IS DÉTENTE DEAD? Paper by James P. Johnson The assigned topic for this presentation is the question whether or not detente is dead. The word, itself, is certainly anathema because President Ford has removed it from the national vocabulary. He has said, however, the policy we have been following, which has been characterized by the word détente, will not essentially change. The United States will continue to pursue its goal of peace in the world from a position of strength. Obviously, there's nothing new in that policy and so, perhaps, a more fitting title for this paper would be "Why Should President Ford Feel it Necessary to Repudiate a Word While Retaining a Policy?" Perhaps the answer lies in the election year politics of the United States. Ever since World War II, anti-Communism and a strong defense establishment have been the platforms and issues on which both parties and most politicians could always fall back when there wasn't much else of interest to talk about in an election year. Over the years, candidates have vied with one another to prove their greater patriotism by their willingness to engage in higher defence spending "to prevent the spread of Communism". Success has varied, but tactics in an election year have not. Though the American people have undoubtedly embraced the attempt to move away from cold war tensions, there is still a residual, basic and unreasoning fear of Communism, which is periodically exploited by some and which can never be ignored by anyone running for public office in the United States. SOME EXTREME VIEWS Just to give an example of how deep this continuing attitude goes, it must be recognized that there is in our country a number of theologically untrained, biblically ignorant, self-annointed ministers of the gospel, who preach week after week to millions of listening citizens in continuing "anti-Communist crusades". One very prominent group right now says that the United States is losing its place in the world because: (1) we lack the will to resist Communism (without saying where or how); and, (2) pornography. The order could be reversed because they seem to equate the two about equally as serious causes for the alleged coming denouement. There are large numbers of other citizens who do not believe that the United States should even have an exchange of ambassadors or any relationships at all with any Communist country. Admittedly, these are extreme views which are held by a minority of citizens. Nevertheless, this element of our society is substantial in numbers, vocal in expression, and must evidently be appeased in any election year. Recent political events and polls lead me to believe, however, that the possibility of a demogogic campaign on the issue of detente is receding. Secretary Kissinger's rating by polltakers is high and the candidates themselves, after a little experimenting, have been generally approving of a policy which supports improved US-Soviet relations. As one columnist said, "The implication seems to be fairly clear that a substantial majority of Americans want their leaders in Washington to continue to try to avoid a war with the Soviet Union. They no longer seem to regard Doctor Kissinger himself as superman, but they have not brought the extremely critical view that détente has simply been a oneway street for Moscow". DÉTENTE AND ANGOLA Having given that brief, superficial review of our quadrennial circus, let us examine briefly the elements of detente and the problems which face us. Essentially, détente must be understood as being nothing more than a lessening of tensions, a broadening of contacts, a tentative approach toward expanded trade and halting of the arms race. Détente is not now, and never was, an alliance or even a reconciliation of adversaries. On the American side, it was defined as a relationship in which the goal of both sides was to maintain peace, preserve vital interests, and adjust differences in a more understanding atmosphere. On the Soviet side, the corresponding term is "razryadka”, which literally means "taking the charge out of a weapon". That is almost the same basic meaning as "détente", which originally stood for easing the tensions on a crossbow. However, to the USSR, detente has never meant maintaining the status quo in developing countries and it has been quite clear in saying so. They have affirmed that there could not be detente in ideology. Thus, the whole debate has been brought to a head over Angola. More about that in a moment. The factors which impell us toward détente-and we must all remember that de Gaulle was the first to recognize the need to take positive steps to change the cold war attitudes and climate-are generally recognized to be the following: (1) the danger of global destruction through nuclear war; (2) the Soviet need for Western technology and US trade benefits from commerce with them; (3) adverse Sino-Soviet relations; (4) Soviet achievement of near strategic nuclear parity and the prohibitive costs of an arms race; and, (5) a mutual desire to establish a reliable structure for managing direct crises. Some of the barriers to détente are recognized to be: (1) the Soviet view that the ideological struggle between Socialism and Capitalism must continue throughout the world, no matter what the relationship is between the two super powers; (2) each nation sees the other as the only major military threat to its own security and thereby feels compelled to challenge any action which might unfavorably tip the delicate balance of