center, that is also the seat of our Federal government, is perhaps unique in the visibility with which these problems have been surfaced. The direct involvement of all Federal branches of government in the District setting is certainly unique to this city.

The most visible national and local problem in the District during the 1960's, as in most other urban areas, was "crime". In response to the perceived crisis in crime and closely related anti-social events, the President established a Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia on July 16, 1965. During the intervening years since its report was published in 1966, the D. C. Crime Commission has played a central role in law enforcement/criminal justice and related reforms in the Nation's Capitol.

The purpose of this staff paper is to develop a current interpretive commentary of the Commission's work within the broader context of similar past commission efforts. The strengths, weaknesses and results of these other efforts are presented as a framework for considering the impact, and constraints, that have resulted during the past four years of Commission implementation. It is hoped that this commentary will provide a timely basis for analyzing and considering the following factors:

Matters affecting the general effectiveness, and limita-
tions, of commission approaches and suggestions for
strengthening their possible use and evaluation in the
future.

The overall experience relating to the D. C. Crime
Commission's work during the past four years.

An identification and assessment of remaining areas
raised by the Commission that may have continuing
relevance in the District.

The current overall status of law enforcement/crim-
inal justice planning, management and operations in
the District.

It is particularly appropriate that the District now take a retrospective and current assessment of the D. C. Crime Commission effort. This

is true for a number of related reasons:

Sufficient time has now elapsed to adequately judge
the actual strengths and weaknesses of the commis-
sion approach as applied in the District of Columbia,
and to relate these to general commission approaches
continuing at the national and local level.

● A host of major external events and significant changes
have taken place subsequent to issuance of the Commis-
sion's report in 1966.

In addition to external changes, substantial new mach-
inery has been established in the District and elsewhere
to address the problems of crime and crime-related
phenomena; this machinery has raised many new issues,
proposed solutions, and effected institutional arrange-
ments to meet crime problems.

• An assessment of the commission approach will provide
an additional background ingredient for considering fur-
ther short and longer range problems, needs, and oppor-
tunities in the District.

In order to facilitate discussion of these issues, this paper is organ

V: Summary of Findings and Recommendations

In summary, it appears fitting that the closing active phase of the Commission's significant contribution to the District's recent efforts to control and reduce crime should be a spur to meeting the large remaining tasks before the District, and the nation.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF PAST COMMISSION ACTIVITIES

Independent, "blue ribbon" commissions have been one traditional public mechanism used to respond to critical social problems. The rationale for establishing commissions, with varying degrees of independence from the organizations or officials involved in dealing with these problems, appears to include one or more of the following:

⚫ Insuring the objectivity of an inquiry.

• Providing a mechanism for investigating sensitive and
controversial matters.

• Developing a timely response to complex issues.

Providing a focal point for public decisions and private
involvement.

⚫ Giving the impression that "something is being done"
in response to a crisis.

Providing a depth of analysis that cannot be developed
by on-going organizations.

The overall effectiveness of commissions in actually impelling change is increasingly being called into question. Public confidence in this mechanism appears to be declining. Examples of the apparent failure of commissions to initiate meaningful action are many. Three cur

rent examples suffice to make this point.

1.

2.

The Eisenhower Commission on Violence found no
cabinet level or other executive official to accept
and respond to its report;

The National Urban Coalition pointed out that "The
(Kerner) Commission report itself was received with

3.

loud official silence.

It was released without White House ceremony, and Administration comment was scant.

The Cleveland Commission of the 1920's contained many
of the principles of judicial reform that were later
resurrected by the National Crime Commission in
1967 and are only now being pursued with noticeable
results.

The frustration with commissions that are established, and issue

reports of varying weights that then are shelved, was eloquently stated by Kenneth Clark when he was called to testify before the Kerner Commission:

"I must again in candor say to you members of this Commission, it is a kind of Alice in Wonderland, with the same moving picture re shown over and over again the same analysis, the same recommendations and the same inaction. "**

Testimony by officials involved in recent commission efforts before

the Senate Sub-Committee on Administrative Practice and Procedures further underscores rising concern over the apparent ineffectiveness of this approach. The usefulness of commissions was generally supported by the Committee's witnesses. However, these statements, taken together with other available background material, indicate that commission results have been mixed at best.

Constraints upon commission impact arise both due to external and internal circumstances. Commissions are appointed most usually as the result of either one or more disasters or tragedies (such as the deaths of

*One Year Later, Urban America, Inc. and The Urban Coalition, 1969, P. 104

**Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, pp. 29, 483.

Senator Kennedy and Martin Luther King) or in response to what appears to be an accelerating problem affecting not only government, but the general public (e.g., the rise in violent crime and civil disorder experienced in the 1960's). It may be said with some justification that the precipitating events are often forgotten during the period of time required for a commission to carry out its mandate. Thus, the riots of 1968 were generally forgotten by the time the Kerner Commission report was issued in 1969 as the Vietnam War, environmental degradation, and the Presidential election vied for public attention.

Other continuing and vexing problems associated with commissions are at least three-fold: (1) a commission insulated from "political influence" often is the source of some embarrassment to the executive that appointed it; as a result the executive parent often disowns the uncomfortable conclusions reached by his own "child"; (2) commissions generally have not given substantial attention to the important questions of implementation mechanisms, administrative responsibility, fiscal implications, realistic time frames for meeting its objectives, and priorities among and between its various findings and recommendations; and (3) commissions have rarely maintained a balance between the demands for difficult research requirements and fact-gathering, and the need to translate its findings into tangible public awareness and sustained political activity.

In addition, problems of effective implementation are tied to the mandate, staffing and scope of commission activities. The Eisenhower