decisive. But the question of importance to us is, Have we the authority of any of the sacred writers for this application of the word? Did our Lord himself, or any of his apostles, ever retort this charge upon the Pharisees? Yet it cannot be denied, that the doctrine then in vogue with them gave, in many things, if this had been a legitimate use of the term blasphemy, a fair handle for such recrimination. They made void, we are told, the commandment of God, to make room for their tradition, Matt. xv. 6; Mark vii. 13; and thus in effect set up their own authority in opposition to that of their Creator. They disparaged the moral duties of the law, in order to exalt positive and ceremonial observances, Matt. xxiii. 23; Luke xi. 42. Now this cannot be done by the teachers of religion, without some misrepresentation of the moral attributes of the lawgiver, whose character is thereby degraded in the minds of the people. Yet there is nowhere the most distant insinuation given, that on any of these accounts they were liable to the charge of blasphemy.

But no sooner did Jesus say to the paralytic, "Thy sins are forgiven thee," than the Scribes laid hold of the expression: "This man blasphemeth," said they: "Who can forgive sins but God?" Matt. ix. 3; Mark ii. 7. Their plea was, it is an invasion of the prerogative of God. Grotius observes justly of this application of the term-" Dicitur hic Blaopnuev, non qui Deo maledicit, sed qui quod Dei est, sibi arrogat." Such, undoubtedly, was their notion of the matter. But I do not see any warrant they had for thus extending the signification of the word. In the simple and primitive import of the name blasphemer, it could not be more perfectly defined in Latin than by these three words, qui Deo maledicit; and therefore I cannot agree with the generality of expositors, who seem to think, that if Jesus had not been the Messiah, or authorized of God to declare to men the remission of their sins, the Scribes would have been right in their verdict. On the contrary, if one unauthorized of Heaven had said what our Lord is recorded to have said to the paralytic, he would not, in my opinion, have been liable to that accusation: he would have been chargeable with great presumption, I acknowledge; and, if he had been conscious that he had no authority, he would have been guilty of gross impiety; but every species of impiety is not blasphemy. Let us call things by their proper names. If any of us usurp a privilege that belongs exclusively to another man, or if we pretend to have his authority when we have it not, our conduct is very criminal; but nobody would confound this crime with calumny. No more can the other be termed blasphemy, especially when it results from misapprehension, and is unaccompanied with a malevolent intention, either to depreciate the character, or to defeat the purpose of the Almighty. The false prophets, who knowingly told lies in the name of God, and pretended a commission from him which

they knew they had not, were liable to death; but they are nowhere said to blaspheme, that is, to revile, or to defame their Maker. Much less could it be said of those who told untruths through mistake, and without any design of detracting from God. This polemic application of the term blasphemy must, therefore, have originated in the schools of the rabbis, and appears to have been, in the time of our Lord and his apostles, in general vogue with the scribes. Nay, which is exceedingly repugnant to the original import of the name, they even applied it to expressions which did not refer to persons, but to things. Thus the historian, in relating the charge brought against Stephen, acquaints us, Acts vi. 13, that " they set up false witnesses, which said, This man ceaseth not to speak blasphemous words against this holy place and the law;" an application of the word, perhaps till then unexampled. But we need not wonder at this liberty when we consider that the perversion of the term answered for them a double purpose: first, it afforded them one easy expedient for rendering a person whom they disliked, odious to the people, amongst whom the very suspicion of blasphemy excited great abhorrence: secondly, it increased their own jurisdiction. Blasphemy was a capital crime, the judgment whereof was in the sanhedrim, of whom the chief priests and some of the scribes always made the principal part. The further the import of the word was extended, the more cases it brought under their cognizance, and the more persons into their power. Hence

it proceeded, that the word blasphemy, which originally meant a crime no less than maliciously reviling the Lord of the universe, was at length construed to imply the broaching of any tenet, or the expressing of any sentiment (with whatever view it was done) which did not quadrate with the reigning doctrine. For that doctrine, being presupposed to be the infallible will of God, whatever opposed it was said, by implication, to revile its Author. Such will ever be the case, when the principles of human policy are grafted upon religion.

