(Residence.) his civil and political rights. Chase v. Miller, 41 Penn. St. R. 404. To constitute residence within the state for the purpose of exercising the rights of an elector, two things must concur; first, the party must have actually resided in the state one year before tendering his vote; secondly, such residence must have been with the intent to become a citizen of the state, and to abandon the citizenship he may have previously had in another state; mere residence for the purposes of business or pleasure, unaccompanied with an intention to abandon the former citizenship, is not sufficient; such temporary residents are not citizens of the state, within the meaning of the constitution. Anon., Common Pleas, Philadelphia, October 1848. To constitute residence there must be an intention to remain; but this intention is entirely consistent with a purpose to remove at some future indefinite time. Miller v. Thompson, 2 Cong. Elect. Cas. 118; Pigott's Case, Ibid. 463. Domicil or residence, in a legal sense, is determined by the intention of the party; he cannot have two homes at the same time; when he acquires another, he loses that home which he has exchanged for the new one; but to effect this change, there must be both act and intention. State v. Frest, 4 Harrington 558; McDaniels' Case, 3 Penn. L. J. 310. When an elector removes his family to a county, with the intention of residing there, that is the county where he should vote, while his family remains there, though he passes his time and works in an adjoining county. People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 124. When by birth or residence one has acquired a fixed domicil, a temporary absence, on business or pleasure, with an intention of returning, will not work a change of domicil, with reference to the right of suffrage. State v. Judge of Ninth Judicial Circuit, 13 Ala. 806; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350. The fact that an elector is a soldier in the army of the United States, does not disqualify him from voting at his place of residence; but he cannot acquire a residence, so as to qualify him as a voter, by being stationed at a military post, whilst in the service of the United States. People v. Riley, 15 Cal. 48; Hunt v. Richards, 4 Kansas 549; Biddle v. Wing, 1 Cong. Elect. Cas. 504. A student at a college, being of age, and otherwise qualified, and being also emancipated from his father's family, is entitled to vote by reason of his residence there. Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Farlee v. Runk, 2 Cong. Elect. Cas. 87. See Opinion of the Judges, 5 Met. 587; Cush. Elect. Cas. 436. Paupers do not acquire a residence, so as to entitle them to vote, by living in an (Payment of taxes.) Opinion of the almshouse. Monroe v. Jackson, 2 Cong. Elect. Cas. 98. And so also, persons who reside on lands ceded to the United States for navy yards, forts and arsenals, where there is no other reservation of jurisdiction to the state than that of serving civil and criminal process therein, do not, by such residence, acquire the rights of an elector. Judges, 1 Met. 580; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. R. 306. And although an elector does not lose his residence by confinement in a prison, neither does he acquire one in the election district in which the prison is located. Anon., 2 Brewst. 144. The thirty days' residence in a county required to entitled a citizen to vote, must be computed by excluding the day of the election. People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 124. CATLIN v. SMITH. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. MARCH TERM 1816. (REPORTED 2 Sergeant & Rawle 267.) [Payment of taxes.] To entitle a citizen, otherwise qualified, to vote, on the ground of the payment of a state or county tax, it must have been assessed upon him, individually, at least six months preceding such election; it is not enough, that it was laid upon the county of which he is a resident. It seems, that it is not required that such tax should be a personal or poll-tax. YEATES, J. This was an action on the case by Charles Catlin, the plaintiff, against Samuel Smith, the defendant, to recover damages for the act of the defendant, as one of the inspectors of the election, in refusing to receive the plaintiff's vote, at a presidential election held in the city of Philadelphia on the 30th of October 1812. The declaration set forth that the plaintiff was a native citizen of Pennsylvania, above the age of twenty-two years; that he had resided within the state for two years next before the said election, and within Walnut ward in the said city, for eighteen months prior to the (Payment of taxes.) same, and then resided therein; that on the 29th October 1812, be caused himself to be assessed by the assessor of said ward, for a county tax, which had been laid on the county, but not assessed upon him, at least six months before the said election: that having, on the said 29th October, paid the said tax, he offered himself to vote, and offered to prove the facts above related, to the satisfaction of the said defendant, but that the defendant refused to receive his vote, fraudulently intending to deprive him of his privilege. To this declaration the defendant demurred, assigning for cause, that, by the constitution of Pennsylvania, every citizen offering to vote must, within