Pessimism

On the extension of unconscious will to the physical world-Relation of
mind to consciousness-Meanings of consciousness-Consciousness and
self-consciousness-Consciousness and attention-Helmholtz's doctrine
of unconscious inferences-Partial sensations as unconscious mental phe-
nomena-Consciousness as wide as mind as known in ourselves-Con-
sciousness as an aggregate or series-Fallacy of inferring the presence
of isolated mental events-Criticism of argument in support of will in
physical processes-The scientific conception of force-Fallacy of in-
ferring unconscious will in organic changes-Relation of modern bio-
logical science to the problem of design-Bearing of the doctrine of

the conservation of energy on our inferences respecting the range of

consciousness-Limits of conscious life unknown-Oscar Schmidt's

opinion of Hartmann's natural science .

PAGE

183

CHAPTER IX.

THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF PESSIMISM: (B) THE PESSIMISTS'

INTERPRETATION OF MIND.

Will as substance, and will as conceived by modern psychology-The

pessimists' view of will confuses volition and feeling-It confuses voli-

tion and instinctive active impulse-Distinctive marks of volition and

instinctive impulse-Complex nature of will-Characteristics of the

higher volition-Confusion of will with desire-Analysis of desire—

Desire controlled by volition-Summary of errors in the pessimists'

conception of desire-Their view of the relation of pleasure and plain

to will-Independence of these feelings of desire and will-Real rela-

tion of pleasure and pain to will-Nature of negative pleasure and the

satisfaction of desire-Bearing of repetition and habit on the relative

intensity of negative pleasures and pains-Examination of Hartmann's

doctrine of nervous exhaustion-Fatigue not invariable consequence of

prolonged pleasurable stimulation-Effects of prolonged painful stimu-

lation-Different effects of prolongation and of renewal of pleasurable

and painful impressions-Hartmann's idea that pleasure does not fully

compensate pain-Disproved by conceiving pleasure and pain as simul-

taneous present feelings-By viewing pleasure and pain as conjoint

effects of one action-The scientific value of the pessimist's view of

ennui.

206

CHAPTER X.

THE EMPIRICAL BASIS OF PESSIMISM.

Hartmann's mode of dealing with individual testimony-Value of his

scheme of life-Unscientific character of his estimation of life-Value

of work, including muscular and intellectual activity-Health a posi-

tive condition of pleasure-Value of reflection on the past-Hartmann's

conception of the illusory nature of a sentiment-His omission of the

results of a volitional control of circumstances-Examination of the

pessimist's proof of the worthlessness of progress-Relation of the idea

that progress depends on intellectual development to pessimism-

Hartmann's opinion respecting the worth of material, moral, scientific,

and æsthetic progress

237

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XI.

PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS.

Résumé of the examination of pessimism-Investigation of scientific opti-
mism-The idea of the coincidence of the individual and the general
happiness in ethics and economics-Hartley's psychological basis of
optimism-The doctrine that pain is a condition of pleasure-The scien-
tific conception of progress-Need of certain preliminary enquiries—
Question of the excess of pleasure or of pain in human life-Treatment
of the question apart from the comparative frequency of the external
causes-Deficiencies in the theory of the causes of pleasure and pain-
Pleasure and pain not invariably equal in different regions of conscious
activity-Inexactness of subjective comparison of pleasure with pain in
these regions-Results attainable by such comparison important though
not adequate Comparison of amounts of pleasure in different regions
-Unsatisfactory character of this abstract method of calculation-
Resort to a biological conception of pleasure and pain of little practical
utility—Impracticability of summing the single external causes of
pleasure and pain-Also of adding together our single experiences of
pleasure and pain-Liability to error in estimating the value of single
feelings The results of an observation of others' single feelings still
less satisfactory-Life not to be measured directly in single feelings of
pleasure and pain-Modification of the problem by the substitution of
the idea of happiness for that of pleasure-Objections to such a substi-
tution as (a) a cession of the hedonist's position, and (b) an exchange
of a simple for a complex idea-Provisional answer to these objections
-Popular conception of happiness examined-Permanent conditions of
pleasure the root-idea of happiness-(4) First stage in construction
of happiness. (1) External elements. (a) Happiness as residing in
certain permanent external circumstances-Reasons of the popular
distinction between valuable objects and agreeable feelings-(B)
Happiness as consisting in permanent lines of pleasurable externally-
directed action: meaning of interests-(2) Internal elements-(a)
Internal processes of reflection as determined by regulation of external
aims: abiding internal effects of moral achievement-(8) Pleasurable
reflection as result of distinct effort to obtain an inner possession: self-
culture as ingredient of happiness-(B) Higher stage in construc-
tion: due adjustment of competing aims, external and internal-(C)
Final stage in construction: control of elements of life, as thus ar-
ranged, by attention-(1) External function of attention negative and
positive (2) Internal function of attention negative and positive:
repression of desire and cultivation of pleasurable recollections and
imaginations-How far a furtherance of others' interests involved in a
wise pursuit of individual happiness-Reciprocal advantages of friendly
relations-Large external aims of individual involve benefits to others

-Conscious pursuit of others' good-Limits to coincidence of agent's

and others' interests-Our idea of happiness seen to involve a clear

remainder of pleasure-Pain of sustained effort in pursuit of happiness

-Happiness and satisfaction-Different meanings of contentment-Our

wise hedonist both contented and discontented-His grounds of content-

ment His grounds of discontent-Objection to hedonism that pleasure

can never satisfy-Happiness differs in structure from a series of single

feelings-Degrees of satisfaction realisable in a series of feelings-Con-

tent and discontent inseparable accompaniments of all conceivable aims

-Necessity for renewed endeavour does not involve disappointment—

Real attainable happiness inferior to our imagined ideals—Bearing of

the evanescence of life on our problem-Brevity of life a good from

pessimist's point of view-Shortness of life does not destroy differences

of value in fugitive and relatively permanent good-How a recognition

of its brevity intensifies the value of life-Stoic contempt of life as

evanescent, partly rational, partly irrational-Brevity of life the basis

of a peculiar sentiment of tender regard-Sense of the brevity of indi-

vidual life partly submerged in wide altruistic sympathies-Review of

argument and re-statement of problem .

NOTE TO CHAPTER XI.

On differences of quality in pleasure-Differences of quality in pleasure said

to be attested by consciousness-Aristotle's arguments for qualitative

differences-How pleasure comes to be thought of as differing in quality

-The higher pleasures probably surpass the lower in quantity, even

to the subject himself-Points of quantitative superiority of the refined

enjoyments viewed as competing with sensual pleasures in their maxi-

mum volume for a chief place in our aggregate happiness-Higher'

and 'lower,' as applied to pleasures, connote a remote bearing on

PAGE

THE REALITY OF HAPPINESS.

Is the practicability of our scheme of happiness affected by the diversity of
human feelings and tastes?-Influences determining action in certain
lives antecedently to individual choice-How far special inherited ten-
dencies and early-formed habits preclude a realisation of happiness-
Bearing of the doctrine of the determination of volition on the attaina-
bility of our ideal of happiness-Effectual pursuit of happiness pre-
supposes a disciplined will-Question of the limitation of human
powers-Pleasure-value of the fixed arrangements of the world, only
roughly ascertainable-Vital question concerns the extent to which
human effort actually dominates the fixed conditions of life-The