over the various atomic energy processes in the hands of national authorities would prove inadequate. When these facts were carefully pondered, it became obvious that an effective system of control would necessarily have to be on an international basis and that some international body would have to be empowered to control all critical phases of atomic energy. 2. UNITED STATES PROPOSALS Through a series of conferences with the President and the Secretary of State, as well as members of the Acheson-Lilienthal group and members of Congress, Mr. Baruch and his associates worked out the broad lines of the United States policy. As presented to the Atomic Energy Commission with the approval of the President as a basis for discussion, the United States plan called for a special treaty establishing an international Atomic Development Authority-as proposed in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report— responsible for control (including, where necessary, accounting, inspection, supervision, management, and licensing) of all activities in the field of atomic energy. The Authority would be supported by a system of rapid and effective punishments for violations and by free access for geological surveyors and other necessary inspectors to prevent misuse and insure compliance. It was proposed that no single state should have power to prevent the carrying out of punishments for crimes specifically defined in advance by voluntary agreement. After a system of international control had been brought into effective operation by appropriate stages, specifically defined in the treaty, it was proposed to cease bomb production and dispose of any existing bombs pursuant to the terms of the treaty, properly ratified in accordance with our established constitutional processes.* Work Accomplished by the Atomic Energy Commission In carrying on its work the Atomic Energy Commission established a series of subcommittees. At present these committees include: a Working Committee or Committee of the Whole, a Committee on Controls, a Legal Advisory Committee, and a Scientific and Technical Committee. The work of the Commission to date may be summarized briefly in six phases: 1. INITIAL PRESENTATION OF VIEWS The first phase extended from June 14 through June 25. While all twelve representatives made opening statements in the Commission, only two basic plans were put forward-the United States and 4 See supplement for text of June 14 Proposals. the Soviet Proposals. The United States Proposal was made on June 14. On June 19 the Soviets proposed a convention calling for the immediate outlawing of the production and use of atomic weapons and the destruction of all stocks of atomic weapons within a period of three months thereafter and the enactment of national enforcement legislation within six months. This was to be followed by further consideration by the Commission of means of exchanging information and of possible methods of control. 2. ELABORATION OF UNITED STATES PROPOSALS The second phase ran from June 25 through July 15, during which the United States Delegation presented a series of three memoranda, which elaborated the provisions that might be contained in the treaty and the charter establishing the Authority, its detailed powers and functions, and the relations between the Authority and the organs of the United Nations. It was proposed that the international control body should have a degree of autonomy commensurate with its responsibilities, but that to the extent possible this body should be brought into close relationship with the United Nations structure. As regards relations with the Security Council, it was urged that a formula should be found which would not diminish the general powers of the Security Council relating to the maintenance of international peace and security but which would not subject the Authority to infaction through the use of the veto. The treaty should define specifically certain acts as international crimes and should provide for swift punishment of violators. It was stated that all parties to the treaty and all peoples of the world should have protection of a final and dependable character against the terrible consequences of the destructive use of atomic energy. Such protection required international machinery which could and would function quickly-machinery which would not permit an offender to be protected by his own or another's obstruction. It was pointed out that a provision that the veto would not apply in the field of atomic energy matters would in no wise involve any compromise of the principles of unanimity of action as applied to general international peace and security problems or to particular situations not foreseeable and, therefore, not susceptible of advance unanimous agreement in the treaty. Concerning the right of self-defense under article 51 of the Charter, it was suggested that the term "armed attack" might be redefined in a manner appropriate to atomic weapons 5 These memoranda are contained in International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy, Department of State publication 2702. so as to include not only the actual dropping of an atomic bomb but also certain other steps which in themselves would be preliminary to such action. With regard to the International Court of Justice it was suggested that the Authority might be authorized to request advisory opinions of the Court on legal matters arising within the scope of the Authority's activities, that the Authority might be authorized to be a party in cases before the Court involving legal disputes arising under the treaty, that the treaty might include provisions that the Authority and the signatory states would be bound to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court in legal disputes defined in the treaty, and that in such cases the judgment of the Court might be enforced by the Security Council. 