industry. In some social sciences, such as anthropology, training in the field is a requirement for the Master's degree. In most schools a Ph.D. is the usual requirement for a faculty position and for the more responsible administrative and research positions. For the most part a Bachelor's degree is not adequate preparation for entrance into professional employment in any of the social sciences or in psychology."

It is concluded, then, that a person who possesses the equivalent of a United States Master's degree major in anthropology, is a member of the professions. In the instant case, the beneficiary does not possess the equivalent of such a degree. Consequently, he is not eligible for classification under section 203 (a) (3) as a member of the professions based on his claimed profession of anthropologist.

ORDER: It is ordered that the petition to classify the status of Medayil Kesavapillai Rajagopala Menon as a preference immigrant under section 203 (a) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, be and the same is hereby denied.

MATTER OF PATEL

Application for Classification as Refugee

A-13788674

Decided by Regional Commissioner October 14, 1968

A native of Kenya who lived in that country with her parents until her nonimmigrant entry into the United States in 1964, and who asserts unwillingness to return to that country because of fear of persecution because of race, is denied refugee classification under section 203 (a) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, since Kenya is not a country within the "general area of the Middle East" as that term is defined in section 203 (a) (7), supra; further, there is no indication, nor has it been asserted, that Kenya was a Communist or Communist-dominated country. ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: Herman Schaier, Esquire

8 West 40th Street

New York, New York 10018

This application is before the Regional Commissioner for review on certification of the District Director's denial of the application for refugee classification under section 203 (a) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended.

The District Director denied the application on the basis that the applicant had failed to establish at the time she came to the United States that she was fleeing from Kenya because she or her parents had been subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political convictions; or, that Kenya is a country or area that is Communist-dominated or that it is within the general area of the Middle East as contemplated by the statute.

In an interview with an officer of this Service at New York on July 22, 1968 the applicant stated that she was born in Nairobi, Kenya on June 7, 1946; that she lived in Kenya with her parents until she arrived in the United States on December 19, 1964 as a nonimmigrant student to pursue a course at the Lowell Business School in Binghamton, New York; that when she arrived in the United States it was her intention to return to Kenya at the completion of her studies; that after 1966 the situation changed in

Kenya becoming such that she would be subject to persecution because of her race if she returned thereto and, as a consequence, she has decided to apply for refugee status. She further stated that her parents have remained in Kenya where her father owns and operates a business and that her parents have obtained Kenyan citizenship while she is a British citizen.

The applicant now seeks to be classfied as a refugee under the provisio of section 203 (a) (7) of the Act in connection with an application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act. The attorney for the applicant has forwarded a brief in connection with the certification of the case to the Regional Commissioner. He submits that the statute does not require the showing of actual persectuion but that the applicant must show inability or unwillingness to return because of "persecution" or "fear of persectuion"; that the intent of the law is to grant refugee status to one who through no fault of her own finds herself without a country to which she can return without being subjected to persecution and discrimination; that the applicant must be considered as having constructively rather than physically fled Kenya; and that section 203 (a) (7) clearly circumscribes the geographical area coming within its scope since Kenya lies in the general area of the Middle East as defined by the statute.

Section 203 (a) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, reads in relevant part as follows:

Conditional entry shall next be made available . . . to aliens who satisfy the Immigration and Naturalization Service officer at an examination in any non-Communist or non-Communist-dominated country, (A) that (i) because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion they have fled (I) from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any country within the general area of the Middle East . . . For the purpose of the foregoing the term "general area of the Middle East" means the area between and including (1) Libya on the west; (2) Turkey on the north; (3) Pakistan on the east; and (4) Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia on the south... (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no indication, nor has it been asserted, that Kenya was a Communist or Communist-dominated country or area. Instead, counsel contends that Kenya lies in the general area of the Middle East as defined by the statute. In determining the meaning of the term "general area of the Middle East" the statutory definition, supra, reveals that it is the area between and including those countries named therein. The southern geographical boundary is listed as Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. In consulting the Rand McNally Cosmopolitan World Atlas, 1962 Edition, on page 3 thereof Kenya clearly is shown to be south of Saudi Arabia and

Ethiopia and therefore not within the statutory definition of the term "general area of the Middle East." As a consequence thereof the applicant has failed to qualify for consideration under section 203 (a) (7) of the Act since the statute clearly indicates that the individual must have fled from a Communist or Communist-dominated country or area or from a country within the "general area of the Middle East" which is specifically defined geographically. Kenya does not fall within this definition. As a consequence, no purpose would be served in considering whether the applicant fled from Kenya because of persecution of fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.

For the reasons set out above the application for refugee classification is denied and the decision of the District Director is affirmed.

It is ordered that the decision of the District Director be and the same is hereby affirmed.

MATTER OF DIAZ-POU

In Adjustment of Status Proceedings

A-17197570

Decided by District Director January 27, 1969

Applicant, who was admitted to the United States as a foreign government official under section 101 (a) (15) (A) (i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and whose official status has been terminated, is statutorily eligible for adjustment of status to that of a permanent resident under section 13 of the Act of September 11, 1957, notwithstanding she is a "special immigrant" as defined in section 101 (a) (27) (A) of the Act, as amended.

The applicant is a 53-year-old female, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. She last entered the United States on August 24, 1966 at Miami, Florida, under the provisions of section 101 (a) (15) (A) (i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended.

The applicant was notified to the Department of State on April 10, 1962 as Consul General for the Dominican Republic at Los Angeles, California. She officially terminated her position with the government of the Dominican Republic on July 14, 1966. She desires to remain in the United States to reside with her United States citizen son, Manelik Pou.

The applicant is presently unemployed, but has substantial savings which are adequate for her immediate needs. In addition her son has guaranteed her support.

The good moral character of the applicant has been established. She is not inadmissible to the United States under the excluding provisions of the Act, except for lack of entry documents. She has fulfilled all the requirements for eligibility under section 13 of the Act of September 11, 1957. The Secretary of State has no objection to the granting of permanent resident status.

The applicant, though a special immigrant, is eligible for the benefits of section 13 of the Act of September 11, 1957. She is not prima facie eligible for adjustment of status under any other pro