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The Soviet bloc repeated over and over that because the Communist Chinese Government was not represented at the Conference, the United States had proceeded in an unlawful manner to negotiate a peace settlement. The delegate from Poland later joined in making this same charge. He further asserted that the United States had acted in violation of the January 1, 1942, declaration by the United Nations,' pledging each signatory government not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.
The Soviet bloc leveled other vituperative charges against the treaty, some of which sound plausible on the surface. Most of these arguments were directed against the United States.
It is interesting to note that of all the 51 Allied delegations represented at the Peace Conference, those of the Soviet bloc alone failed to sign the treaty.
18. Relation of treaty to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
During the hearings questions were raised about that part of the preamble in which Japan states the intention "to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."2
In the peace treaties with the European satellites of Nazi Germany, special articles guaranteeing human rights were inserted in the operating clauses of those treaties. However, it is now clear that such rights are difficult to enforce. In spite of this difficulty, it appeared desirable to record Japan's good intentions to respect human rights. Because it has no legal binding effect the preamble was deemed to be the most appropriate place for such a statement. Since almost all nations outside the Soviet bloc have accepted the universal declaration of human rights as a worthy statement of objectives, the Japanese people wished to be in the same category. It seemed only equitable to permit Japan to make the kind of statement of intent that it wanted and that other free nations have made.
The committee wishes to make clear that there is nothing in the treaty that makes human rights a matter of international contract, nor which gives any Allied nation the right to interfere in Japanese internal affairs in order to enforce such rights.
The committee also wishes to make emphatically clear that the United States in ratifying the treaty in no way undertakes any commitment with respect to human rights. The statement in the preamble is a unilateral Japanese announcement. It is not even a commitment for Japan, much less so for the United States.
19. The question of "belligerent rights" of the Soviet Union and Communist China in Japan
The committee explored in the hearings the following question: When the treaty of peace comes into effect, what legal obstacles, if any, will stand in the way of the Soviet Union or Communist China dispatching a military force to occupy Japan on the ground that they are
1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 2-3.
2 Ibid., pp. 1156-1159.
still at war with Japan and that such occupation will be merely an exercise of a belligerent right?
The Department of State, in a memorandum to the committee,' replied that this matter has been given thorough consideration over the past few years. The Department believes that any risk of Soviet or Red Chinese military action in Japan is neither increased nor diminished by purely legalistic considerations. If military action is taken, it will be for other than legal reasons. Of course legal pretext can always be invented to support any action which these Governments might elect to embark on.
The committee agrees with the Department that any right of unilateral occupation will not exist after the treaty comes into force. The Potsdam surrender terms of July 26, 1945,2 to which the Soviet Union later adhered, provided for a single "allied" occupation-not for separate and independent allied occupations-to end with the achievement of certain stated objectives described by article 7 of those surrender terms as follows:
Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
Article 12 of the Potsdam terms provides:
The occupying force of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
Clearly the Japanese Peace Treaty, having been signed by 48 Allied nations, is conclusive evidence that the objectives set forth in article 7 of the surrender terms in the Potsdam agreement have been attained. Furthermore it is equally clear that Japan now has a Government established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people; that this Government is peacefully inclined; and that it is a responsible Government. Under such circumstances, since occupation is a collective right and the objectives of the occupation have been obtained, the withdrawal of the occupation forces of the Allies is in order.
Any effort on the part of any single power to occupy Japan in pursuit of what it might elect to describe as belligerent rights would be a unilateral action in direct violation of the Potsdam surrender terms, especially if undertaken by the Soviet Union, which adhered to the Potsdam agreement.
It is not without some bearing on this subject, that article 2 of the security treaty 3 provides that
During the exercise of the right referred to in article 1, Japan will not grant without the prior consent of the Unites States of America, any bases or any rights,
1 Secretary of State to Senator Wiley, Feb. 5, 1952; Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific: Hearings
., pp. 63-64.
2 A Decade of American Fore Policu, pp. 49–50. 3 Infra, pp. 885-886.
powers, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air, or naval forces to any third power.
