CHAPTER II.

UNREASONED OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.

THE varieties of instinctive optimism and pessimism, the history of which is to be briefly reviewed in the present chapter, turn wholly on the content or subject-matter of the belief. The believing impulse is the same in all cases; only it fastens now on one object now on another. Human life presents numerous divisions and aspects, each of which may become the subject of a hopeful or a despondent view. Differences of intellectual development, too, lead to differences in the extent of object comprehended in the vision. Hence the diverse expressions of these instinctive convictions.

First of all, the unreasoning optimist or pessimist may contemplate either his own interests alone, or, again, those of some portion of mankind closely related to himself, or, finally, those of the human race as a whole. In this way there arise what may be termed the individual, particular, and universal varieties of optimism and pessimism. Thus a man may entertain a cheerful view of his own individual life, or of that of his nation; or he may still further extend his vision and include in his favourable verdict the whole of mankind.

Again, there are very unlike objects of value in human life. We may select some special department of this life, for example, that of political and social effort, and make

INSTINCTIVE BELIEFS.

9

this the object of a happy confidence or of a gloomy despair. In this case, we become optimists and pessimists in the familiar newspaper sense. Or we may take in the

whole of life, and view it from different sides. Thus we may look at human nature as an object of moral and æsthetic appreciation; and either rise to a favourable flattering estimate of man's moral worth and dignity, or fall to a low condemnatory estimate. Once more we may turn our attention less to life itself than to its external conditions, to the sources of its good in nature. Thus it is possible to erect nature into something beautiful and glorious, into a kindly fostering parent; on the other hand, we may regard nature as full of imperfections, of ugliness and discordance, or as a cruel and hostile presence. Finally, the object of estimation may be life itself as made up of joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain.

Let us now briefly review the history of unreasoned optimism and pessimism, as they present themselves under these various aspects.

From the point of view of what is called a healthy common sense all inquiry into the worth of human life doubtless seems unnecessary and even ridiculous. The bulk of mankind pursue their various ends as a matter of course, and never raise the question whether the result will compensate for all the toil. The child gazes out into its farstretching future, and sees only possibilities of exciting activity and of ever-growing enjoyment. The busy man stretches forth his eager hand from day to day to seize some fresh possession, or to shape some new achievement, and in his well filled consciousness there is no room for the In this stage men are They have never felt

6

question, What is it all worth?' neither pessimists nor optimists.

called on to reflect on the value of life. Yet we may speak of them as unconscious or practical optimists, inasmuch as they act as if they believed in the goodness of life.

There

But this unreflecting stage does not continue. must be pauses in the busiest life, and the eager child will soon find moments when the swiftly-pursued good recedes for a moment from the grasp, and becomes an object for the contemplative vision. The simplest mode of such reflection. is seen when active impulse transforms itself into peaceful anticipation, when the object of real pursuit shines afar, drawing to itself fond regard, and when the instinct of active quest becomes conscious of itself, so to speak, as the assurance of an attainable good. The world presents itself as fair and rich in treasure, and the heart rejoices in the security of permanent sources of gladness. This condition may be called the nascent stage of conscious optimism. The mind does not yet distinctly set the joy of life in sharp antithesis to its sorrow. It does not care to measure the exact range of the golden rays of its happiness. It is only conscious that the earth abounds in well-springs of delight, that beauty and love make the air about it sunny and warm.

But only a few are so fortunate as to preserve this naive trust long unbroken. The intrusion of unsuspected pain, of a sense of weariness in pursuit, of sharp blows of disappointment, soon disturbs the happy dreamer with a rude shock, and forces on him the impression of discordant evil. In this way, too, reflection is awakened, and a first vague estimate of life wrought into shape. When these dark experiences fix themselves powerfully in the imagination, we have in a nascent form likewise a conscious pessimism. That is to say, the mind looks out on the whole of life under the dark shadow which these forms of misery cast on it.

RUDIMENTARY OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.

11

The first crude reflection on the world is here born of a harsh check to instinctive hope, not as in the other case of the mere exuberance and after-play of this hope.

These crude forms of optimism and pessimism are abundantly illustrated in daily life. When filled with a new joy, as that of a requited love, a man instinctively calls the world good and fair. On the other hand, when enfolded by the dark shadow of affliction, we are disposed to see all things awry and harshly discordant. In the pages of literature, too, these first immature manifestations of the optimist and pessimist temper are familiar appearances. How strikingly, for example, are they revealed in the alternate moods which characterise the impulsive utterances of the Psalms! Now the tone is one of jubilant praise: The earth is full of the goodness of the Lord;' 'Let the heavens rejoice, and let the earth be glad.' At other times all is despondency and gloom: Man is like to vanity; his days are as a shadow;'' How long shall the wicked, how long shall the wicked triumph?' So again the dramatic poet has frequent occasions to present these opposite tendencies of the human mind under the two unlike influences just described. With the Greek dramatists the happy dénoûment commonly calls forth from hero or chorus an optimistic exclamation touching the justice of the gods, and the permanent triumph of good over ill. A striking example of the corresponding effect of present adversity is found in Hamlet's reflection on the ills of life:

For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,

The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, &c.

This, then, is the first vague expression of the opposing tendencies of the human mind towards optimism and

pessimism. But the views thus generated are the offspring of the most narrow and impulsive reflection. Growing knowledge of life speedily familiarises us all with its mixed. and checkered character; and all reflection, worthy of the name, must recognise the alternate light and dark strata which make up life's structure. Yet we find that even

after men have fully learnt to comprehend this twofold nature of their life, their line of reflection continues to move towards one of two opposite poles. It cannot now be an image of pure delight, or of all-embracing misery; there emerges the question of relative quantity or proportion, though at first this is not distinctly formulated. The man leaning to the pole of optimism does not say the good exceeds the evil; he simply dwells on the good, makes it prominent, and emphasises it, treating the evil as something secondary and accidental. So with the opposite type of man. Evil is conceived as the one impressive fact of existence, whereas good presents itself now only as an occasional and uninfluential element.

Here, again, we may find illustrations in poetic literature. All poets sing of trouble and of joy; yet some dwell by preference on the one, some on the other; and it is easy to mark off writers who, while recognising the double aspect of their life, habitually accentuate the one rather than the other. In our own literature Keats and Byron may, perhaps, serve as an example of this contrast.

As reflection on the world grows in extent and definiteness, the antithesis between optimism and pessimism reaches a higher stage of development. The observer's eye no longer looks on the world as existing solely for his individual self, but recognises in it a home and a destiny for his fellow men. The object to be gauged is not now the individual but