two years next preceding the election, have paid a state or county tax, which had been assessed at least six months before the election; whereas, by the plaintiff's own showing, the tax which he paid, had been assessed only the day before the election. Wallace and Rawle, for the defendant. C. J. Ingersoll, contrà. TILGHMAN, C. J. Charles Catlin, the plaintiff, has brought this action against Samuel Smith, the defendant, for refusing to receive his vote, at an election of electors of a president and vice-president of the United States. The defendant was an inspector of the election, and refused the plaintiff's vote, because the tax which he had paid prior to the election, had not been assessed on him six months before the election; the plaintiff had called on the assessor of his ward, and caused himself to be assessed personally, for a county tax, on the 29th October, and paid it the same day; the election was held on the 30th of October; the county tax had been laid more than six months before the election. The question depends on the first section of the third article of the constitution of the commonwealth, by which it is declared, that "every freeman, of the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the state two years (Payment of taxes.) next before the election, and within that time paid a state or county tax, which shall have been assessed at least six months before the election, shall enjoy the rights of an elector." In order to ascertain the meaning of the term "assessed," we must consider the mode of taxation prevailing at the time of adopting the constitution, and the sense in which that word had been used in prior acts of assembly. The system of laying, assessing and collecting taxes, is to be found in the act of the 20th March 1724-5 (1 Dall. Laws 209). An account was to be taken of all persons and all property subject to taxation; the commissioners and assessors met, and made an estimate of the necessary expenses of the county for the ensuing year, and then the sum which each individual was to pay, either on account of his property or his person, was fixed, and this was called the assessment of each person. That the word "assessment" was used in this sense, will appear from several parts of the act, and particularly, from the 5th, 10th, 13th and 16th sections; in the 5th section it is said, that the assessors shall equally and impartially assess themselves and all others; the 10th section provides, that if any person or persons shall find him or herself aggrieved by any of the said assessments, supposing the same to be unequal, he or they may appeal to the commissioners; the 13th section speaks of collecting and receiving from the persons assessed, the several sums mentioned in the duplicates; and it is enacted in the 16th section, that if any person, so rated or assessed, shall neglect or refuse to pay the sum so assessed, it shall be lawful for the collector to levy on his goods, &c. The plaintiff insists that the constitution intends a tax laid and assessed on property and persons in general, at least six months before the election; but this will not accord either with the sense in which the words had been generally used, or with the reason for introducing them into the constitution. The voter is to have paid the tax assessed, not upon others, but (Payment of taxes.) upon himself; a tax assessed upon others, is no tax as to him. Why was an assessment, six months prior to the election, deemed necessary? It was not merely to induce the citizens to pay their taxes; the object was of more importance; it was, to secure peace and certainty, and to prevent tumult and confusion at elections. Six months before the election, when the passions were not inflamed with the approaching contest, every man might give in his name to the assessors, and thus a register would be formed, showing, with certainty, every person "who was entitled to a vote;" but as the election drew near, the minds of men became heated, and great exertions were made, attended often with tumult, to procure votes, by causing persons who had no property to be assessed. I believe this often took place on the day of election, involved the inspectors and judges in difficulties, for want of time to ascertain the qualifications of men thus suddenly brought to the polls, and of course, was productive of altercation and hot blood. These were the evils to be prevented; and they will be prevented, if no person is permitted to vote, unless the tax was assessed on him six months before the election. Our system of taxation has been altered, in some respects, since the adoption of the constitution; but the alteration is by no means opposed to my construction. The commissioners are to cause transcripts of the assessments to be transmitted to the assessors or collectors, on or before the second Monday in April in each year, so that the assessment is always completed six months before the general election, which is held on the second Tuesday in October. The assessment being thus closed, it has not been shown by what authority an assessor has afterwards exercised the right of assessing individuals, who have applied to him near the time of election; nor has it been shown how any assessment can legally be made without the intervention of the commissioners; yet, in the case before us, the assessor appears to have acted independently |