ous codes under our jurisdiction there were 74 mills. Those were only what we might call discrimination-on-account-of-union-activities complaints. There were other complaints. There were other complaints and other mills involved concerning hours and wages, the strecth-out, and general conditions; but in many instances discrimination complaints would be against a certain mill, and likewise we would have an hour-and-wage complaint against the same mill. If we should attempt to build up those mills on the basis of complaints, we would have as many mills in the country as we had complaints-which does not exist.

Mr. HARTLEY. What percentage of complaints were justified, according to your findings?

Mr. TAYLOR. May I defer a discussion of that for a while?
Mr. HARTLEY. Certainly. Go ahead in your own way.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

For the fourth question I was asked:

When you state that the cases have been adjusted, do you mean that the persons affected have been restored to employment?

Answering that I will say that a statement that the cases or complaints have been adjusted does not necessarily mean that the persons affected have been restored to employment for the reason that all of the cases or complaints do not relate to the termination of employment. Many of the complaints received by us did not involve the question of employment. A susbtantial number of the complaints involved the maximum hour and minimum wage provisions of the codes. Other complaints related to the work assignments of the employees, while still other complaints involved other conditions of employment. In none of these types of complaints was there any question of restoring the complainants to employment. Therefore, the adjustment of these complaints does not mean that the people affected have been restored to employment.

Furthermore, a substantial number of the labor complaints or what we term 7 (a) complaints did not involve the question of restoring the complainants to employment, e. g., those complaints charging a refusal on the part of the employer to bargain collectively with his employees, those complaints charging that the employer had discriminated against the complainant by demoting him or by reinstating him in an inferior position to that which he had formerly held or by failing to give him fair share of the working time, and those complaints which charged forms of discrimination other than discriminatory discharges and failure to reinstate because of participation in a strike. A substantial number of the other complaints related to impending or threatened strikes. In addition, complaints which were withdrawn by the complainants and complaints which either were not substantiated by the investigation of our field representatives or were not found to be supported by the evidence where a hearing was held were considered as adjusted. For purely record purposes, those complaints involving working assignments over which the Textile Labor Relations Board had no jurisdiction were treated as adjusted upon being referred to the proper work assignment boards. Four hundred and seventy-six complaints involving strictly the provisions of the codes were pending when the codes were suspended on May 28, 1935, and were thereupon classified as

adjusted, but with a notation clearly showing that these complaints were dismissed by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Schechter case. With these exceptions a statement that so many cases have been adjusted means that a disposition of those cases satisfactory to the parties has been effected.

Mr. KELLER. You said that in none of these types of complaints. was there any question of restoring the complaints to employment. Does that indicate that they had lost employment in those cases? Mr. TAYLOR. Not in all instances.

Mr. KELLER. That is what I am trying to clear up.

Mr. TAYLOR. Question 5 was:

How many cases can you cite that were settled by the Textile Labor Relations Board in which all of the employees were returned to work?

Answering that I will say that the time allowed for the compiling of the necessary information was not sufficient to permit an answer to the fifth question. Prior to the submission of this question, no attempt had ever been made to determine the number of cases settled by the board in which all of the employees were returned to work. In some cases employees were excluded from employment for reasons stated in the decision; while in other cases the union consented to the exclusion of certain employees for reasons which appeared to the union to be proper. In still other cases certain employees waived their rights to be reinstated in order that the dispute might be settled and the great majority returned to employment. All cases which were settled on any of the foregoing bases were considered as adjusted, and our records so indicate, and no attempt was made to distinguish this type of settlement in our records from a settlement that resulted in returining all of the employees to work. It should not, however, be overlooked that in the settlement of many cases all employees were returned to work.

The sixth question is:

How many of the southern cases decided in favor of the employees by the board were complied with?"

