Mr. HARTMAN. The "inviolability of frontiers" phrase has been one of greater sensitivity to the Germans as far as participants are concerned. They, therefore, took the lead in discussing this and finally came up with the suggestion that we modify the inviolability principle with the clause on peaceful change. After they had come up with the principle, they then asked us to be instrumental in its negotiation with the Soviet Union which we were. That was one of the key compromises that led to any of us thinking that this Conference was going to end because without some reference to the peaceful change principle I doubt very much that our Western European friends, and possibly even ourselves, would have been willing to go to a final conference, if all that was left was the straight declaration of the inviolability of frontiers. Mr. DERWINSKI. I find it difficult to put great credence in a statement that when you get to basket 1 and you resolve language that calls for freedom of religion when a participating state has as its basic constitutional structure that of atheism. How do you reconcile the official atheism of the Soviet Union with language calling for freedom of religion? Mr. HARTMAN. All I can say is that these are statements of intent. Statements if you call them statements-of policy. As we see evidence that they are not adhering to these policies, then we say, "All right, you signed this document. You came here with 34 other countries and agreed to this. Why are you not applying it?" It is a public standard, it is not a legal obligation. Mr. DERWINSKI. What about the subject of equal rights and selfdetermination, how would that be applied in the positive or at least how would we publicly emphasize our concern over such things as Russification of the Baltic states, deliberate movement of Russian settlers into the Baltic states and forced movement of the Baltic peoples out? The same thing could occur in Soviet Armenia or the Ukraine, and other sections of the Soviet Union. How does that enter into our interpretation? Mr. HARTMAN. Well, the principle of self-determination has been reiterated, and one of the reasons for our not accepting what has happened there is that self-determination did not take place. That has been our position right straight through since this occurred. I am sure we will continue to say these things afterward, and our feeling is that, again marginally, having this in an agreed statement of principles is another argument we will be using to say that this is something that should happen. Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FASCELL. It seems to me that all statements of principles are an opportunity for both parties to say exactly where they are on important issues and how they hope to move forward on those issues provided they have common ground. But, frankly, I don't see how it is going to change a thing. I am not being cynical, just pragmatic. Once a border is established, it is established and once the people have been incorporated they are incorporated. That is not to say the statement of principles should not be adopted or that an act which is in violation of an international norm ought not to be recognized as such but it certainly does not say that there is ever going to be any change without some kind of armed conflict. I don't think anybody is advocating that. That leads me to ask what differences exist with 53-963-75 respect to final determination of the 10th item in agenda item No. 1, fulfillment of obligations. You might have to strike that one. Mr. HARTMAN. I am not sure what the current discussion is. One of the outstanding issues between us on that is a need by the four allies who have rights in Berlin to put something into these documents which indicates that these documents, even though they have no legal effect, in no way alter, change or modify our rights in Berlin, the quadripartite rights. So it is the negotiation of that language which would go into the 10th principle that is at least one of the issues that is holding it up from being agreed, but we will get that. Mr. FASCELL. I find it difficult to support a disclaimer where there is no legal need for it, but I guess there is a strong political reason. Mr. HARTMAN. There are going to be disclaimers throughout these documents. There are going to be little words thrown in, for example, on the human rights. Mr. FASCELL. Perhaps it is useful to get a document where everybody's positions are reasonably set forth and clarified. Mr. HARTMAN. For example, I received a delegation from the American Jewish community who were quite concerned that since the area and the specifics of human rights dealt with within these documents might be less comprehensive than the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, would this in any way be seen as a modification? Well, there are going to be words in here that will make it quite clear that that is not the case. Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Russell. Mr. RUSSELL. On this point, Congressman, we have been concerned that though not a legal document some formulations could be considered a waiver of a legal position and in particular the principle of sovereign equality when applied to the German Democratic Republic, which is at this Conference with us for the first time, might cast certain doubts over the continued viability of our residual rights in Germany. Therefore, although not a legal document, it has been felt that it would be prudent to make sure explicitly on the record that there is a reservation of Four Power rights. Mr. FASCELL. I imagine for the same reason the West Germans want to keep alive the possibility, no matter how remote, of the reunification of Germany. Mr. HARTMAN. Yes. Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Derwinski, I was interested in following your line of comment with respect to the Baltic states. I assume that the U.S. position is totally satisfactory and it certainly appears to be to me. Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes. I think the concern I have is, for example, the point you just made, Mr. Russell, that we would specifically state the fact that we were not in any way by participating with the East Germans in this Conference waiving our rights to Berlin. It seems to me that it then makes it incumbent to attach at some point the proper statement reemphasizing the fact that our policy in the Baltic states does remain what it has been for 35 years. Mr. HARTMAN. I will say in addition to my public testimony and to the letters that we have put with the committee, we will examine also how this might be stated more directly connected with the results. Mr. DERWINSKI. Have you ever tried to test the good will of the Soviets by suggesting that one of these sessions open with a prayer? Mr. HARTMAN. I don't believe so. Mr. DERWINSKI. This would be a psychological test. Mr. HARTMAN. Yes, and with the Vatican present at these meet ings [Laughter.] Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Hartman, does the United States still maintain its position on the Baltic states? Mr. HARTMAN. It has not changed. Mr. FASCELL. How has the United States operated internally with respect to decisions on Conference issues? Mr. HARTMAN. Depending on what the subject is. For example, on the economic subjects we have a committee that is composed of ourselves in the State Department, the Special Trade Representatives Office, Treasury, and Commerce. On the military confidence building measures, we have a committee that is composed of the NSC staff, Defense, and ourselves. On the other items, which are more strictly within the purview of the State Department, we have the InterOffice Committee. The major positions are all put to the Secretary of State for his decision. Mr. FASCELL. How has the United States coordinated its position with its allies? Mr. HARTMAN. In two ways. There have been two caucuses. There has been a caucus of the nine; that is, of the European Community member states, in which under their political cooperation arrangements they have talked about taking common positions. Indeed, sometimes at the Conference the European Community appoints a single spokesman. The chairman of that happens to be the Irish Government at the moment, but another member state may be asked to speak to a particular topic. Then there is the broader coordination that takes place in NATO either by a caucus of all NATO members sitting in Geneva at the Conference site or periodically by discussions in the NATO Council to set policy for the next period of the negotiations. Sometimes we send experts from capitals to these meetings; CSCE, MBFR and generally stated East-West relations and talks come up on each of our NATO Council agendas when the Secretary of State goes twice a year to the NATO meetings. Indeed when the President goes at the end of this month to the NATO Council meeting, this will be an important subject on the agenda. Mr. FASCELL. Thank you. Are there any other questions? Does either one of you gentlemen, Mr. Frowick or Mr. Russell, want to add anything at this point? Without objection then, we will keep the record open for 15 days from the date of this meeting to allow interested organizations to file statements in the record on this subject. I want to thank you very much, gentlemen, for giving us such a very thorough and concise review on this important subject. We appreciate your cooperation. Mr. HARTMAN. Thank you. Mr. FASCELL. The committee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m. the subcommittee adjourned.] APPENDIX LETTER FROM EDWARD J. SUMANAS, THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL ENCLOSING LIST OF COSPONSORS OF RESOLUTIONS REGARDING BALTIC STATES THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE, Rockville, Md; Hon. DANTE B. FASCELL, DEAR CONGRESSMAN FASCELL: Enclosed you will find the list of the eighty-nine Congressmen and ten Senators who have co-sponsored the Baltic States Resolution in this year's session. The Joint Baltic American Committee would appreciate the addition of this list to the end of our letter dated May 13, 1975, and the printing of both in the permanent record of the hearings before your Subcommittee on International, Political, and Military affairs. Respectfully, EDWARD J. SUMANAS, |