Opinion of the Court 100 C. Cls. all disputes concerning questions of fact arisunder this contract shall be decided by the contracting officer or his duly authorized representative, subject to written appeal by the contractor within thirty days to the head of the department concerned, whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto as to such questions of fact. There is no proof that this finding was arbitrary or grossly erroneous. The contracting officer's figures are not accurate, but neither are those of plaintiff. Which figures are the more accurate we are unable to say. In such circumstances, it is obvious that we cannot say that the contracting officer's action was arbitrary or grossly erroneous. Therefore, we must take it as true that only 11 percent was hardpan. This was not a material difference from the conditions indicated by the specifications. Article 15 of the contract also forecloses plaintiff's recovery for the removal of the deposits in the channel after it had been dredged. The plaintiff claims that the removal of this material comes under article 17 of the specifications, while defendant says it comes under article 21. Article 17 provides: Shoaling. Should the last examination of the contract work, extended to include the entire area, show shoaling since the previous dredging under the contract, or shoaling for which the contractor is evidently not responsible, and which shall include shoals in the finished channel formed by the natural lowering of side slopes, between the time of dredging and that of the last examination herein referred to, redredging at the contract price, so far as permitted by available funds, may be done if agreeable to both the contractor and the contracting officer. Article 21 provides: 21. Misplaced material.-Any material that is deposited elsewhere than in places designated or approved by the contracting officer will not be paid for, and the contractor may be required to redredge such material and deposit it where directed. Should the contractor, during the progress of the work, lose, dump, throw overboard, sink, or misplace any material, plant, machinery, or appliance, which in the 80 Opinion of the Court opinion of the contracting officer may be dangerous to or obstruct navigation, he shall recover and remove the same with the utmost dispatch. The contractor shall give immediate notice, with description and location of such obstructions, to the contracting officer or inspector, and when required shall mark or buoy such obstructions until the same are removed. Should he refuse, neglect, or delay compliance with the above requirement, such obstructions may be removed by the contracting officer, and the cost of such removal may be deducted from any money due or to become due the contractor, or may be recovered under his bond. Plaintiff claimed that the material it was required to remove was refuse from a paper mill up the river from the site of the work. The contracting officer found that it was material which the plaintiff had placed on the bank and which had sloughed off into the water. The plaintiff appealed from the finding of the contracting officer, but his decision was affirmed. Article 15 makes his decision final and conclusive, and we cannot say that this decision was either arbitrary or grossly erroneous. Plaintiff's claim for the remission of liquidated damages is based upon the discovery of an unexpected amount of hardpan. Article 9 relieves the contractor from the assessment of liquidated damages for delays due to "unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor." The contractor was required to notify the contracting officer of any delays, who in turn was required to "ascertain the facts and extent of the delay, and his findings of facts thereon shall be final and conclusive, subject to appeal to the head of the department The contractor first complained of hardpan on December 1, 1933, after the work had been going on for ten months. The contracting officer held that it was not entitled to the extension of time it requested. This ruling was affirmed by the Chief of Engineers. We find that it was neither arbitrary nor erroneous, and it is, therefore, conclusive. Plaintiff's last claim is for increased costs incurred as a result of the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Opinion of the Court 100 C. Cls. Plaintiff's instant contract was exempt from the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the President's Reemployment Agreement and the Code of Fair Competition; nevertheless, considerable pressure was brought to bear on plaintiff to increase wages and shorten hours on this contract as prescribed in the President's Reemployment Agreement, and plaintiff finally did so. At first the contracting officer had told plaintiff that it would be required to comply with the National Industrial Recovery Act, and that the contract price would be adjusted accordingly; but later plaintiff was advised that the Chief of Engineers had overruled the contracting officer and had held that the contract would not be converted to one under the National Industrial Recovery Act. As unreasonable as it may seem, the contracting officer, nevertheless, transmitted to plaintiff later a complaint