The answer to that is this: The summary given in the answer to the third question gives the status, on May 28, 1935, of 135 cases referred to the legal department of the board for formal hearings. Of these 135 cases, as stated, approximately 25 were disposed of either by compliance with the decisions of the board or by agreement between the parties while the cases were pending or after decisions were rendered. Of this number of approximately 25 cases disposed of in these ways 14 were in connection with mills in the South. Certain changes have undoubtedly taken place in the status of a number of the cases referred to since May 28, 1935; but as the power of enforcement was suspended on that date it is not possible for the board to make a report on such changes as may have occurred since that date, except as to new complaints filed since then, which have been covered in the answers to other questions asked me at this hearing.

The seventh question is:

What percentage of discrimination cases in the cotton-textile industry were in the South?

With regard to the percentage of discrimination cases in the cottontextile industry that were in the South, our records indicate that of the total cases either heard or set for hearing by the board, 64.5 percent were against southern cotton mills.

With regard to complaints against mills in the South, this figure is 91 percent. Expressed on the basis of mills against which complaints were received, the figure is 84 percent; and shown on the basis of employees involved, the figure is 78 percent.

Mr. KELLER. What organization is now attempting the same work? We have an organization doing the same thign under the WagnerConnery Act, have we not? At least it is attempting to do that same work.

Mr. TAYLOR. As I understand the Wagner-Connery Act-I cannot express it legally, but I know it in my own way

Mr. KELLER. Shoot away.

Mr. TAYLOR. They are charged with collective bargaining matters and the holding of elections, and such other things.

During the existence of the codes we had under our jurisdiction, in accordance with Executive orders, certain of that authority, but when the codes went out our authority ceased and the Wagner-Connery Act took over that job. Since that time, May 28, 1935, we have been what might be called an exclusively mediation agency. We can attempt to effect a satisfactory settlement or adjustment of differences, we attempt to bring the two parties together, but, in the event either refuses, then it becomes a question, possibly, for the board created by the Wagner-Connery Act. I think that is the situation.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. How many cases, approximately, did you have or have you had since the codes went out under the new set-up, and what success have you had in adjudicating them?

Mr. TAYLOR. I think I can give some information that will be very valuable of great interest in that connection.

When first appearing before this committee I made a statement about the total number of complaints that this board received up to January 25, 1936, which amounted to 4,804. I had with me at that time a summary of our records, and it is rather surprising since the suspension of the codes the difference in the trend of complaints. To answer your question, I think I can do the best by referring to those figures. When I use the word "adjusted" here please understand that I am using it in the sense that we had gone as far as we could with our

resources.

During the first 6 months of the board's existence we received 3,600 complaints.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Since the National Recovery Act decision?

Mr. TAYLOR. I am showing the trend of complaints. During the first 6 months, from September 28 to March 31, we received 3,678 complaints. During the next quarter, from April 1 to June 30, 1935, we received 696 complaints; during the fourth quarter of 1935-in the third quarter of the year there were 696, and that takes in 1 month after the code went out. During the fourth quarter, from July 1 to September 30, we received 186 complaints. In the next quarter, however, which was the last one of that year, October, November, and December, making the fifth quarter, we received 219 complaints; and from January 1 to January 25 we received 25 complaints, making a grand total of 4,804 complaints.

During the quarter after the code the number of complaints decreased materially. The number of mills involved were approximately the same. We were getting a different type of complaint. Mr. SCHENIDER. What was the character of those complaints?

Mr. TAYLOR. From July 1, 1935 to September 30, 1935, we received complaints alleging violation of the former code provisions as to hours and wages, 17. We received 13 complaints regarding hours. We received 26 complaints regarding wages alone. We received 11 complaints regarding discrimination after the general strike. We received 45 complaints alleging discharge for union activity; and we received 29 complaints alleging the mill would not recognize the union. We received 11 complaints alleging general violation of the former section 7 (a) of the National Recovery Act. Those are the principal ones of the total received during that quarter.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The complaints fell off quite materially?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That was no doubt due to the fact that the board had lost its teeth and could not function effectively?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

Mr. HARTLEY. Has the number of complaints increased since the enactment of the Wagner-Connery Act due to alleged discrimination on account of union activities?

Mr. TAYLOR. That matter would not come to us.

