U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: MILITARY BASES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Paper by Leo Ryan

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Since the end of World War II, U.S. interests in the Mediterranean derive from the premise that no area of the world is of greater importance to the security of the United States than is Western Europe. Conversely, a viable partnership with the United States is essential to the security of the nations of Western Europe. The framework of that partnership is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a body whose strength and effectiveness during its 27-year existence has depended heavily on Western Europe's southern tier of countries adjacent to the Mediterranean.

In addition to the importance of the Mediterranean area to NATO's collective security mission, the United States and Western Europe also share a common interest in the region due to its proximity to the volatile but oil-rich Middle East and the vital Indian Ocean area.

Clearly, the interests of the United States and those of Western Europe in the Mediterranean are not divisible. In spite of our independent interests, however, recent events in Western Europe's Mediterranean countries have raised serious question as to whether our common interests in the area can be protected and promoted under the NATO umbrella.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND U.S. MILITARY ROLE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

A significant part of the United States' contribution to NATO's mission in the Mediterranean area-and to its own unilateral security interests as wellis the presence of U.S. military bases and installations from the Azores to Turkey. During a tour of NATO countries last August, I found, in discussions with government officials, that they appear to regard the heavy U.S. commitment to defense of Western Europe and the stationing of U.S. forces there as vital to their own security. In fact, nowhere in Europe, including non-NATO countries such as Spain and neutral Sweden, did government leaders express any feasible alternative to NATO or to the predominant role of the United States in NATO.

However, despite the apparent agreement among the partners of the alliance with respect to NATO's relevance, recent pressures and upheavals in NATO's southern tier have cast doubt on whether the U.S. military presence can continue in some locations. These same pressures now bring up the question of whether the alliance is structured to deal with internal dissension and political disparity.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY

The conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus-as well as their simmering dispute over the Aegean islands-has severely damaged NATO's southeastern flank.

As part of the complex problems emerging from the Greek-Turkish hostilities over Cyprus, Greece announced in August 1974 its withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure. While, in fact, Greece has maintained participation in some NATO military activities, the long-term Greek role in the Alliance is now open to speculation, both within the Alliance and outside of it.

Reacting sharply to a cutoff in U.S. military sales and assistance on February 5, 1975, and the subsequent rejection of legislation in the Congress to lift the embargo, Turkey in July 1975, suspended its bilateral defense arrangements with the United States. While Turkey has taken no action to change its NATO role, its dispute with Greece over Cyprus and the bitterness engendered by the embargo impacted adversely on the security interests of the United States as well as those of Western Europe.

Specifically, the suspension of U.S. access to important intelligence gathering facilities in Turkey has deprived the United States and its NATO allies of (66)

sorely needed information with respect to the Soviet Union's military activities—particularly with respect to monitoring the extent of Moscow's compliance with strategic arms limitations agreements.

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COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS

Movement to the left in Portugal and the recent rise in the electoral capabilities of the Communist Party of Italy (CPI) have created considerable alarm within both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the U.S. gövernment and the American media with regard to the potentially adverse impact Communist participation in NATO governments would have on the security interests of the United States and West Europe. Such alarm was expressed by Secretary of State Kissinger when he recently stated in an address before an American audience:

**** we must be concerned about the possibility of Communist parties coming to power or sharing in power in governments in NATO countries. Ultimately, the decision must, of course, be made by the voters of the countries concerned. But no one should expect that this question is not of concern to this government. Whether some of the Communist parties in Western Europe are, in fact, independent of Moscow cannot be determined when their electoral selfinterest so overwhelmingly coincides with their claims. Their internal procedures their Leninist principles and dogmas-remain the antithesis of democratic parties.

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"By that record they would inevitably give low priority to security and Western defense efforts, which are essential not only to Europe's freedom but to maintaining the world balance of power. They would be tempted to orient their economies to a much greater extent toward the East. We would have to expect that Western European governments in which Communists play a dominant role would, at best, steer their countries' policies toward the positions of the nonaligned. The political solidarity and collective defence of the West and thus NATO-would be inevitably weakened if not undermined."

STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT FORD

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President Ford summed up this fear more succinctly when he asserted: "I don't think you can have a Communist government or Communist officials in a government and have that nation be a viable partner in NATO."

From my own point of view as a Member of Congress which has a different and more populist orientation, I would suggest a slightly different view. The American people believe in the process of free elections-almost passionately. If they did not invent this idea, they certainly perfected it in war and peace for the last 200 years. Americans just don't understand the people of countries who advocate the overthrow of a government which is freely elected.

Furthermore, they find it difficult to understand how other Western European nations can be quite so passive, or perhaps noncompetitive toward the Soviet bloc and toward those nations that advocate totalitarian philosophy. We rejoice that Portugal seems to be moving toward freedom for its people. We rejoice for Spain as it moves in some agony to open up its society, without finding itself overthrown again by a coup from the left or the right.

