STATEMENT OF WALTER C. TAYLOR-Continued Mr. KELLER. The next witness is Mr. Walter C. Taylor, of the Textile Labor Board, Labor Building. Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, on Tuesday, January 28, I appeared before your committee to furnish certain information with regard to discrimination complaints handled by the Textile Labor Relations Board. I had with me some office records, but, due to the fact that the questions were not asked to conform with the basis upon which our records were set up, it was rather difficult for me to answer directly some of the questions propounded. It was, also, in other instances, impossible for me to answer some of the questions that were asked, because I did not have the information requested available at that particular time. Congressman Ellenbogen very kindly suggested to the chairman that a series of questions be prepared and that I be given an opportunity to gather the information asked in those questions. This the chairman consented to do. I am now in position to answer these questions to the best of my ability from the records in our office. First, however, I should like to state the position or the function of the Textile Labor Relations Board. The Textile Labor Relations Board was created by executive order on September 26, 1934, pursuant to title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act and Public Resolution 44. The board so created was vested with both quasi-judicial powers and mediatory powers. It was authorized not only to mediate and conciliate complaints charging a violation of section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act by manufacturers in the textile industry but also to investigate, conduct hearings, and make findings with respect to such complaints. In addition, the board was authorized to conduct elections for the selection by the employees in the textile industry of their representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining. The administration of the maximum hour and minimum wage provisions of the cotton, silk, and wool textile codes was likewise vested in the board. The board was also given authority to handle questions of work assignment in certain of the textile industries. The Textile Labor Relations Board continued to exercise these functions until the Schechter decision was rendered on May 27, 1935, and the codes were suspended by proclamation of the President on May 28, 1935. Since that time. the Textile Labor Relations Board has functioned solely as the mediation and conciliation agency in the textile industry. It has no enforcement powers and does not attempt to exercise such powers. Its function is, and ever since May 28, 1935, has been, to assist the parties to a dispute in reaching a voluntary adjustment of their differences. The activities of the Textile Labor Relations Board are now coordinated with those of the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor, and the Textile Labor Relations Board has been designated by that Department as the conciliation and mediation agency in the textile industry. In discussing the work of the Board and its experiences, the difference in its function prior to and after May 28, 1935, must constantly be borne in mind. The questions are here, and I will now take them up in order. Mr. TAYLOR. Due to the short time at my disposal, I am going to have to confine any figures mentioned as referring to the board's activities for its first year and further, since the board was not authorized to make any general survey of conditions in the textile industry. Any information I may give you is based solely on the situations brought to our attention. The first question is: What happened to Pepperell cases, Biddeford, Maine, York Mill, Saco, Maine, cases; Oldtown Woolen cases, Sangerville, Maine; Oldtown Mills, Oldtown, Maine; Wakefield Woolen cases, Wakefield, R. I.; Greenville Finishing Co. cases, Greenville, Rhode Island? Mr. HARTLEY. How long were the Wakefield woolen cases pending? Mr. HARTLEY. The purpose was to learn how long it took for the case to be heard, a decision to be rendered and enforcement to be effected. Mr. TAYLOR. I was in the field in the early stages of the board's activities and I was in New England and personally handled this from the standpoint of trying to effect a satisfactory adjustment. At the time I received from that plant a statement to the effect that if those people would apply for reinstatement they would be given employment just as quickly as conditions permitted. Mr. HARTLEY. Have they been reemployed? Mr. TAYLOR. I cannot say. I reported back to the complainant in this case and told him the circumstances. Temporarily we were in hope that those people would comply, but they did not. As I remember, they then filed charges and asked for a hearing before our board. That is the reason, I think in that instance, it was held over for that length of time. The complaint against the Pepperell Manufacturing Co., of Biddeford, Maine, was heard on March 15, April 10, and May 2, 1935, and the transcripts of the record of these hearings were under examination preparatory to a decision when the codes were suspended on May 28, 1935, and the authority of the board to make findings was removed. Hence no decision in this case was rendered. The same conditions existed with reference to the complaint against the York Manufacturing Co., of Saco, Maine, hearings on