new term at the end of six years. His immediate successor, or some future Napoleon, occupying the same position, may be less pure and patriotic, and with the precedent established and approved by the people, placing this vast military power in his hands, he may make the presidency a stepping stone for the gratification of his unholy ambition, and by the use of the military at his command, may assume the imperial robes and seat himself upon a throne.

"To guard effectually against usurpation, sustain republican liberty and prevent the consolidation of the power and sovereignty of the States in the hands of the few, our people should watch, with a jealous eye, every act of their representatives tending to such a result, and condemn in the most unqualified manner every encroachment made by the general government upon either the rights or the sovereignty of the States."

The Governor also differed from the Confederate President on the subject of the right of Georgia troops to elect officers. His views and those of the government are well stated in the following extract from the annual message of November 5, 1863:

"In this connection I earnestly invite the attention of the General Assembly to the correspondence (copies of which are herewith forwarded) between the Secretary of War and myself in reference to the right of Georgia's volunteer militia in the military service of the Confederacy to elect their own officers. And it is proper that I here remark that since the correspondence was ended, even the right of the home guards to elect to fill vacancies is also denied, and the power of appointing the company officers as well as the field officers is claimed by the President.

"The Constitution gives Congress power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the Confederate States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers. The right of the State to appoint the officers to command her militia or any part thereof, when employed in the service of the Confederate States, is not left to inference, but is reserved in plain, simple language, which admits of no two constructions. The State, by her constitution and laws, has provided how she will make these appointments. All militia officers are to be elected by the people subject to do military duty under them, and the officers of the volunteer militia are to be elected by the members of the volunteer organization, to be commanded by the officers when elected, and all vacancies are to be filled in the same way. In a word, the State appoints those who are elected by the persons to be commanded.

"If the militia of Georgia, or any part thereof, is now employed in the service of the Confederate States, no one can question the right of the State, as reserved in the Confederate constitution, to appoint the officers to command

them, and the right of the troops, under the constitution and laws of the State, to have those elected by them appointed or commissioned to command them, is equally unquestionable.

"By the militia of a State, I understand the framers of the constitution to have meant the arms-bearing people of the State. That they intended to use the term in this sense is evident from the fact that they speak of the militia as in existence at the time they are making the constitution, and confer power upon Congress, not to create a new militia, nor to organize that already in existence, but to provide for organizing the militia. In other words, they gave Congress power to provide for forming into militia organizations the arms-bearing people of the respective States. Had the constitution given Congress power to organize the militia without any qualifying words, it would have had power to appoint officers to command them, or to authorize the President to appoint them, as the militia cannot be organized without officers. The language used was well weighed and carefully guarded. Power was given to Congress to provide for organizing that already in existence without sufficient organization-the militia or arms-bearing people of the States. When Congress has provided for the organization, and the States have organized the militia, Congress may authorize the President to employ them in the service of the Confederate States, but, in that case, the States expressly reserve to themselves the right to appoint the officers to command them, and Congress cannot, without usurpation, exercise that power or confer it upon the President.

"The President has made repeated calls upon this State for organized bodies of her troops for Confederate service, and his requisitions have invariably been filled by the tender of militia organized and officered by the State, and they have been accepted by him with their officers as organized. In addition to this, the conscript act has been passed, which has made all persons between 18 and 45, (except those exempted by the act,) subject by compulsion to Confederate service. This act has been executed in Georgia. In contemplation of law, every person in this State between 18 and 45, not specially exempt, is now in Confederate service; and the fact corresponds very nearly with this contemplation of law. Thus the whole organized militia of the State is now employed in the service of the Confederate States; and notwithstanding the State in such case has expressly reserved the right to appoint every officer to command them, her right to appoint a single officer to fill a single vacancy in a single company, battalion or regiment, is now denied; and it is claimed that they are all in future to be appointed, not by the State, but by the President. "One of the reasons given for this extraordinary pretension is, that it will not do to trust the troops after they are in service with this important right of choosing their own officers, as they would not elect officers who are faithful and who maintain discipline and do their duty. This objection would certainly apply with equal force to the first election, when a regiment or company is being organized. If the men are competent on entering the

service to elect those who shall command them, why are they not equally competent to elect to fill vacancies which afterward occur? Do experience in the military field, and intimate acquaintance with their comrades in arms, make them less competent to judge of the qualifications of those who aspire to command? The simple statement of the proposition is a sufficient expose of its fallacy. At the organization of our regiments, the men elected officers on short acquaintance, as but little time was allowed them; and doubtless made some mistakes, putting in men less competent than some others left out. They have since seen them tried in service, and now know who is best qualified. But when a vacancy occurs, they are now to be confined to those who were first elected to lower positions, to fill the higher positions, to which they never chose them. And if an officer who claims promotion is set aside for incompetency by an examining board, the next in rank may step forward and claim the place, and is held to be entitled to it over the best man in the regiment if he is a private, though he may be the choice of every man in the command. It is only the lowest commissioned officer in the company who is taken from the ranks; and if the best and most competent man failed to get a commission at the first election, he cannot now aspire from the ranks to a higher position than the lowest lieutenancy. This policy of filling all vacancies by promotion not only disregards the constitutional rights of the States, but it does the grossest injustice to those who are often the most deserving of promotion, and denies to the men the valuable right of selecting their own rulers.

