status quo. Although he felt as a result of private talks that some form of participation was generally favored, neither side was ready to make concessions. With Greece, the refugee problem was a central issue.

The continuation of the American arms embargo against Turkey would only strengthen Turkish resistence to a solution and foster Greek illusions. He urged the total lifting of the embargo and approval by Congress of the agreements recently arranged by the United States with Greece and Turkey concerning military bases in both countries. Rejection of these agreements by Congress could force Turkey to seek other allies. Greece had, moreover, more to fear in the long term from the Soviet Union than from Turkey. He hoped that America's allies in the European Community would continue to stress the importance of full Greek and Turkish membership of NATO.

Mr. Pisoni also wondered about possible developments in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period. He felt that Mr. Ryan had a very superficial view of Communism in Italy and warned against jumping to

conclusions.

CLOSE RELATION OF U.S.-EC INTERESTS

Mr. Cousté noted that the fate of Western Europe was of especially great importance to the security of the United States. Defense matters had also been raised by the Council of the European Economic Community. There was an increased awareness of the growing threat from the Soviet Union. Political relations between the European Community and the United States were characterized by an atmosphere of mutual trust.

Mr. McDonald also dealt with the connection between the activities of the Community and overall foreign policy. The Community should grow along with the new political developments. He regretted that the United States had failed to take advantage of the political opportunities afforded by the European Community. It was, after all, in the interests of the United States to have a united Europe. The Communist parties in Europe were being financed from abroad. In conclusion, he stated that he was opposed to permanent partition of Cyprus.

Mr. Ryan asserted that a permanent partition should not be the basis for a final Cyprus solution. In virtually no instance has partition brought real peace. T

BASE AGREEMENTS SUPPORTED

Mr. Corterier endorsed the views of Mr. Solarz and hoped that Congress would approve the two agreements referred to. He noted that the Federal Republic of Germany was giving military aid to both Turkey and Greece. The role of the European Community in this connection was politically important, since in some respects, it had taken over from NATO there. The Community was attempting to stabilize the situaton by making financial and economic sacrifices. In the wider view, the possible accession of Greece to the European Communityirrespective of the financial consequences for the wealthier countries of the Community, in particular-had also to be considered. The growing success of communism in southern Europe was a serious matter but

should not be dramatized at present. Participation by the Communist Party in the Italian government was, however, imminent and bound to raise serious problems.

Mr. Corterier noted the efforts that Germany and, Europe in general, have made to compensate for the lack of American aid to Turkey. He noted, too, that in the case of Greece the Community was in many respects replacing NATO which continued to stand in great disrepute.

He added that the effort of the EC to stabilize the Mediterranean and to maintain a western influence there during the failure of US policy should not go unnoticed. He said that it was often asked of Europe: What are you doing for NATO and the West? The answer is that we are doing a lot and it is very expensive.

Greek membership in the community will be a particular problem from an economic standpoint, aggravating an existing imbalance between the affluent Benelux countries and the poorer states. And yet, for overriding political reasons, we recognize that Greece must be in the alliance. Moreover, if we accept Greece, it is inevitable that compensatory arrangements will have to be established with Turkey.

MORAL ASPECTS IMPORTANT

Mr. Fraser noted that there were important security considerations at stake in Southern Europe, but that it was wrong to simply ignore the moral dimensions of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. This he found reminiscent of the arguments used to defend U.S. support of the Greek junta.

Mr. Fraser felt that it was unfortunate that Europe was not able to play more of a mediating role when that conflict unfolded. He said that he understood that the NATO council had been discouraged from taking any action; if this is true then it compounds the error of US policy.

U.S. MISHANDLING OF CYPRUS

In Mr. Fraser's view the Cyprus problem had been mishandled by the United States from the beginning. He doubted whether Congress would approve the pacts with Greece and Turkey. A complete lifting of the arms embargo against Turkey could cause Greece to view membership of NATO as an encumbrance. In the United States there was the overwhelming feeling that the Greek population of Cyprus had suffered a great injustice. In NATO the principle of justice should have priority. Mr. Badillo endorsed Mr. Fraser's views, especially the judgment that the arguments now used to justify normal relations with Turkey were the same justifications used during the Greek military dictatorship to continue normal relations with the junta.

Mr. Lenihan felt that EC aid to southern European countries could only be justified if and when it was certain that they had a pluralist democracy. The Community's external policy had to be compatible with overall foreign policy.

Mr. Corona hoped that American delegations from the Congress to Italy would subsequently establish contact with all political groupings there, including the Communists. He expressed his appreciation of Mr. Ryan's understanding of the delicate political situation in Italy.

Referring to the point made by Mr. Fraser, Mr. Guertsen observed that one injustice in Cyprus should not be met by another in Turkey. He therefore hoped that the American Congress would approve the two agreements.

Following concluding remarks by the two rapporteurs, Mr. Ryan and Mr. Normanton, the chairman closed the debate.

PAPERS

THE FUTURE ROLES OF GREECE, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN IN AN

INTEGRATED EUROPE

Paper by Tom Normanton

In the short space of time available to prepare this paper it is not possible to do more than provide thumb-nail sketches of each of the three countries which are prospective new members of the EEC, their present social and economic state and stages of development, their progress and prospects for advancement towards pluralistic parliamentary democracy, and the course which negotiations might be expected to take as formal requests for full membership of the Community are submitted. Only then can an assessment be made of the consequences for the Community of the Nine arising from its progressive enlargement.