15. When we consider this, and remark at the same time with what plainness our Lord condemned, in many particulars, both the maxims and the practice of the Pharisees, we cannot be surprised that, on more occasions than one, that vindictive and envious sect traduced him to the people, as a person chargeable with this infernal guilt. Once, indeed, some of them proceeded so far as to "take up stones to stone him," John x. 31, 33; for that was the punishment which the law had awarded against blasphemers. But he thought proper then to elude their malice, and by the answer he gave to their unmerited reproach, evidently showed that their application of the term was unscriptural, ch. x. 34-36. Those who, on other occasions, watched our Lord to entrap him in his words, seem to have had it principally in view to extract either blasphemy or treason from what he said.

By the first, they could expose him to the fury of the populace, or perhaps subject him to the Jewish rulers; and, by the second, render him obnoxious to the Roman procurator. What use they made of both articles at last, is known to every body. Nor let it be imagined, that at his trial the circumstance, apparently slight, of the high-priest's rending his clothes when he pronounced him a blasphemer, (an example which must have been quickly followed by the whole sanhedrim, and all within hearing,) was not a matter of the utmost consequence for effecting their malicious purpose. We have reason to believe, that it contributed not a little in working so wonderful a change in the multitude, and in bringing them to view the man with detestation to whom so short while before they were almost ready to pay divine honours.

16. But here it may be asked, "Can we not then say, with truth, of any of the false teachers who have arisen in the church, that they vented blasphemies?" To affirm that we cannot, would I acknowledge, be to err in the opposite extreme. Justin Martyr says of Marcion, (Apol. 2,) that he taught many to blaspheme the Maker of the world. Now, it is impossible to deny the justice of this charge, if we admit the truth of what Irenæus (lib. i. c. 29.) and others affirm concerning that bold heresiarch, to wit, that he maintained that the Author of our being, the God of Israel, who gave the law by Moses, and spoke by the Prophets, is one who perpetrates injuries and delights in war, is fickle in his opinions and inconsistent with himself. If this representation of Marcion's doctrine be just, who would not say that he reviled his Creator, and attempted to alienate from him the love and confidence, of his creatures? The blasphemy of Rabshakeh was aimed only against the power of God; Marcion's, not so much against his power, as against his wisdom and his goodness. Both equally manifested an intention of subverting the faith and veneration of his worshippers. Now, it is only what can be called a direct attack, not such as is made out by implication, upon the perfections of the Lord of the universe, and what clearly displays the intention of lessening men's reverence of him, that is blasphemy in the meaning, (I say not of the rabbis, or of the canonists, but) of the sacred code. In short, such false and injurious language, and only such, as, when applied to men, would be denominated reviling, abusing, defaming, is, when applied to God, blasphemy. The same terms in the original tongues are used for both; and it would perhaps have been better, for preventing mistakes, that in modern tongues also the same terms were employed. Indeed, if we can depend on the justness of the accounts which remain of the oldest sectaries, there were some who went greater lengths in this way than even Marcion.

17. Before I finish this topic it will naturally occur to inquire, What that is, in particular, which our Lord denominates "blasphemy against the Holy Spirit ?" Matt. xii. 31, 32. Mark iii. 29.

Luke xii. 10. It is foreign from my present purpose to enter minutely into the discussion of this difficult question. Let it suffice here to observe, that this blasphemy is certainly not of the constructive kind, but direct, manifest, and malignant. First, it is mentioned as comprehended under the same genus with abuse against man, and contradistinguished only by the object: Secondly, it is further explained, by being called speaking against, in both cases. Ος αν ειπη λογον κατα του υἱου του ανθρωπου-ός δ' αν ειπη κατα του πνευματος του άγιου. The expressions are the same, in effect, in all the evangelists who mention it, and imply such an opposition as is both intentional and malevolent. This cannot have been the case of all who disbelieved the mission of Jesus, and even decried his miracles; many of whom, we have reason to think, were afterwards converted by the apostles. But it is not impossible that it may have been the wretched case of some who, instigated by worldly ambition and avarice, have slandered what they knew to be the cause of God, and, against conviction, reviled his work as the operation of evil spirits.