Under these commitments Japan would be obligated to oppose any Soviet or Chinese effort of the kind described above. This would immediately bring into play the whole far-eastern security arrangement to which the United States and several other countries are now parties. Therefore not only legally are the Soviet Union and China barred from undertaking any unilateral occupation of any part of Japan, but, if they do so, that act will be open aggression of the broadest and boldest kind-an aggression which would only be undertaken if the aggressor is willing to assume the consequences of starting world war III.
Restoration of Sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany
13. PROTOCOL ON THE TERMINATION OF THE OCCUPATION REGIME IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (PARIS PROTOCOL), OCTOBER 23, 19541
The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany agree as follows:
The Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Finance Convention, the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation, signed at Bonn on 26 May 1952,5 the Protocol signed at Bonn on 27 June 1952 to correct certain textual errors in the aforementioned Conventions, and the Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members signed at Bonn on 26 May 1952, as amended by the Protocol signed at Bonn on 26 July 1952, shall be amended in ac
1 The Bonn Agreements of 1952 as Amended by the Paris Protocol of 1954 (S. Doc. No. 11, 84th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 1-2. Ratification advised by the Senate Apr. 1, 1955; ratified by the President Apr. 7, 1955; entered into force May 5, 1955. 2 S. Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 9-22.
3 Ibid., pp. 89-133.
Ibid., pp. 135-150.
5 Ibid., pp. 25-88.
The text of the corrective Protocol of June 27, 1952, is not printed ibid.; the corrigenda it effected are printed at the head of each of the conventions. Ibid., pp. 131–133.
cordance with the five Schedules to the present Protocol and as so amended shall enter into force (together with subsidiary documents agreed by the Signatory States relating to any of the aforementioned instruments) simultaneously with it.
Pending the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defense Contribution, the following provisions shall apply:
(1) The rights heretofore held or exercised by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to the fields of disarma
1 The Schedules as such are not reprinted here; instead, see infra for texts of the Bonn Agreements of 1952 as amended by these Schedules to the Paris Protocol of 1954.
2 See the Protocol of Oct. 23, 1954, to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Protocol of this same date to the Brussels Treaty; infra, pp. 871-873 and 972-989. See also the Final Act of the London Conference, Oct. 3, 1954; infra, pp. 1474-1491.
ment and demilitarisation shall be retained and exercised by them, and nothing in any of the instruments mentioned in Article 1 of the present Protocol shall authorize the enactment, amendment, repeal or deprivation of effect of legislation or, subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this Article, executive action in those fields by any other authority.
(2) On the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Military Security Board shall be abolished (without prejudice to the validity of any action or decisions taken by it) and the controls in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation shall thereafter be applied by a Joint Four-Power Commission to which each of the Signatory States shall appoint one representative and which shall take its decisions by majority vote of the four members.
(3) The Governments of the Signatory States will conclude an administrative agreement which shall provide, in conformity with the provisions of this Article, for the establishment of the Joint Four-Power Commission and its staff and for the organisation of the work.
1. The present Protocol shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The Instruments of Ratification or Approval shall be deposited by the Signatory States with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.
2. The present Protocol and subsidiary documents relating to it agreed between the Signatory States shall enter into force upon the deposit by all the Signatory States of the Instruments of Ratification or Approval as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article."
3. The present Protocol shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which will furnish each Signatory State with certified copies thereof and notify each State of the date of entry into force of the present Protocol.
IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Representatives duly authorized thereto have signed the present Protocol.
Done at Paris this 23rd day of October, 1954, in three texts, in the English, French and German languages, all being equally authentic.
1 The Military Security Board was established Jan. 17, 1949, by a three-power directive of that date (Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents (Department of State publication 3556; 1950), pp. 103-105) in pursuance of decisions taken and included in the communiqué of the London Conference, dated Dec. 28, 1948 (ibid., pp. 332–343).
2 The instruments of ratification of the United States and of the Federal Republic of Germany were deposited Apr. 20, 1955; those of the United Kingdom and of France, May 5, 1955.