Mr. HARTLEY. Have you any information about that matter?
Mr. KELLER. We had them before us.

Mr. TAYLOR. I have not got that information. When we go as far as we can, we stop.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. What treatment is accorded your board and its representatives since the Schechter decision; is it as cordial as it was before?

Mr. TAYLOR. They are very cooperative in some instances, but not in all. Perhaps when we had a few teeth we had to knock at the door a little louder, but since then we do not have to knock so loudly.

Mr. HARTLEY. Can you make a comparison of complaints under the N. R. A. between your industry and other industries?

Mr. TAYLOR. No; I do not believe so. You are speaking of compliance in other industries, are you not?

Mr. HARTLEY. Yes. Can you give us an opinion as to whether, generally speaking, the compliance in the textile groups was fair or whether you met much resistance? Just what was the situation in that respect?

Mr. TAYLOR. Not knowing what degree of success they met in the compliance division of the National Recovery Administration, I cannot answer that by comparing our work with the work of other industries.

I can, however, break our work down into three or four classifications in which we conducted our work. We divided our complaints into four major classifications. We had, I should say, very good compliance under the codes with regard to hours and wages-better perhaps than in our other types of complaints. As regards hours and wages, it was clearly written what he should do. If he was found to have violated, he tried to set himself aright.

Mr. HARTLEY. That answers the question.

Mr. KELLER. If there are no further questions, and Mr. Taylor has nothing further to tell us, let us thank Mr. Taylor for his statement, and recess until 2:10 this afternoon.

(Thereupon at 12:30 p. m. the subcommittee recessed until 2:10 p. m. this date.)

AFTER RECESS

Met, pursuant to the taking of the recess, at 2:10 p. m.
Mr. KELLER. The committee will please come to order.

We will call Robert Lassiter. Mr. Lassiter will present a statement prepared by John F. Matheson, and after he presents that statement Mr. Matheson will be called and you may cross-examine him in view of the testimony that was presented here the other day.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT LASSITER, FOR JOHN F. MATHESON, ON BEHALF OF MOORESVILLE COTTON MILLS, MOORESVILLE, N. C.

Mr. KELLER. Mr. Lassiter, will you please state your name? Mr. LASSITER. My name is Robert Lassiter. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am chairman of the board, Mooresville Cotton Mills. I would like to state that I am presenting this statement for Mr. Matheson, who has some trouble with his voice. The Washington weather has not been very conducive to keeping him in voice.

This is the statement of the Mooresville Cotton Mills, of Mooresville, N. C., to the Labor Committee (subcommittee), House of Representatives.

We wish to express our appreciation to the committee for its invitation and permission to reply to certain charges made against our company by Thomas F. Moore and Ed. Christenbury. We think it advisable to give the committee the background of the situation with the Mooresville Mills that required the loan of $800,000 from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The facts in the case are as follows:

Owing to the financial difficulties of the former backers of the mill, and their inability to carry on longer, and in view of the fact that an obligation of $1,200,000 was maturing in September 1935, it became necessary to refinance the Mooresville Cotton Mill. Application was made to the R. F. C. for this loan and the reasons set forth in that application were that it was necessary for this company to have this loan in order to continue business and to prevent wide-spread unemployment and the liquidation of the company, which would have meant the loss of employment by 1,800 people and consequent disaster to the city of Mooresville, of 6,000 population, all of which facts were set out in the application to the R. F. C., which application was made March 19, 1935, and was approved by the R. F. C. June 25, 1935, and the money was paid to the company on October 28, 1935. We wish to state here that if we had not had the cooperation of the creditors and their undivided support in securing this loan that it could not have been done, they realizing that to liquidate the company in order to collect their claim would have caused a catastrophe to overtake the city of Mooresville and Iredell County.

We feel that the helpful attitude of the creditors and the circumstances surrounding employment of people in that community fully justified the loan from the R. F. C., and that their conditions were fully complied with in this situation. There can be no question of the soundness of this loan, nor can there be any question of the proceeds having been used for the purposes for which the loan was secured.

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