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Secretary CHAFEF. We are requesting six conversions for fiscal 1971. Senator ELLENDER. What is the average cost of these conversions? Admiral GADDIS. Approximately $73 million for each conversion, counting the overhauls and core replacement.

Senator ELLENDER. What was the original cost of these Polaris submarines?

Admiral MOORER. I believe $120 million, but I would like to supply for the record the exact cost of the six that we plan for conversion in fiscal year 1971.

Senator ELLENDER. Please do. Also I wish you would provide an estimate of the cost for the construction of a new Poseidon submarine. Admiral MOORER. I will provide that information for the record, Mr. Chairman.

(The information follows:)

The original new construction cost of each of the six SSBNs in the FY 1971 conversion program is shown in the table below:

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The comparable cost to build a new POSEIDON SSBN at today's price is estimated at $215 million for the lead ship and $165 million for a follow-on.

COST OF POSEIDON MISSILES

Senator ELLENDER. The $73 million for the Poseidon conversion

does not include the cost of the 16 Poseidon missiles, does it?

Admiral GADDIS. No, sir.

Senator ELLENDER. What is the cost of the missiles?

Admiral GADDIS. The missiles cost right now, at this stage of development, [deleted] million a piece.

Senator ELLENDER. The original plan calls for the conversion of 31 of the 41 Polaris submarines for the Poseidon. Has there been any change in this plan?

Admiral GADDIS. No, sir.

Senator ELLENDER. With only 10 Polaris submarines, you will have a tremendous excess inventory of Polaris missiles.

Admiral GADDIS. We will have an excess of missiles but this also means that we will not have to rework as extensively as we would have. In other words, the missile motor ages and, frankly, no one knows to what degree at this point in time because we have not had them long enough to know when the propellant grain deteriorates. By a test procedure, we will be able to select missiles to retain and will not have to do extensive rework as we might otherwise.

Senator ELLENDER. All of these, of course, will have to be stored somewhere and periodically examined.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Senator ELLENDER. At quite a cost?

Admiral GADDIS. There will be cost. I don't feel it will be excessive. We have two activities; one in Washington and one in South Carolina where those missiles are stored.

COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND POLARIS/POSEIDON SUBMARINES

Senator ELLENDER. Will you please compare the present capabilities of the Soviet submarine ballistic missile forces with our Polaris/ Poseidon forces, and also forecast as to comparability of the two. Admiral MOORER. The present Soviet submarine ballistic missile force consists of [deleted] submarines: [deleted] Zulu conversion class and [deleted] Golf class SSB's and [deleted] Hotel class and [deleted] Yankee class SSBN's. The most significant element of this force is the Yankee class which is currently under series construction and will reach some [deleted] units by 1974. These submarines, which can fire 16 SS-N-6, [deleted] missiles from a submerged condition, [deleted]. They have a powerplant capable of producing no less than [deleted] shaft horsepower providing a speed capability of up to [deleted] knots, compared to [deleted] SHP and [deleted] knots for the newest U.S. Polaris submarines. [Deleted.]

RESEARCH ON NEW CLASS OF MISSILE FIRING SUBMARINE

Senator ELLENDER. We are just getting started on this expensive Polaris to Poseidon conversion program, and you have already started the program for the development of a new submarine-launched missile system. I think you call it the ULMS. Admiral Moorer, would you comment on this new system?

Admiral MOORER. ÜLMS stands for undersea long-range missile systems, Mr. Chairman. We have just initiated the first effort towards the development of this submarine. It is scheduled to have an initial operational capability by [delete].

The concept here is that the submarine missile will have a range [deleted] miles and consequently the submarine will be able to operate in a much wider area.

Senator ELLENDER. I sought to bring out simply this, that you are in the process of getting something to substitute for what you now have, and building something more modern and more effective.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; giving the submarine a wider area in which to operate and consequently by improving its survivability.

FORCE REDUCTION

Senator ELLENDER. Will you please provide for the record the Navy's portion of the force reductions which have been made by President Nixon in U.S. Southeast Asia forces, and also, if it has been determined what portion of the recent 150,000 announced reduction is Navy personnel?

Secretary CHAFEE. The Navy's portion of previous force reductions made by the President was:

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not determined the Service breakdown of the 150,000 reduction recently announced by the President. Plans are now being developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense prior to 1 June 1970.

READINESS OF THE FLEET

Senator ELLENDER. On page 1 of your statement, you refer to the readiness of the fleet. You indicate that one-third is at sea or overseas and that another third is available on short notice. What is the status of the remaining third in terms of the length of time it would take to put it to sea?

Secretary CHAFEE. Of the somewhat less than one-third of the fleet ships which are not deployed or available as a surge capability, only a small percentage could not be ready for sea within a 30-day period. This minority is represented by a small portion of the approximately [deleted] of the ships which are undergoing major overhaul at any one time.

RIVER AND PATROL CRAFT

Senator ELLENDER. On page 2 you refer to the transfer of [deleted] river and patrol craft to the South Vietnamese by June 30, 1970.

What is the cost of these craft?