received by the Chief of Engineers of plaintiff's failure to comply with the President's Reemployment Agreement on this contract, and asked plaintiff what it had to say about it. A little later the Central Labor Union got after plaintiff and demanded that it pay PRA wages from then on, and, in addition, to pay its employees back PRA pay. The plaintiff replied that it would be glad to do so if the defendant would reimburse it. The Union then took up, with the contracting officer the matter of whether or not the Government would reimburse the contractor, and reported to plaintiff that the contracting officer had said it was entitled to reimbursement under the Act of 1934 (U. S. Code, Title 41, section 28). The plaintiff took the matter up with the contracting officer directly, who confirmed what he had told the Union people. Then the Monroe Business Men's Association came to plaintiff urging that it comply with the President's Reemployment Agreement. Yielding to all this pressure, plaintiff increased wages of some of its employees from 30 to 40 cents an hour, and continued to pay these wages until the contract was completed. This increased its costs for wages and compensation insurance by the amount of $1,059.60. Except for the passage 80 Opinion of the Court of the National Industrial Recovery Act, neither the contracting officer nor the Labor Union nor the Monroe Business Men's Association would have said a word about the wages plaintiff was paying. This law prompted them to do it; it set in motion the forces that made it necessary for plaintiff to increase wages and, therefore, we are of opinion that the increase can be fairly said to be the direct result of the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act. See National Fireproofing Corp. v. United States, Nos. 44004 and 44067, decided June 7, 1943 (99 C. Cls. 608). Plaintiff is entitled to recover on this account the sum of $1,059.60. Plaintiff also claims that the increased wages which it paid the crew of the dredge Peru was the result of the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act. We do not think so.. The crew of this dredge were being paid National Industrial Recovery Act wages on another job. When the dredge and crew were brought to this job plaintiff necessarily had to continue to pay the same wages; but it did not have to bring the dredge and crew to this job; it might have used a different dredge or a different crew whom it would not have been required to pay NIRA wages. The increase was a result of its own act. Plaintiff lost a great deal of money on this contract, but the defendant was not responsible therefor. On the whole case the plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of $1,059.60. Judgment for this amount will be entered. It is so ordered. MADDEN, Judge; LITTLETON, Judge; and WHALEY, Chief Justice, concur. JONES, Judge, took no part in the decision of this case. 100 C. Cls. Reporter's Statement of the Case FRAZIER-DAVIS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 44803. Decided October 4, 1943] On the Proofs Government contract; labor from relief rolls.-Following the decision in Seeds & Derham v. United States, 92 C. Cls. 97, it is held that plaintiff is not entitled to recover where, under the terms of the contract, labor was taken from the relief rolls, and where the proof shows that the labor so obtained was average relief-roll labor, and there is no showing that any rules and regulations were enforced which the contractor did not know about in advance, or that the labor was of a quality below that which the contractor had a right to expect. Same; quantum meruit.-Judgment on the basis of quantum meruit can not be allowed where there is a valid contract between the parties. Same. Where the Government in the invitation for bids or in specifications makes a misrepresentation of material fact or conceals material facts and information known to it but not available to or known to the bidder, damages by way of excess costs may under the implied terms of the contract be recovered in a suit on the contract. Same. In the instant case it is held there was no misrepresentation by defendant of any fact which it was under a legal duty to disclose to bidders, or of any fact known to it and unknown and unavailable to bidders; and the proof does not show fraud, duress, accident, or such mistake as would justify the application of equitable principles under the equitable jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Claims by Section 145 of the Judicial Code. (U. S. Code, Title 28, Section 250.) Same; decision of contracting officer final under terms of contract. Where under the provisions of the contract the decisions of the contracting officer upon the facts, when affirmed by the head of the department, were final; and where such findings are not shown to have been arbitrary or grossly erroneous; it is held that plaintiff is not entitled to recover. The Reporter's statement of the case: Mr. M. Walton Hendry, for the plaintiff. Mr. William A. Stern, II, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea, for the defendant. Plaintiff seeks to recover $400,666.50 as damages for alleged breach of contract, representing alleged excess costs plus |