power; and, (3) suspicions born of the long cold war period are engrained on both sides. A VOLATILE RELATION It must be remembered that detente has had a rocky road, up to this point. The Soviets cancelled the 1972 trade agreement with the United States in response to Congressional action in the Trade Reform Bill, linking most favoured nation treatment to liberalised Soviet emigration policies. MBFR and SALT II negotiations have not culminated in agreement. There was a potential confrontation in the Middle East in 1973, which demonstrated the volatility of the relationship. Excluding the political factors present, which I mentioned earlier, the combination of heavy Russian spending in their own defence establishment, expansion of their naval forces and Angola have brought about a renewal of analysis and debate in US governmental circles. Though the US has said the outcome in Angola is not going to affect the SALT II negotiations and is not going to mean another grain embargo, the US has delayed three Cabinet level meetings of Soviet and American joint commissions indefinitely. The State Department said, "In light of the situation in Angola, we felt we could not conduct our business with the Soviet Union as usual". These conflicting statements about our reaction to Angola should not be confusing. There is a certain amount of face-saving involved (we were in Angola, too); there is a certain amount of pacifying citizens at home; and there is the need to convey an attitude to the USSR. The increased expenditures for defence this year will also provide a signal, if one is really needed. DÉTENTE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES In my opinion, the immediate future of detente is tied to Russian actions in developing countries in the next few years. The people of the US truly want peace with the USSR; but we are wary and skeptical, and rapid expansion of Russian influence can lead to a hardening of anti-Russian attitudes in the US very quickly. On the other hand, the climate for détente is opportune for improvement if there is no radical or dramatic event in the next few years which will be perceived to a threat to American interests. After the election, a new SALT treaty and expanding trade could renew the expectations that were so widely felt prior to Angola. A Library of Congress research brief has this to say, "Détente has change markedly Soviet-American relations since early 1972 ... The substance of the relationship has changed markedly. A multilevel framework for orderly negotiations has been established and potentially significant agreements have been reached in the fields of strategic armaments, international exchange and science and technology. Economic relations have also expanded. The magnitude of the improved relationship is evident by the number of treaties. Of the sum, 105 treaties and other international agreements with the Soviet Union since establishing relationship in 1933, 58 were concluded between January 1969 and May 1974. Forty-one of them were signed during 1972-1974 .. The political and power factors that created the rationale for detente are not likely to dissolve within the foreseeable future". Modern history does not offer much hope that European nations or the United States can avoid war for a prolonged period. But one has to hope, and right now this appraisal is basically an optimistic one. "IS DÉTENTE DEAD?” Paper by Joseph E. Karth The world-renowed Albert Einsten, after becoming an honored refugee in the United States, once declared: "I do not know with what weapons World War III will be fought. But I do know that World War IV will be fought with rocks". Grim as that prediction was, the prospects for our world's future that loom today are undoubtedly even grimmer, because it is possible that the rocks anywhere would be too "hot", radioactively, to handle. But that ominous prospect is a measure of the chaos, confusion and drift that now mark international relations and particularly relations between the nations of the free world on the one hand and the Communist bloc on the other. I have been asked to make a keynote presentation to this meeting on the theme: "Is Détente Dead?" I would like, if I may, for purposes of a more fruitful discussion to pose the question more realistically: "Was Détente Ever Alive?" The change is not rhetorical; to the contrary, it is pressingly historical and as such has decisive meaning for the world of today and the world of the future. The question, "Is Détente Dead?" suggests the possibility that it may not have died and that therefore it might be revived and even made healthy. The decision by President Ford to abandon the word "détente" makes our revised question more pertinent. DID DÉTENTE EVER EXIST? There are three major aspects of our question. Was there ever actually such an international agreement as détente? Was there ever détente in the sense that the people of the free world or the people of the Communist world or the people within any country had a common understanding of the term? And finally and most importantly, was detente ever an operational part of Soviet Russia's foreign policy or its pragmatic practices? It is my conviction and the conviction of a growing number of people in the United States and throughout the free world today, that the answer must be "no" and that in no realistic sense did détente ever exist. But before the doubts began to rise about the very existence of détente, a marked change of attitude toward détente became clear in all