18. A late writer,* more ingenious than judicious, has, after making some just remarks on this subject, proceeded so far as to maintain that there can be no such crime as blasphemy. His argument, (by substituting defamation for blasphemy, defame for blaspheme, and man for God,) serves equally to prove that there is no such crime as defamation, and stands thus: "Defamation presupposes malice: where there is malice, there is misapprehension. Now the person who, misapprehending another, defames him, does no more than put the man's name" (I use the author's phraseology) "to his own misapprehensions of him. This is so far from speaking evil of the man, that it is not speaking of him at all. It is only speaking evil of a wild idea, of a creature of the imagination, and existing nowhere but there." From this clear manner of reasoning, the following corollary, very comfortable to those whom the world has hitherto misnamed slanderers, may fairly be deduced-If you have a spite against any man, you may freely indulge your malevolence in saying of him all the evil you can think of. That you cannot be justly charged with defamation is demonstrable. If all that you say be true, he is not injured by you, and therefore you are no detractor. If the whole or part be false, what is false does not reach him your abuse in that case is levelled against an ideal * Independent Whig, No. 55.

+ That the reader may be satisfied that I do not wrong this author, I shall annex, in his own words, part of his reasoning concerning blasphemy. "As it is a crime that implies malice against God, I am not able to conceive how any man can commit it. A man who knows God, cannot speak evil of him and a man who knows him not, and reviles him, does therefore revile him, because he knows him not. He therefore puts the name of God to his own misapprehensions of God. This is so far from speaking evil of the Deity, that it is not speaking of the Deity at all: it is only speaking evil of a wild idea, of a creature of the imagination, and existing nowhere but

there."

being, a chimera to which you only affix his name, (a mere trifle, for a name is but a sound,) but with which the man's real character is not concerned. Therefore, when you have said the worst that malice and resentment can suggest, you are not chargeable with defamation, which was the point to be proved. Thus the argument of that volatile author goes further to emancipate men from all the restraints of reason and conscience, than I believe he himself was aware. He only intended by it, as one would think, to release us from the fear of God: it is equally well calculated for freeing us from all regard to man. Are we from this to form an idea of the liberty, both sacred and civil, of which that author affected to be considered as the patron and friend; and of the deference he professes to entertain for the Scriptures and primitive Christianity? I hope not; for he is far from being at all times consistent with himself. Of the many evidences which might be brought of this charge, one is, that no man is readier than he to throw the imputation of blasphemy on those whose opinions differ from his own.*

PART III.

OF SCHISM.

THE next term I proposed to examine critically was axioua, schism. The Greek word frequently occurs in the New Testament, though it has only once been rendered schism by our translators. However, the frequency of the use among theologians has made it a kind of technical term in relation to ecclesiastical matters; and the way it has been bandied, as a term of ignominy, from sect to sect reciprocally, makes it a matter of some consequence to ascertain, if possible, the genuine meaning it bears in holy writ. In order to this, let us, abstracting alike from the uncandid representations of all zealous party-men, have recourse to the oracles of truth, the source of light and direction.

σχισμα,

2. As to the proper acceptation of the word axioua, when applied to objects merely material, there is no difference of sentiments among interpreters. Every one admits that it ought to be rendered rent, breach, or separation. In this sense it occurs in the Gospels; as where our Lord says, "No man putteth a piece of new cloth to an old garment; for that which is put in

In the dedication of the book to the lower House of Convocation, the author advises them to clear themselves from the imputation of maintaining certain ungodly tenets, by exposing the blasphemies of those of their own body. In No. 23, we are told that false zeal talks blasphemy in the name of the Lord; in No. 24, that persecutors blasphemously pretend to be serving God; and in No. 27. that it is a kind of blasphemy to attempt to persuade people that God takes pleasure in vexing his creatures. More examples of the commission of this impracticable crime might be produced from that author if necessary.