GREECE

Greece is the only country of the three which has formally asked for full membership and whose membership is now under consideration. During the military regime the Association Agreement, negotiated in Athens in 1962, was frozen under the initiative of Europeans who felt that the new undemocratic system of government in Greece was inconsistent with such an agreement. This objection to the development of closer links lost its validity in July 1974, when the junta collapsed and power was returned to the politicians under Mr. Constantine Karamanlis.

The military government does not seem to have hindered the swift development of the Greek economy in the early 1970s. Between 1973 and 1974 the GDP rose by 18 percent, from $16,040 million to $19,000 millon. Between 1968 and 1973 the average hourly wage for unskilled workers rose by 61 percent, from 19.31 pence to 31.13 pence. While this increase is lower than that of Spain, which in the same period increased its equivalent wage from 24.63 pence to 49.39 pence, one must bear in mind that the cost of living in Greece was markedly low and that Greece is generally poor in natural resources, including agricultural.

The Greek economy continues to make good progress, although the violent events of 1974 have taken their toll. Greece has felt herself morally obliged to give massive aid to the Greek part of Cyprus. (It was, after all, the Greek junta's interference in Cyprus affairs which brought tragedy to the island as well as democracy to Greece.) Because of the confrontation with Turkey, Greece is now spending large sums on equipping her armed forces, and the effect of the crisis on Greece is economically greater, because of the relative sizes of the two countries. Massive fortifications are being built on the Greek islands of the Aegean and along the River Evros, which marks the Greek-Turkish frontier.

POLITICAL MOTIVATION

Greeks are ready to admit that their recent application for full membership was politically motivated, but they do not admit that it was an anti-Turkish manoeuvre. Instead, they say, it is an earnest desire to reconsolidate democracy and to restore their position as a respectable European nation, opposed to extremes of both right and left. There are some who, in the present mood of antiAmericanism, see membership of the Community as a substitute for good relations with one of the superpowers. After the disasters of 1974 they feel deeply in need of friends, so there is a danger that the EEC may be built up in the minds of the Greek masses as the answer to all their problems. This is obviously to be discouraged, because this euphoria could so easily be replaced by disillusionment.

When he visited the European Parliament in June 1975 Mr. John Pezmazoglu, Chairman of the Greek side of the mixed committee presently discussing the

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application, said that he expected that Greece would join the Community “in year or so". But since then it has become clear, on both sides, that this estimate was very over-optimistic. The application has been considered by the EEC Commission, who gave their opinion in a carefully analysed report dated 29 January 1976. Their conclusions are as follows:

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"15. In preparing the present opinion the Commission has been deeply conscious of the obligation that lies on the Community to find a fitting and ap propriate response to the Greek request for membership. This request, coming a few months only after the restoration of democracy in Greece and enjoying the support of almost every shade of Greek political opinion, represents remarkable affirmation by the Greek people and their leaders of the overriding importance they attach to their country being committed to the cause of European integration. It is clear that the consolidation of Greece's democracy which is fundamental concern not only of the Greek people but also of the Community and its Member States, is intimately related to the evolution of Greece's relationship with the Community. It is in the light of these considerations that the Commission recommends that a clear affirmative reply be given to the Greek request and that negotiations for Greek accession be opened."

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The Commission opinion has been presented to the Council of Ministers, debated in the European Parliament, and has been and still is the subject of intense debate.

FULL GREEK MEMBERSHIP

The European Parliamentary Committee on External Relations has recommended in a report drafted by Mr. James Scott-Hopkins dated 17 March 1976 "that the Commission should begin negotiations immediately with a view to full Greek membership with a transitional period which will take account of the difficulties which have to be overcome".

The Council of Ministers expressed on 24 June 1975 its satisfaction in principle that Greece had submitted the application, and, without pre-judging the outcome of negotiations on details, has given clear indications that no efforts will be spared to bring about a conclusion satisfactory to all parties. The ultimate objective must be full and unconditional Membership, the acceptance of all existing obligations binding upon present member States.

No indication has been forthcoming on the duration of negotiations other than that "there shall be no delay". It would be unwise however to read too much into the official prenouncements to date, since the "difficulties" to be resolved in the economic field are to say the least considerable. In some respects the political "difficulties" may even be greater since they relate to third countries, e.g. Turkey, with which the EEC has but looser links at present but hopes for closer links in the future.

On the assumption that negotiations will be successful, a time-scale of from 2 to 5 years should be considered for Greece achieving membership, even if subject to a transitional formula leading to full acceptance of the Treaty of Rome. The EEC will therefore guard carefully against committing itself too obviously to one side or the other in this dispute. In permitting the progress of the Greek application, she will be careful to reassure Turkey at every turn and to keep Turkey in the political picture. This will require delicate diplomacy on the Community's part. But it is hardly an impossible diplomatic task, and the problem is hardly so great as to make Greece's progress towards membership out of the question.

SPAIN

Of the three countries under consideration, Spain appears to be the one with the most developed economic structure and the highest standard of living. She has the lowest percentage of the active population engaged in agriculture (27.6 percent) and the highest percentage employed in industry (37.7 percent). The comparable figures for Greece are 35.7 percent and 25.2 percent, for Ireland 25.7 percent and 30.3 percent, for France 12.7 percent and 38.4 percent. Between 1973 and 1974 the GDP per head rose by a remarkable 19 percent, to $2088.

The Spanish economy enjoys all the advantages of late industrialisation. Its factories operate up-to-date equipment. Its workers have been taught up-to-date skills. In the year 1973-74 its GDP rose by about 20 percent, from $60,710 million to $73,300 million. If this rate of growth continues at its present speed. Spain could within five years overtake one or two of the poorer members of