Secretary CHAFEE. First let me point out that the craft being turned over are currently in the U.S. Navy inventory, thus no additional procurement is required as a result of planned turnover to the South Vietnam Navy. These craft have all been paid for out of previous programs in support of the war effort in Southeast Asia, or were procured by the U.S. Navy prior to the Vietnamese war. and are now in excess of U.S. Navy posthostilities requirements based on current budgetary guidance. Many of the units are of World War II vintage. Thus, the only cost associated with the turnover of these vessels is overhaul and operational maintenance costs. The approximate original costs of the craft, including conversion costs in some cases, was as follows:

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YDB.

1 Costs are approximate as construction cost varied from year to year, as did conversion cost.

165

575 [deleted]

140

1,160

300

6,800

10,400

1,550

1,800

295

135

490

770

420

100

Approximate total cost TRANSFERS OF SHIPS TO VIETNAMESE

Senator ELLENDER. The last [deleted] you say, will be transferred in the first 6 months of 1970. Do you plan any further such transfers? Secretary CHAFEE. Yes, sir; under currently approved programs the USN plans to transfer a total of [deleted] ships and craft to the VNN. Follow-on programs, which have not been formally approved by the Secretary of Defense, would transfer an additional [deleted] craft. Senator ELLENDER. What will be the total inventory of such craft after this transfer?

Secretary CHAFEE. The total U.S. inventory of craft specifically designed for river and coastal patrol and riverine assault warfare will be:

[Deleted] river patrol boat (PBR),
[Deleted] patrol craft fast (PCF),

[Deleted] river assault craft (RAC).

The majority of these craft will be used to train advisers to the VNN. The [deleted] river assault craft will be made available to the VNN as attrition craft.

Senator YOUNG. Will this be sufficient for our foreseeable needs? Secretary CHAFEE. Based on current budgetary guidance the postwar riverine and coastal patrol and riverine assault warefare program will be [deleted] coastal/riverine craft capable of rapid production. Also a small operational cadre is planned to continue tactical development and maintain training and organization for rapid expansion to an operational force.

SEA TRANSPORT

Senator YOUNG. On page 4, you indicate that the bulk of our supplies must be transported by sea. Do you have any idea as to the percentage of our total commitment to Southeast Asia that is shipped by sea?

Secretary CHAFEE. Approximately 96 percent of all logistic support to Southeast Asia has been provided by sealift.

Senator YOUNG. How much of this is done by commercial contracts or leases? Is this competitive?

Secretary CHAFEE. Commercial carriers, under competitive conditions, provided 87 percent of this support.

ASW REQUIREMENT

Senator ELLENDER. When you speak of a greater ASW requirement, could you be more specific? Are you talking about quantity or quality or even a research breakthrough?

Secretary CHAFEE. By a greater ASW requirement I mean that we must continue our ASW technological effort in order to stay abreast of the increased capability that the Soviets have demonstrated in their newer submarines. Such an effort is necessary, if we are to maintain our present [deleted] qualitative advantages.

As to quantity, it must be sufficient to ensure rapid and flexible response in support of national objectives and adequate to tolerate the attrition of our own forces which would be inevitable in a war at sea with the Soviet submarine force. In the next few years, because of anticipated budget constraints, the Navy will be forced to operate with perate lower force levels than I consider prudent while trying to modernize our ASW forces.

SOVIET SEA PREDOMINANCE

Senator ELLENDER. On page 5, you refer to "the growing threat of Soviet forces to our supremacy at sea" Aside from attack submarines, in what types of ships do they predominate?

Secretary CHAFEE. In addition to attack class submarines, the Soviet Navy predominates in the following classes of ship:

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2 Unlike Soviet CLGM's and DDGS's, the U.S. guided missile cruisers and destroyers are not equipped with surface-tosurface antiship cruise missiles. The United States, however, has almost as many guided missile cruisers as the Soviets, 8 U.S. versus (deleted) U.S.S.R., and more guided missile destroyers, 54 United States versus (deleted) U.SS.R; • Although fewer in total number, at the present the United States has twice as many nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and twice as many SLBM tubes.

PROXIMITY OF SOVIET VESSELS

Senator YoUNG. How close and in what numbers have Soviet naval vessels approached our territorial waters in the past year?

Secretary CHAFEE. Soviet Navy ships have approached our territorial waters to a range of less than 500 n.m. on [deleted] occasions in the last year.

The first instance was the well publicized transit of a Soviet task group en route to a visit on July 26 in Havana. This task group consisted of a KYNDA CLGM, a KASHIN DLG, and a KILDIN DDGS plus one November class and two Foxtrot class submarines. The entire task group was supported throughout by a UGRA class subtender, the fleet oiler Lena, and merchant tanker Karl Marx. [Deleted.]

Additionally, Soviet intelligence collectors are routinely stationed off our coasts, near operating bases, and especially in the vicinity of our Polaris bases.

PROXIMITY OF U.S. NAVAL VESSELS TO RUSSIA

Senator YOUNG. How close and in what numbers have we done the same to them in the past year?

Secretary CHAFEE. Since January 1969, U.S. naval vessels have operated in the vicinity of Soviet territory on six occasions. Four operations, consisting of two destroyers each operation, were conducted in the Black Sea as a part of normal task force operations. The closest point of approach to Soviet territory was 65 n.m. The other two operations were oceanographic surveys conducted by ships (U.S.N.S. Bent, U.S.N.S. Vandenberg) of the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) in the vicinity of the Kuril Islands and the Kamchatka Peninsula. These ships approached no closer than 27 n.m. to Soviet territory, or 15 n.m. from the Soviet 12 n.m. territorial sea claim.

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