is not the estimate of peoples as they stand opposed in this war. The population of the eleven States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Tennessee, which are the States properly embraced in the Confederacy, are whites 5,671,723; slaves 3,570,987; to which add a liberal estimate of the people of Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland, who co-operated with us, say one-third of the people of Missouri and Kentucky, and one-fifth of those of Maryland, added to the white populalation South 797,793 whites, and 130,776 slaves, making 6,468,516 whites, and 3,701,763 slaves and a total population in the South in that war of 10,170,279. Add to the northern population the remainder of the people of Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland not included on the southern side by our estimate, 1,967,766, makes the grand total for the North 21,181,226.

In addition to the fact that more than one-third of the 10,170,279 on the side of the South were slaves, liable to be abducted or corrupted and rendered useless, and an element of weakness upon the near approach of the enemy, the foregoing is a more than liberal estimate in favor of the South when it is remembered that Western Virginia and a majority of the people of East Tennessee were opposed to us, .and co-operated with the other side whenever opportunity offered, and there were numerous persons along the border in other States thus disaffected. When it is considered that President Davis adopted the policy of defensive war and declined generally to invade the enemy, it is apparent at once that the efficient number for the South was decreased at every advance of the enemy. For those who were thus cut off from us and left within the line of the enemy's occupation were powerless to aid us, even if they did not be

come disaffected by the presence of the enemy among them, and their resources in provisions were not only thus cut off from us but were converted to the use of the

Federal army.

It is not practicable to present a precise estimate of the strength of the two sections in people. The North increased rapidly by immigrants, and when we consider the extent of the Union sections of the South, and the fact that so large an element were slaves and unavailable for bearing arms, it was thought fair to estimate three for one in favor of the United States against the Confederate States.

The superficial area of the Confederate States was 741,990 square miles; that of the United States, including the four slave States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, was 1,045,820 square miles; and that of the territories of the United States, 1,580,000 square miles.

DIVISION OF TERRITORY.

The dividing line between the two confederacies, if fixed on the northern boundary of the eleven States mentioned, was upwards of two thousand miles in length. By far the greater portion is a dry line; and upon the balance the Red, the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Potomac rivers mark the boundary. There were no moun-. tains forming a line of boundary, except a part of that between Virginia and Kentucky. The line of sea-coast to be defended was still greater in length than the boundary line by land, reaching from the mouth of the Rio Grande to that of the Potomac, from which any one of the eleven States could be directly invaded except Arkansas and Tennessee. The States of Virginia, North Carolina, Texas and Tennessee furnished a large surplus

of beef and bacon, corn and wheat, while a considerable portion of these essentials were drawn from other States. The resources of the South in sugar, syrup, and rice seemed ample to meet the wants of the people and the army. The large area of the cotton crops occupying the most valuable lands of the cotton States rendered the supply of grain and meat, in those States, somewhat sparse. But the planters wisely determined to curtail the cotton, and largely increase the crops of grain, and there was but little ground to fear that the confederacy would be self-sustaining in all the articles needed to feed the people and the army for an indefinite period.

COMPARATIVE RESOURCES AND VALOR.

It was apparent, however, that the resources of the United States were vastly superior to ours in cattle, hogs, corn and wheat, from the middle and western States. The facilities for internal transportation of troops and army stores by railroads and rivers, seemed to be abundant in both sections. The North also possessed great advantages over the South in the supply of mules and horses for wagons, artillery, and cavalry. The supply in the South was ample for immediate use, and for some time to come; but as the war became long protracted, this became an embarrassing subject to us. For war is as destructive to horses and mules as to men, and we had comparatively few facilities in the South for raising these animals.

Great reliance was placed in the South upon the superior courage and bravery of our troops over those of the North. While there was no apparent reason to doubt the prowess of the South, or the skill of her rising military chieftains, but great reason to be proud of both, there

did not seem to be good grounds to doubt the soldierly qualities of the northern men. The vigorous, physical and mental constitutions of the western men, in connection with their habits and mode of life, did not seem to warrant the conclusion that they would prove deficient in courage, endurance, or skill. Drill, exposure to hardships and privations, and familiarity with danger, did much to improve the prowess of the troops from the middle and eastern States. The large element of Irish composition in the federal army, together with the presence of the troops of the regular army who had seen much service, were things which an impartial and considerate spectator could not overlook in order to reach the conclusion that federal troops in that war would be formidable in battle. There were, however, apparent, well-settled facts which warranted the conclusion that the Confederates would be a match for the Federals, man for man. The fiery impetuosity of their temper, the fact that personal physical courage in private life was esteemed in the South a higher virtue than it was in the North, the familiarity of all our people with the use of firearms, and their consequent skill as marksmen, and above all, the consideration that they were fighting in defence of their country, homes, firesides and families, against an invading army-stimulants which must be wanting to the northern troops-seemed to warrant this conclusion.

They were vastly our superiors in mechanical skill and in their resources and preparations for the manufacture of machinery, clothing, shoes, blankets, tents, arms, ammunition, wagons, rolling stock for railroads, boats for river service, transports, gun-boats, and all manner of ships of war, and also in navigation. They had a navy, we had none. They had an army which they retained,

except that most of the army officers of southern birth quitted their service to join ours, while we had no army and but comparatively few arms or ordnance stores. They had a government fully organized and a full representation at foreign courts; we had to supply the former, but were wanting in the latter because foreign governments did not recognize our nationality. They had a national credit which we had to supply by a judicious use of the resources at our command. They had the open markets of the world in which to buy and sell, and enlist hireling troops to take the place of their citizen soldiers, while we were blockaded and our ports of entry sealed up except to such ships as were fortunate enough to carry on a trade through the blockading squadron of the enemy.

Such were some of the difficulties that seemed to environ the Confederate States and stand between us and the independence of our country. But we had a determined will to be free. We had the peace and security of our homes, the safety of our women and children, the weal of the present and future generations at stake; we had truth, justice, honor, and humbly trusted that we had the just God of battles on our side and would ultimately prevail.

For the causes and with the auspices we have endeavored faithfully to set forth, the government of the Confederate States, sustained by their people, boldly ventured upon the expedient of war for that independence.

The occupation of Forts Pickens and Sumter by the forces of the United States, as we have seen, was cause of irritation to the people of the Confederacy. The government took early steps to expel them. While the command of the forces and works for the reduction of Fort Sumter was confided, as we have seen, to General Beau