We wonder if freedom can survive in Italy. We wonder if the free enterprise system which has given so much to the average man can survive the Communist promise of total equality for all-and which only means the destruction of a system of manufacture and distribution that has brought new meaning to the lives of working men and women of Western Europe.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

In view of the deteriorating situation on NATO's south-eastern flank, and in view of the rise in Communist Party power in NATO governments, we must seriously ask ourselves where do we go from here vis-a-vis protecting our common interests in the Mediterranean.

Specifically, we parliamentarians must come to grips with the following issues:

1. Can the NATO Alliance remain viable if local Communist parties achieve a role in certain NATO governments?

2. What can the members of the Alliance do in concert to heal the GreekTurkish split and insure that future internecine conflicts do not boil over within NATO?

3. Should post-Franco Spain be included in the Alliance?

4. Should the Alliance be more concerned with problems and events heretofore considered by the West European member governments to be outside NATO's mission?

In my personal view, with respect to the issue of Communist influence in NATO governments, I believe it is much too early to panic. Events in Portugal have not shown, thus far, that NATO is in imminent danger of losing that government's participation. As for Italy, I recommended in a report to the House Committee on International Relations that:

"US policy in Italy must take into account the growing political significance of the Italian Communist Party in the fact of the continued inability of the other political parties to make any meaningful progress toward solving Italy's worsening economic and social problems. We can no longer pretend that the PCI does not exist, officially. The attitude of the PCI toward the United States just might be influenced to some extent by our attitude toward the PCI. A long hard and honest look should be given to the PCI to determine their true degree of independence from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)."

In the final analysis the Italian electorate must make these decisions and determinations themselves.

With respect to NATO's apparent inability to deal with such destructive intramural conflicts as the Greek-Turkish dispute, I have long been concerned with the inability of the Alliance to have a positive influence on problems outside the military sphere. Its institutional inertia has virtually hamstrung the Alliance's ability to cope with the Arab oil embargo, for example. If the Alliance is to remain a credible force in today's world, this inertia and narrowness must be overcome.

On the question of Spain, it is my view that, with the passing of Franco, the emergence of a more moderate government, and the signing of a US-Spain base rights treaty, Spain should be brought in to NATO to shore up the Alliance's southern tier.

JOINT ACTION NEEDED

Finally, I believe very strongly that the NATO parliamentary members, as a bloc, and as individual delegations should become more conscious of a responsibility to praise those activities of governments or of popular movements that move a country toward freedom, and condemn those actions that the Alliance sees as hostile to their stated beliefs. It is not enough for you to expect the US to be a leader in such fashion, and to fail to take such actions yourself.

In a democracy such as exists in the US, you are quick to note the opposing policies of the Ford Administration and Mr. Kissinger on one side, and the Congress on the other.

President Ford wants to help Angola. The Congress does not. The Congress does not like some of the more peculiar digressions of the CIA. The President tries to defend them. In a country the size of ours, whatever else all this means, it at least means this:

(a) We mean to protect our hard won liberties even from our own excesses on occasion.

(b) In a truly free society, other nations may look through wide open windows to see the way we live.

I am not overly embarrassed by our internal bickering. You should not be either. In fact, it would be good for Third World nations to see that we can do this and still remain strong. The American voter would like to be sure that NATO countries share those beliefs. Proof does not necessarily come from internal example, but by being more active in openly questioning Soviet bloc failures, for example.

I have heard from many of my distinguished colleagues at these conferences that you need America to provide an example. A noble and challenging thought— may I reply in the same vein? American citizens need to hear Europeans proclaim their belief in free enterprise and free elections. This is not to say that you do not do so now, and have not done so. But like any jealous lover, we need constant reassurance of your affections, too. Perhaps it is just that you need to speak up more loudly for those of us who live on the far side of America. Distance may make us slightly deaf-but still in need of reassurance, too.

I put forth these issues and views for the consideration of my fellow parliamentarians and welcome your reactions.

Friday, April 23, 1976, Morning

FINAL SESSION

Before the press conference the two Delegations evaluated the results of the Working Sessions during this Ninth Interparliamentary Meeting, and unanimously expressed their satisfaction with both the organizational and substantive parts of the programme.

The American Delegation renewed the formal invitation to the European Parliament to send a Delegation to Washington for the next, and Tenth, Interparliamentary Meeting. It also renewed Congressman Paul Findley's (Republican, Illinois) invitation for this Delegation to participate in the celebrations of the bi-centennial of the Independence of the United States, by visiting Springfield, Illinois, the city where Abraham Lincoln was active before he was elected President of the United States. The time for the next meeting would be September 1976. (69)