I would recommend it to those who are accounted the most refined rationalists in religion, to take the trouble to reflect a little, and inquire what is the method which they, and indeed all, must follow, in the acquisition of human knowledge. In natural history, for example, how insignificant would be our progress, if our conviction were to be regulated by the same maxims by which those men seem to regulate their faith in matters of revelation? If our not knowing the use of any thing were a sufficient reason for disbelieving its existence, how many animals, how many vegetables, how many inanimate substances, apparently useless, or even noxious, should we discard out of our systems of nature, inflexibly denying that they exist any where, except in the disordered imaginations of men? Nor should we make greater proficiency in the other branches of science. Of nothing have we clearer evidence than of this, that, by means of the food which animals swallow, life is preserved, the body is nourished, the limbs gradually advance in strength and size to their full maturity. Yet, where is the philosopher, where is the chemist, who can explain, or will pretend to understand, the process whereby the nourishment is converted into chyle, and the chyle into blood, and the blood into skin, and flesh, and bones, and sinews?

Now if, in matters of science merely human, our ignorance of the use in the one case, and of the manner of operation in the other, does not preclude our belief of the fact, a belief which ultimately rests, in most cases, on the testimony of our fellowcreatures; can we think it reasonable to be more shy of admitting a fact on the testimony of God, when, in effect, we admit that sufficient ground is given us to conclude that we have his testimony? For I do not here argue with the deniers of revelation, but with those who, professing to believe it, reject its obvious meaning. Are we better acquainted with things divine than with things human? or with things eternal than with things temporal? Our Lord, in his conversation with Nicodemus, seemed to consider it as an acknowledged truth, that things earthly are more level to the natural capacity of man than things heavenly; John iii. 12. Yet how soon would an effectual stop be put to our progress in every branch, even of earthly science, were we to lay down as maxims, that the existence of any being, however well attested, whereof we cannot discover the use, is not to be believed; and that the production of an effect, if we do not comprehend the mode of operation in the cause, is incredible? The much greater part of all human knowledge, whether of things corporeal or things spiritual, things terrestrial or things celestial, is originally from information. Revelation means no other than information from God; and whatever human knowledge we derive from the testimony of our fellow-mortals, which is more than ninety-nine parts in a hundred of all we are possessed of, is, if I may be allowed the expression, a revelation

from man. In regard to both, we ought no doubt, in the first place, to be satisfied that we have the proper testimony; but when this point is ascertained, I think it unaccountable to reject the obvious meaning of the divine testimony, (which is indirectly to reject the testimony), on grounds which no judicious person would think sufficient to warrant him in rejecting the testimony of a man of character. If ye have not satisfactory evidence that what claims to be the testimony of God is really such, ye are no doubt entitled to reject it. But do not first admit the testimony, and afterwards refuse your assent to what it manifestly implies; and that for such a reason as would prove no obstacle to your assent on the information of a fellow-mortal. This is surely the reverse of what might be expected from a humble pious Christian: "For if we receive the witness of man, the witness of God is greater," 1 John v. 9.

Besides, this conduct, in rejecting the obvious sense of the divine testimony, is the more inexcusable, as the circumstance on which the objection is founded is such as the whole analogy of nature leads us to expect in all the works of the Creator. If, in every part of the creation, we find that there are many creatures, the purpose of whose existence we cannot investigate; and that there are hardly any natural productions in which, though from experience we may discover the cause, we may trace its operation; it is but just to conclude, that this unsearchableness to human faculties, is a sort of signature impressed on the works of the Most High, and which, when found in any thing attested as from him, ought to be held at least a presumption in favour of the testimony.

But, though nothing can be more different from an implicit adoption of all the definitions, distinctions, and particularities of a sect, than the general disposition of the rationalist, there is often a great resemblance in their methods of criticising, and in the stretches which they make for disguising the natural interpretation of the sacred text. Each is, in this, actuated by the same motive, namely, to obtrude on others that interpretation which suits his favourite hypothesis. And, if we may say of the one, that he is too foolish to be improved by teaching; we may, with equal justice, say of the other, that he is too wise to attend to it. Revelation, surely, was never intended for such as he. Our Lord said to the Pharisees, that he came not "to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance," Matt. ix. 13. We may, with like reason, say, he came not to instruct the learned, but the ignorant. Nay, he, in effect, says so himself: It was to babes in knowledge, not to sages, that the things of God were revealed by him; Matt. xi. 25. The disposition of children, so often recommended as necessary for our giving a proper reception to the gospel, and obtaining admission into the kingdom, refers as clearly to the teachable temper of children, free from

prepossessions and self-conceit, as to their humility and innocence. How strongly is this sentiment expressed by the apostle: "if any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise!" 1 Cor. iii. 18. The judicious and candid will not mistake me as, in matters of religion, decrying the use of reason, without which, I am sensible, we cannot proceed a single step; but as pointing out the proper application of this faculty.

