THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1978.

ARMY TANK PROGRAM

WITNESSES

DR. PERCY A. PIERRE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION)

GEN. DONN STARRY, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

LT. GEN. DONALD R. KEITH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION

MAJ. GEN. DONALD BABERS, PROJECT MANAGER, XM-1 TANK BRIG. GEN. RICHARD D. LAWRENCE, CHIEF TANK FORCES MANAGEMENT OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

COL. ROBERT E. BUTLER, PROJECT MANAGER, M-60 TANK DEVELOPMENT

COL. R. H. SAWYER, PROJECT MANAGER M-60 TANK PRODUCTION RICHARD R. VIOLETTE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

LT. COL. JAMES EVANS, ASSISTANT PROJECT MANAGER FOR PRODUCTION, OFFICE OF THE PROJECT MANAGER, XM-1 TANK

OPENING REMARKS

Mr. MAHON. The committee will come to order.

We will proceed with the tank hearing which had been arranged some time ago.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I move that the hearing today on Army Tank Program will be held in executive session due to the classification of the material to be discussed.

Mr. MAHON. If there is no discussion, this requires a roll call and the clerk will call the roll.

[The clerk proceeded to call the roll.]

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Reporter, let the record show that on this motion Mr. Mahon, Mr. Sikes, Mr. Addabbo, Mr. Edwards and Mr. Cederberg voted aye. Five votes in the affirmative. Five is not a sufficient number to close this hearing.

Mr. SIKES. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. MAHON. We have met today to review the Army Tank program, a very controversial and expensive program.

We are pleased to welcome Dr. Pierre, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA); General Starry, Commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command; Mr. Richard Violette, Director of the Operations Directorate, Defense Security Assistance Agency; Lieutenant General Keith, Deputy Chief of Staff for RDA; Major General Babers, XM-1 Tank Project (243)

Manager; Brigadier General Lawrence, Chief, Tank Forces Management Office, and their supporting witnesses.

Who will be your principal witness, Mr. Pierre ?

Dr. PIERRE. I am the principal witness, General Lawrence will make a presentation, and questions will be handled by General Keith and myself.

Mr. MAHON. Very well.

There are a number of important issues that we hope to address during the day; for example, the validity of the Army's proposal to facilitize the plants in Lima, Ohio, and Detroit in order to establish a surge capability of producing XM-1 tanks at a rate of up to 150 per month.

The problems the Army has had in producing M60 tanks because of the inability of the foundries to cast the number of hulls and turrets to meet the 112 per month production rate by February 1977, but never achieved.

Next, why the Army made the decision to reduce the number of planned M60A1 to M60A3 conversions when the M60A3 conversions appear to be the fastest and least costly means of meeting the Soviet T-72 tank threat, when compared with building new M60A3 tanks, which are seriously backlogged.

Among other questions, an evaluation of the Soviet tank threat and the most efficient and cost-effective means of meeting that threat; an evaluation of the validity of the Army's authorized acquisition objective for tanks; why deliveries of tanks to foreign customers apparently have taken priority over the delivery of tanks to the United States Army, presumably without a specific determination by the President in accordance with existing law; a review of the number of tanks in the AAO for support of allies and the reasons therefor.

Our investigative staff has had an opportunity to conduct a brief analysis of the proposed XM-1 tank production program. A number of our questions are based on that analysis. We have a lot of ground to cover and we would hope that our witnesses would speak right to the point. You can amplify for the record, but let's get along as much as we can and cover as many of these issues as may be possible. In the interest of saving time, we hope that you, Mr. Secretary, and you, General Lawrence, will summarize your statements which have been available to members so that we may be able to discuss the many issues I have mentioned.

At this point I will insert in the record the fiscal year 1979 budget request for the Army and Marine Corps tank programs.

[The information follows:]

[The prepared statements follow:]

STATEMENT OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION)

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this morning the Army Tank Program. In describing the various aspects of this complex issue, I intend to limit my opening remarks to a discussion of our current tank posture and how the fiscal year 1979 tank procurement request improves that posture. While this short term consideration of the tank program is useful in highlighting budget issues that must be addressed in the near future, these issues can be meaningfully reviewed only as a part of our overall long term goals for tank modemization. To explain to you the Army's long term goals for tank modernization goals and the rationale that ties those goals into an integrated, cohesive program, I will be followed by General Lawrence, the Chief of the Tank Force Management Office. General Lawrence, in describing the Army's long range tank programs, will focus on the relationship between tank procurement goals and our ability to counter an ever increasing threat within force structure and affordability constraints. Finally, during this discussion we will highlight the difference between the Army's out year tank procurement goals and that portion of those goals that have currently been approved by the Secretary of Defense.

At the end of fiscal year 1977 our tank asset posture showed the Army to be in a quantitatively poor position, with only half of our authorized prime tank assets on hand. Our inventory includes recently upgraded M48A5 assets, M60's built between 1959 and 1963, a large fleet of M60A1's, and the recently fielded low density M60A2. These assets represent both a considerable sunk cost and a firm basis upon which to structure future tank procurement plans. The size of the investment in our current inventory drives us, through product improvement programs, to attempt to extend the useful lives of these existing assets. Moreover, the quality advantage these tanks enjoy over similar vintage Soviet vehicles leads us to believe that M60 series vehicles will be of use to us and our allies in selected missions into the 1980's. However, the continued reliance on what is essentially a 1960's technology tank fleet in the face of a rapidly modernizing Warsaw Pact threat would not be a prudent course of action to adopt. What is necessary in the coming years is a tank program that addresses quality as well as quantity issues in a practical, affordable manner. After an extensive review of this question, we believe we have developed such a program.

Consider now the Army's tank posture when procurement plans as included in the fiscal year 1978 budget are executed. In effect this is a snap shot of the tank fleet as it will look when we initiated procurement with fiscal year 1979 funds; the specific issue we are addressing today. Our asset posture will be considerably improved with a 77% fill of total requirements. However, only about 1,000 of those tanks will be modernized, M60A3 assets. The M48A5 program, which provides prime assets to Reserve and National Guard tank units will be completed. Almost 6,000 M60A1's of various configuration will be fielded and its follow-on, the M60A3, will be in full production. Preparations to build the first XM1 will be near completion.

These factors place us clearly at a cross roads in the tank program with several possible procurement alternatives to consider. With 77% requirements fill we are in a position, thanks to your support, to examine quantity versus quality tradeoffs in future years. Consequently, there are at least two major modernization options to be considered. One approach would be to product improve the large, existing M60A1 fleet and constrain both M60A3 and XM1 new tank production. A clear alternative to that option would be to minimize the funds spent on M60 assets and accelerate the XML program. The Army has considered a number of such options in terms of the cost effectiveness of each in meeting the future threat.

When modernization options are considered in conjunction with existing tank assets, a complete picture of our tank inventory over time can be gained. We will have 1,864 M48A5's and 1,554 M60's to equip National Guard and Reserve units in future years. Our 540 Shillelagh missile armed M60A2's provide a unique long range antitank capability. The total number of M60A1's in the fleet over time, from a maximum of 5,876, is a function of the size of the M60A1/A3 conversion program. General Lawrence will describe to you our modernization program which integrates the M60A3 and XM1 programs into a single procurement initiative. Regardless of the modernization option selected we will have a significant number