which were held on April 17, and 18, 29, and 30, and May 1. No decision was authorized after the suspension of the codes and none was rendered. A decision was rendered by the board on the complaint against the Old Town Woolen Co., Inc., of Sangerville, Maine, on April 17, 1935, finding the company had violated section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the code of Fair Competition for the Wool Textile Industry and ordering the reinstatement of employees named therein. On April 27, 1935, prior to the date set for compliance with the decision of the board, application for a rehearing was filed by the company. Action on this application was deferred by mutual consent of the parties to enable them to negotiate for a settlement. These negotiations were still in progress when the codes were suspended on May 28, 1935. Hence no further action by the board in this case was authorized. Complaint was made against the Old Town Woolen Co., Inc., of Old Town, Maine, alleging discrimination for union membership and activity against four union workers. The company agreed with the board's representative to reinstate two of these and declined to reinstate the other two. A formal complaint and request for a hearing was filed with the board on May 17, 1935, and preparations for a hearing were being made when the codes were suspended on May 28, 1935, after which a hearing was not authorized. Hence no decision was rendered in this case. On January 30, 1935, the board rendered a decision on the complaint against the Wakefield Textile Co., Inc., of Wakefield, R. I., finding that the company had discriminated against five union workers and ordered three of them reinstated and the remaining two placed on a preferential list for subsequent reinstatement. The company claimed that the five workers involved were employed elsewhere when the decision was rendered, but admitted that they had applied for reinstatement and subsequently agreed with the representative of the board to comply with its decision. The union subsequently reported that the workers were not reinstated as agreed and the board notified the union on May 23, 1935, that it was prepared to refer the case to the proper authorities for enforcement upon the receipt of required affidavits. The suspension of the codes on May 28, 1935, removed the authority for enforcement. The complaint against the Greenville Finishing Co. of Greenville, R. I., was heard on March 18 and 22, 1935. The decision of the board was prepared for release on May 28, 1935, on which date the authority of the board to make findings was removed. Therefore no decision in this case was released. Question no. 2 is: How many workers who lost their jobs because of union membership have been restored to employment? In answer to that I will say that we have no such information on the industry at large. The only basis upon which this question can be answered is from an analysis of the records of the complaint filed through various sources with the board. We classified complaints which we received that had anything to do with labor; that is, discrimination, discharge of union activity, and so forth, under a general classification. We then broke this classification down and I am going to have to answer this question as accurately as I can from the information contained in our records of the complaint filed with the board. Of those complaints received alleging discrimination after the general strike of September 1934 our records indicate that 70 percent of those involved were restored to employment; of those complaints received alleging discharge for union activity during our first year, our records indicate that 65 percent have been restored to employment. It is impossible to answer this question on any other basis, as it has not been feasible to keep our records so as to show the changing status of the individuals involved. You can appreciate the difficulty of keeping an accurate record of each of the approximately 100,000 individuals involved in the complaints received by us. Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is a general answer to the question. In connection with all complaints made to the board, I take it there were but two men reinstated out of all those complaints made against these various companies. Mr. TAYLOR. You are referring to the first question? Mr. SCHNEIDER. There were two workers reinstated by the employers? Mr. TAYLOR. If I may be permitted, in the third question, I think it is, I am answering how many mills actually complied with decisions rendered by the board. That will throw further light on the first question answered. Likewise in answering question 2 as to the number involved, in many instances those people who made complaints about union activities and failed to be returned after the general strike-we received in our office about 4,600 complaints during the first year's activities. It was impossible, obviously, for me to read all those complaints or to check them. Therefore, that does not necessarily mean that those people are not employed in some other mill. Mr. SCHNEIDER. And it does not mean that they are employed? Mr. TAYLOR. It does not. To get that information, we would have to take each individual name and trace it. Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am referring to those formal complaints made that you mentioned in answering the first question. They were formal and no doubt serious. No doubt they were cases of unquestionable discrimination, and your reply indicates how impossible it was for the workers to get adjustment of their complaints in regard to discrimination on the part of employers. It is true that under National Recovery Administration the workers had no redress against discrimination. The employers dragged the employees' cases out and starved them into submission and thereby intimidated other workers so that they would not join unions, because their comrades were being put on the street without any recourse to justice. Mr. TAYLOR. I should like to call attention to a statement that I endeavored to clarify or explain last Tuesday. In the handling of complaints, everything received in our office, regardless of whether it involved one individual or a thousand, was considered as a complaint. We exercised all of our resources to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of that complaint. If it was then not possible to handle that on a complaint basis, the complaints were consolidated into what we called a case and referred to our legal department for what we termed "appropriate action", which was the holding of a hearing, as the case may be. Question no. 1 had to do with cases that were heard by our board after they had been handled as complaints. All of those complaints were grouped against a mill, for example, and consolidated into a case. We handled about 4,600 complaints, but only 135 cases were set for hearing. I will get to that in my next question, if you please. Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am not criticizing your report to the committee of these conditions, but I am criticizing the conditions that prevailed and the fact that there were about 4,600 complaints by the workers against the employers, which is sound testimony that the employers were not dealing fairly with the employees. Mr. TAYLOR. I shall deal with that matter later. Next is question 3, which asks How many mills actually complied with the decisions rendered by the Textile Labor Relations Board? In answering that question, I will digress to say that this question has been interpreted to mean cases heard by the board rather than complaints. Answering that question I will say that 135 cases were referred to the board's legal department for hearing. The following is a statement of the status of these cases on May 28, 1935, when the codes were suspended: Cases referre 1 to N. R. A. compliance, 16; cases decided but enforcement suspended, 4; cases in which decisions have been complied with or settlement effected, 10; cases which have been settled and dismissed, 12; cases withdrawn by complainants, 2; cases decided by regional boards, 2; cases in which no violation of 7 (a) was shown, 14: cases in which final decisions have been rendered and enforcement is withheld pending negotiations for settlement, 4; cases in which rehearings have been granted-now under consideration-3; cases continued by consent of parties pending negotiations for settlement, 8; cases heard not decided because settlement pending, 5; decisions pending when codes were suspended, 9; decisions not completed when codes were suspended, 33; hearings arranged but continued on suspension of codes, 10; cases held in suspension pending further investigation, 3; making total cases (10 subdivided plus 125 full cases) 135. It will be seen from this summary that approximately 25 cases were settled either by compliance with decisions rendered by the board or by a settlement between the parties while the cases were pending or after decisions were rendered. Mr. HARTLEY. What happened to the other 4,465 complaints? You have told us that there were about 4,600 complaints originally. Mr. TAYLOR. That is true. Mr. HARTLEY. What happened to the 4,000 other complaints that were not referred to your legal division for consideration? Mr. TAYLOR. I think I can give you the facts concerning that. That figure, to be exact, was 4,560 total complaints received. Mr. HARTLEY. What happened to the remainder of the complaints? Mr. TAYLOR. Of the 4,560 complaints 603 were developed into these 135 cases. Mr. HARTLEY. In other words they were, then, cut down so that one complaint would cover a group of persons or those employed by one mill? Mr. TAYLOR. That is correct. For example, if I may give this illustration a worker filed a complaint with the board in which complaint he stated that he or she had been discharged on account of his or her union activity. That was a complaint, of course. On the other hand, through the union they may have filed a complaint or a letter stating that 25 workers had been discriminated against on account of union activities, and that was another complaint. Perhaps four or five other persons wrote and said they had been discriminated against. All of those were complaints. If we, through our field force, were not able to effect an adjustment of that matter, those complaints, which were all against one plant, were built into one case; and that accounts 603 complaints. We differentiated between complaints and Mr. HARTLEY. How many mills were involved in the 4,56 Mr. TAYLOR. That brings up another angle. We rec plaints against 432 mills, in which complaints it was allege had violated or had discriminated against certain employ were 432 mills in cotton; there were 110 mills in silk; th mills in woollen; there were 52 mills in hosiery, and in the |