may have perceptions of all the objects he ever saw. Yet perceptions are impossible without previous sensations, for one born blind can have no perception of color, or form. Again, sensation always exists in an organ, perception does not. When you hear a fine melody for the first time, you have a sensation of it, but when afterwards, without hearing it, it floats in your mind, you have a perception of it. When you experience hunger, you have a perception of food, though it may not be present. The animal has perception as well as man. The dog dreams, and in his dream he pursues his prey. When he is near his master he has a sensation of him by scent or sight; but when seeking him for days in succession, he has only a perception of him. The animal is confined within the sphere of sensation and perception, and as its sensations are confined within its natural wants, so must be its perceptions. The perceptions of man are as much more numerous and acute, as his sensations are much more numerous and acute. But he has, in addition to sensations and perceptions, a faculty that the animal has not, which may be termed apperception.

As the animal is separated from the plant by sensation, so man is elevated above the animal by apperception. Perception and apperception differ widely. The objects of perception are always such as are single, and met with in a certain place and time. The eagle that builds his nest on a high rock, has no idea of the nature of the stone on which his nest is built, nor of the region in which it stands, but he carries with him the image of this rock, as it stands in a particular place, and noticing no semblance between it and other rocks, he would find it among thousands of others; its peculiar features being strongly and solely impressed upon his eye. The objects of apperception are the kinds, the species, and the individuals of things. It is by apperception that man distinguishes between his perceptions and the objects perceived; and, again, that he classifies nature and its productions; thus, when he distinguishes between apples and peaches. This the animal cannot do; it sees the grass, but it cannot arrange it according to its botanical classes. The dog will pursue the rabbit, and it may seem that he does so because he knows this class of animals, and distinguishes between it and others; but the truth is,

that all rabbits being exactly alike in size, and form, and scent, will produce the same sensations in the dog, and these will always set him in motion. This, then, is the broad difference between man and the animal; the former can reason, the latter cannot; it lives, but it acquires no experience; it eats its daily food, but never knows what this food is. Some, indeed, have gone so far as to say, that animals not only judge, but draw conclusions from cause to effect. To draw conclusions, is the highest power of human reason, and if animals could do this, they could think and will like man, and have apperceptions like him. Those who maintain this assertion, cannot know what it is to think, or to understand, or to judge, and draw conclusions. Animals have no idea of power, of capacity, of beauty, or of truth; consequently they have none of cause and effect: these are not visible, or accessible to the senses, but only to thought, which it cannot be proved animals possess. Man arrives at conclusions by the following process: he has three thoughts, each differs from the other, and each is included within a certain limit. But while all differ, one is capable of uniting the two others, and of removing this difference; thus, two thoughts are reduced to one class by a third one uniting them. How superior, then, is man to the animal, which can neither judge, nor draw conclusions ! *

If that in man which thinks, be matter, or any modification or combination of it, the question arises, what produced it? Every one knows there is a great difference between matter and mind, and all the materialists upon earth cannot produce a solitary instance in which the combination of certain elements produces something quite different, not only from each of the simple ingredients, but also from the whole compound. Lord Brougham, treating on this subject, says, "We can, by mixing an acid and an alkali, form a third body, having the qualities of neither, and possessing qualities of its own different from the properties of each. But here the third body consists of the other two in combination. These are not two things-two different existences, the neutral salt, composed of the acid and the alkali, and another thing different from the neutral salt, and engendered for the first time by that salt, coming into existence. So when by chiseling, "the marble, softened into life, grows warm," we have the marble new-moulded, and endowed with the power of agreeably affecting our senses, our memory, and our fancy; but it is all the while the marble instead of the amorphous mass, and we have not beside

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