3. ELABORATION OF SOVIET PROPOSALS The third phase of discussion extended from July 24 through August 6. It developed that the Soviet Proposals envisaged national control of atomic energy activities in the several countries, coupled with a convention outlawing the production and use of atomic weapons. It was proposed that the Security Council would handle any cases arising in this field which might constitute a threat to international peace and security in the same way that other threats would normally be handled by that body. No provision was made for inspection to insure compliance nor for any international machinery for control and enforcement, beyond action by the Security Council under the terms of the United Nations Charter. At this stage in the discussions, the Soviet Representative took the position that the United States Proposals were not acceptable "as a whole or in their separate parts". In the discussions that followed the Soviet presentation, a number of the delegates expressed doubt that the Soviet Proposals would be effective, emphasizing that there was urgent need for a system of control which would foster the beneficial uses of atomic energy while preventing its diversion to destructive ends. It was felt that a convention which would merely provide for punishments after bombs were dropped would not be enough and that emphasis should be put on a fully effective system which would prevent diversions. 4. STUDY OF THE FEASIBILITY OF CONTROL With the views of the several delegates having been developed in some detail, the Commission turned to the Scientific and Technical Committee for a report on the technological feasibility of control. During this fourth phase further discussions of policy were suspended. In a series of some twenty meetings, most of which were informal, the Scientific and Technical Committee prepared its report. As unanimously approved, the Scientific and Technical Committee report concluded that, on the basis of the available scientific facts, there was no reason for supposing that effective control was not technologically feasible. No attempt was made to evaluate the political feasibility of any system or systems by which effective control could be achieved. The report was a presentation of the basic scientific and technical facts in the field of atomic energy which demonstrated that the same atomic energy activities might lead either to peaceful or to destructive ends, and that these peaceful and destructive possibilities were so intimately interrelated as to be almost inseparable. It analyzed the principal activities involved in the peaceful use of atomic energy and described the points of danger and the character of the dangers which would exist at each point unless appropriate safeguards were established against the use of atomic energy for destructive ends. 5. STUDY OF SPECIFIC SAFEGUARDS Upon receipt of this report on October 2, the Commission entered the fifth phase of the negotiations by undertaking to discuss in detail the types of safeguards that should be devised in order to meet the facts presented by the Scientific and Technical Committee report. These discussions, which were carried on in the Committee on Controls, were organized around three broad phases: 1. measures to prevent diversion of uranium and thorium and their fissionable derivatives to destructive uses; 2. measures to prevent clandestine operations; and Within these three categories the Committee discussed the various steps in the production of fissionable material and its use for peaceful purposes, starting with raw materials. More than twenty meetings-nearly all of which were informal-were held with various technical experts participating in the discussions. The Committee on Controls completed its study on December 26 when it adopted its report by a vote of 10-0. Poland abstained, while the U. S. S. R. was recorded as not having participated in the adoption of the report. The report of findings of the Committee on Controls was adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission as a part of its year-end report to the Security Council. The Committee reached the important con "The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council is in process of publication by the United Nations. The findings, in full, of the Committee on Controls will appear as part V of that Report. clusion that an international control agency must be responsible for the system of safeguards and control. While indicating the types of safeguards that should be applied at various stages by the international control agency in the production of atomic energy, the Committee was careful to point out that its findings were not definitive but rather indicative of the types of safeguards required. The findings do not, therefore, represent a comprehensive plan for atomic energy control but only some of the elements which should be incorporated in any complete and effective system." 6. ADOPTION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS As the Committee on Controls was proceeding with its work, the Atomic Energy Commission entered upon the sixth phase of discussion when it decided on November 13, 1946 to submit to the Security Council by December 31, 1946 a year-end report of its proceedings, findings, and recommendations. Aware that many aspects of atomic energy control involved political considerations which could be acted upon only by the Commission itself rather than its subcommittees, the United States Representative on December 5, 1946 put forward for action by the Commission at a later meeting a series of general findings and recommendations for incorporation into the report to the Security Council. Meanwhile, the General Assembly had begun consideration of the general problem of disarmament. In the debates that were held on this matter, the statements made by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. V. M. Molotov, indicated that a greater measure of agreement on atomic energy control than had appeared likely earlier might now be possible." On December 17, 1946 the Commission adopted the principles on which the United States general findings and recommendations were based, with the proviso, as put forward by the Canadian Representative, that the wording should be conformed to the pertinent wording of the General Assembly disarmament resolution of December 14, 1946.10 'The introduction to and the text of the findings of the Committee on Controls as summarized in The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council appear in the supplement. *The speeches of the United States Representative before the Commission on Dec. 5, 1946 and on Dec. 17, 1946, as well as the general findings and recommendations as finally incorporated in the report to the Security Council are found in the supplement. See chap. I, General Assembly. See supplement. 726027°-47-5 |