sections of the American population. Public opinion polls taken in 1975 and 1976 disclosed a mounting American distrust of the Soviet Union's motivations, intentions and actions and finally a widening rejection of détente itself. The idea of detente, we remember, came on the international scene in May 1972. It had everything in its favour. The American people approved; the press approved; national leaders and the American intellectual community approved. For good reason. Détente was seen as the end of the Cold war, the easing of frictions, armament races and the danger of open hostilities. Détente was hope; and Americans as well as other millions of people in the free world wanted, most of all, hope. CRITICISM OF DÉTENTE Although frequently antagonists on both international and domestic issues, the Wall Street Journal, the voice of American business and industry, and the AFL-CIO, representing the American labor movement, are now criticising detente in language that could easily be interchangeable. The Journal declared last month (March 10) that "Détente is dead. And yet (Secretary of State Kissinger) refuses to recognize it". As for American labor, AFL-CIO unions, individually and collectively in convention, unanimously condemn détente and all its works from the "one-sided" exchange of technology to the costly sale of grain to the Soviet Union. On the political scene there has been no outcry from the Republican Party since its leader, President Ford, publicly repudiated detente and announced that henceforth United States policy would be something called "peace through strength”. On the extreme "right", Ronald Reagan, Ford's rival for the Republican presidential nomination, seems to consider détente a fraud that should promptly be killed if it is not already a corpse. The Democratic Party, in position papers being prepared for its national convention in July, will deny that détente ever worked and will advocate its replacement with a new philosophy and new implementing structures. Within the US government there is occurring a policy shift much deeper and broader than any abandonment of a term or shibboleth. The nation's most important and influential newspapers have recently noted "a serious stiffening in the United States' attitude toward the Soviet Union". This stiffening derives, of course, from the recurrently bellicose and imperialist actions of the USSR in Africa and elsewhere. But it also derives from an increasing doubt among the leaders and rank-and-file of both parties that détente has ever been a two-way street, that it has ever been a reciprocal operation. A CONSENSUS ACHIEVED So from every area of American life-public opinion polls, organised labour, business, the major political parties, and the government itself—there has arisen a consensus. And that consensus has been based on one or all of the following: That détente has not achieved its primary purpose of relaxing international tensions; that détente has not restrained the Soviet Union's military adventurism; that détente has never been an effective two-way street; and that, in fact, détente has operated at a disadvantage to the free world. The Cold War-including, the not-so-cold occupation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia-dominated international relations in the 1950s and 1960s. Then with the fall of Vietnam and the departure of American troops came détente. Today, after nearly four years of détente, the question for the free world has become; Was détente a delusion? Was détente merely a continuation of the Cold War by the Soviets and a prayer for peace by Americans? THE SOVIET RECORD To answer that, we need of course to look back on these four years and review the record of the Soviet Union-not what the Soviet Union said but what it did. That record includes: The successful invasion and takeover of Angola by Soviet arms carried by 4,000 to 6,000 Cuban troops; Similar Russian military threats, most of them continuing, in Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and elsewhere in Africa; The provision of vast amounts of Russian military hardware of all varieties to Syria, Egypt and other Arab countries, plus the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), all of whom are openly determined to wipe out democratic Israel, the free world's only ally in the Middle East; The strenuous, though unsuccessful, Soviet effort to capture the fledgling government of Portugal; The USSR's enormous buildup of its own military power, and the continuous enlargement of its army, navy, and airforce strength; The deadlock after deadlock, by Soviet choice, in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during 1975 and 1976; The repeated Kremlin attempts to whip the large Communist parties of Italy and France into conformity with Soviet policies; Accelerated and widened involvement of the Soviet Union in Africa; The Soviet Union's corruption of the United Nations by pressuring the Arab and African member states to vote for the outrageous resolution equating Zionism with racism; The perversion of the International Labour Organization (ILO) for Soviet purposes and the ILO's gradual degradation into a Soviet tool; The USSR stalling tactics on the Helsinki agreement to ease the exchange of people, news and ideas; The Soviet government's intensified warfare on a substantial number of its citizens because they have indicated a desire to emigrate, including the persecution, arrests, Siberian exile and commitments to mental asylums of those citizens; |