In what concerns revelation, reason has a twofold province; first, to judge whether what is presented to us as a revelation from God, or, which is the same thing, as the divine testimony to the truth of the things therein contained, be really such or not; secondly, to judge what is the import of the testimony given. For the former of these, first the external evidences of Christianity offer themselves to our examination, prophecy, miracles, human testimony; and then the internal, arising from the character of the dispensation itself, its suitableness to the rational and moral nature of such a creature as man. As to the second point, the meaning of the revelation given;-if God has condescended to employ any human language in revealing his will to men, he has, by employing such an instrument, given us reason to conclude, that, by the established rules of interpretation in that language, his meaning must be interpreted; otherwise the use of the language could answer no end, but either to confound or to deceive. If the words of God were to be interpreted by another set of rules than that with which the grammar of the language, founded in general use, presents us; with no propriety could it be said that the divine will is revealed to us, till there were a new revelation furnishing us with a key for unlocking the old. This consideration points to the necessity of the grammatical art, and of criticism, by means of which readers, especially of a distant age and country, must arrive at the requisite proficiency in the language. As to both these, it is evident, that the sacred writers address themselves to our reason. Why," said our Lord, (Luke xii. 57.) "even of yourselves, judge ye not what is right?" and the apostle Paul (1 Cor. x. 15.) "I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say." With the first, the evidences of the truth of our religion, I am not here concerned: The great design of this Work is, to deliver with plainness, in our own tongue, a very essential part of what was, more than seventeen centuries ago, communicated in another tongue to the inhabitants of countries remote from ours. It was in order the more effectually to answer this end-particularly, to remove all prejudices and prepossessions which might prove obstructions in the way, that I determined, on reflection, to add to the Version the Preliminary Dissertations and the Notes.

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The necessary aids for acquiring the knowledge of an ancient and foreign tongue, are more or fewer, according to the circum

stances of the case. The distance of time and place, and the great difference, in respect of customs, manners, and sentiments, between those to whom the sacred writers first addressed themselves, and the present inhabitants of this island, could not fail to occasion our meeting with some difficulties. And although it cannot be justly doubted, that a good deal of light has been thrown on some points by the labours of former critics, it can as little be denied, that, by the same means, many things have been involved in greater darkness. In other critical inquiries, wherein religion is not concerned, there is little to bias the judgment in pronouncing on what side the truth lies. But where religion is concerned, there are often, not only inveterate prejudices, but secular motives, to be surmounted, to whose influence few can boast an entire superiority. Besides, I shall have an opportunity to observe, in the sequel, that, in what relates to this subject, there has come a gradual change on the meaning of many words, consequent on the changes which have been gradually introduced into the church, in religious ceremonies, modes of government, and formularies of doctrine. Old names are given to things comparatively new, which have, by insensible degrees, arisen out of the old, and have at last supplanted them.

To trace such changes with accuracy, is an essential quality of philology. A translator, when he finds that the words used by former translators, though right at first, have since contracted a meaning different from that in which they were originally employed, sees it necessary, that he may do justice both to his author and to his subject, to substitute such terms as, to the best of his judgment, are adapted to convey those sentiments, and those only, intended by the author. When a change is made from what people have been long accustomed to, it is justly expected that the reason, unless it be obvious, should be assigned. Hence arises the propriety of scholia, or notes, both for vindicating the version, and for supplying further information, which, if not necessary to all, is to most readers highly useful. The frequent allusions to rites, customs, and incidents, well known to the natives of the writer's country, and to his contemporaries, render such occasional illustrations as can be given in the notes, very expedient for those of distant lands and ages. It is not on account of any peculiar obscurity in sacred writ, that more has been judged requisite in this way, with regard to it, than with regard to any other writings; but partly on account of certain peculiarities in the case, and partly on account of the superior importance of the subject. Of both these I shall have occasion to take notice in the Preliminary Dissertations. There is a further use in bringing additional light for viewing these subjects in, though we admit that the light absolutely necessary was not deficient before. To brighten our perceptions is to strengthen them; and to strengthen them, is to give them a firmer hold of

the memory, and to render them more productive of all the good fruits that might naturally be expected from them. The most we can say of the best illustrations which, from the knowledge of Christian antiquity, critics have been enabled to give the sacred text, is like that which the ingenious author of Polymetis says, in regard to the utility of his inquiries into the remains of ancient sculpture and painting for throwing light upon the classics: "The chief use," says he, (Dialogue vi.) "I have found in this sort of study, has not been so much in discovering what was wholly unknown, as in strengthening and beautifying what was known before. When the day was so much overcast just now, you saw all the same objects that you do at present-these trees, that river, the forest on the left hand, and those spreading vales to the right: but now the sun is broke out, you see all of them more clearly. and with more pleasure. It shows scarce any thing that you did not see before; but it gives a new life and lustre to every thing that you did see."

There

It cannot, however, be denied, that on this subject many things have been advanced, in the way of illustration, which have served more to darken than to illuminate the sacred pages. I have great reason to think, that in my researches into this matter I have been impartial; but whether I have been successful, is another question: for, though partiality, in the method of conducting an inquiry, sufficiently accounts for its proving unfruitful, the utmost impartiality will not always ensure success. are more considerations which, in a work of this kind, must be taken into view, than even readers of discernment will at first have any apprehension of. Several of the changes here adopted, in translating both words and idioms, will, I know well, upon a superficial view, be judged erroneous; and many of them will doubtless be condemned as frivolous, which, it is to be hoped, will, on deeper reflection, be admitted, by well informed judges, both to be more apposite in themselves, and to render the matter treated more perspicuous.

In illustrating the principles on which some of the changes. here made are founded, a great deal more, in the way of critical discussion, was found necessary, in order to do justice to the argument, than could with propriety be thrown into the Notes. A conviction of this first suggested the design of discussing some points more fully in Preliminary Dissertations. This, however, is not the only use which these discourses were intended to answer. Though there has appeared, since the revival of letters in the West, a numerous list of critics on the Bible, little has been done for ascertaining the proper, and in some respect peculiar rules for criticising the sacred books; for pointing out the difficulties and the dangers to which the different methods have been exposed, and the most probable means of surmounting the one, and escaping the other. Something in this way has been attempted