"If it is said the President may go out of the regular line of promotion, and reward merit in the ranks, it may be truly replied that this is seldom done; and that the men cannot look to their companions in arms, but can look only to the President for promotion. This not only concentrates all power in his hands, but subjects every man's claims to his favoritism, prejudice, or caprice; and destroys independence of thought and of action by compelling all to depend for promotion upon their capacity to flatter or their ability to please a single individual. Georgia's troops have done their duty nobly in the field, and they have a right to look to the government of their State for the protection of their rights. Many of them now claim this protection. Shall they have it?

"I recommend that this General Assembly pass a joint resolution declaratory of the reserved rights of the State, and of the constitutional right of election by her troops, and demanding of the Confederate Government the recognition of this right."

Next to the conscription laws and the provision for exempting slaveholders, perhaps nothing done by the Congress of the Confederacy had so damaging effect as the law allowing

SUBSTITUTES IN THE ARMY.

Governor Brown's opposition to that law, and the practice of government and army officers, is strongly set forth in his message to the Legislature, as follows:

"That portion of the conscript act which authorizes those within conscript age to employ substitutes, has, in my opinion, been productive of the most unfortunate results. If conscription is right, or if it is to be acquiesced in as a matter of necessity, it is certainly just that it act upon all alike, whether rich or poor. With the substitution principle in the act, its effect has been to compel the poorer class, who have no money with which to employ substitutes, to enter the army, no matter what may be the condition of their families at home, while the rich, who have money with which to employ substitutes, have often escaped compulsory service. This is not just as between man and man. While I trust I have shown that the poorest man in the Confederacy has such interest at stake as should stimulate him to endure any amount of hardship or danger for the success of our cause, it cannot be denied that the wealthy are under as great obligation to do service, as they have, in addition to the rights and liberties of themselves and their children, a large amount of property to protect. If every wealthy man would do his duty, and share his part of the dangers of the war, but few complaints would be heard from the poor. But if the money of the rich is to continue to secure him from the hardships, privations, and dangers, to which the poor are exposed, discontent, and more or less demoralization in the army must be the inevitable result.

"He who has paid two or three thousand dollars for his substitute has often made it back in a single month by speculation, and it has not unfrequently happened that the families of those in service, at eleven dollars per month, have been the most unfortunate victims of his speculation and extortion.

"A very large number of stout, able-bodied young men, between 18 and 45 years of age, are now out of the army, and in their places the government has accepted old men over 45, who have, in most cases, been unable to undergo long marches, privation, and fatigue. Thousands of these have sunk by the way, either into the hospitals or into the grave. It is also understood that much the larger number of deserters and stragglers from the army have been substitutes who have entered it for hire, and, after receiving the stipulated price, have sought the first opportunity to escape, which they have in some instances been permitted to do, with the acquiescence and encouragement of officers who have been their partners in guilty speculation. Thus the same individual has been accepted as a substitute for each of several able-bodied young men, who have been left at home to seek for gain and

enjoy comfort, while our enemies have gained advantages on account of the weakness of our armies.

"If we expect to be successful in our struggle, the law must be so changed as to place in service the tens of thousands of young men who are now at home. This would reinforce our armies, so as to enable us to drive back the enemy upon every part of our borders. After this change in the law the government could provide for the protection of the most important interests at home, by making proper details of such persons as are indispensably necessary. This would be much better than the extension of the conscription act up to 50 or 55, as it would bring into the field young men able to endure service, in place of old men who must soon fail when exposed to great fatigue and hardship, many of whom are as competent as young men to oversee plantations and attend to other home interests.

"But it may be denied that the Government can now so change the law as to make those who have furnished substitutes liable to service, as it is bound by its contract to exempt them, and they have acquired vested rights under the contract, which it is not in the power of the Government to divest. Let us examine this for a moment. I purchase a lot of land from the State of Georgia, and pay her one thousand dollars for it, and she conveys it to me by grant under her great seal. The contract is as solemn, and binding, as the Government can make it. My fee simple title is vested and complete. But while I have the grant in my pocket and the State has my money in her treasury, it is discovered that public necessity requires the State to repossess herself of the land; I refuse to sell to her; she may pay me just compensation, and take the land without my consent, and she violates no fundamental principle, as all our private rights must yield to the public good, and if we are injured we can only require just compensation for the injury.

66

'Again, suppose I have labored hard and made upon my land a surplus of provisions, which are my own right and property, and I refuse to sell them to the Government, when the army is in need of them; it may take them without my consent and pay me just compensation, and I have been deprived of none of my constitutional rights.

"The right of a person who has employed a substitute, to be exempt from military service, can certainly stand upon no higher ground. The Government has extended to such persons the privilege of exemption upon the employment of a proper substitute, but if the public safety requires it, the Government certainly has as much right to revoke this privilege as it has to take from me my land, or my provisions, or other property, for public use; and all the person who employed the substitute could demand would be just compensation for the injury. The measure of damages might be the amount paid by the principal for his substitute, less a just pro rata for the time the substitute has served; and upon the payment of the damage or the just compensation for it, the Government would have the right to retain the substi tute, as well as the principal, in service, as the substitute has been paid by