single phase? Or, if the difference of extension in feeling be regarded, like that of intensity, as one of pure quantity, and so as involving the pleasurable accompaniment of a state of consciousness, it is surely a loose way of talking to speak, for example, of the refinement of an æsthetic impression as a quality of the pleasure which belongs to this impression. Similarly, I think, Aristotle's transference of the quality of perfection of intellectual pleasures from the intellectual activity in its relation to our functions as a whole to what is but the adjunct of this activity is a psychological error.

The hedonist need not fear, I think, to throw all the superiority of the higher' pleasures, so far as their value is estimated in relation to the subject himself, on certain quantitative peculiarities.' Although many of the enjoyments connected with the study of art, with social activity, and so on, are less intense than the so-called sensuous pleasures, they stand out in marked superiority on other grounds. Intellectual pleasures can be indefinitely prolonged, whereas the more exciting enjoyments of a dissipated life are in their nature quickly exhausting and evanescent. Further, these higher pleasures admit of prolongation, not only because they are but little exhausting, but because they are connected with a wide variety of impressions and mental activities. The activities which form the basis of the intense pleasures of the sensualist admit of very little variation. The man who chooses the excitements of wine for his favourite enjoyment soon runs through the whole scale of various impressions. On the other hand, a lover of art or of science finds a practically boundless area of variety lying open to his contemplation and fruition. Just as the higher pleasures may be greatly prolonged at any given time, so they may be frequently renewed, and for the same reasons. The person who seeks enjoyment in sensual indulgence must necessarily wait till the exhausting effect of the excitement has disappeared, whereas one who prefers the higher sources of pleasure knows no such necessity.

1 It is curious to note how Hutcheson concedes, again and again, the superiority of the higher pleasures as estimated in quantity. Thus, he dwells on the evanescence of sensual indulgences, as well as on their diminution by craving and desire. So he affirms that the pleasures of knowledge and the ingenious arts transcend the sensual in duration. Plato, too, was not insensible to the quantitative differences between the higher and the lower pleasures.

HIGHER AND LOWER PLEASURES.

329

Again, the higher pleasures, being largely connected with ideal representation and intellectual activity, may be much more readily revived by ideal suggestion than the lower gratifications. As Mr. Bain has shown, the impressions of the higher senses, as colours and tones, are far more easily called up in idea than sensations of eating, drinking, &c. The sensualist gains only a very limited amount of ideal enjoyment from the images of poetry or the spontaneous internal ideas of his own mind; on the other hand, the person who seeks enjoyment in some refined source, as, for example, in the aesthetic aspects of Nature, is enabled to reap a considerable and varied enjoyment from the bare imagination of the objects which delight him.

It is to be remembered further that the refined intellectual pleasures receive reinforcement from various sources from which the lower pleasures are excluded. The sensualist cannot, except within very narrow limits, share his enjoyments with others, and so obtain the added pleasure of receiving their sympathy, and of taking part at the same time through a reciprocal sympathy in their delights. The lover of literature and art, or the man interested in the practical movements of his age, receives a vast addition to his pleasures through these avenues of sympathy. Then there are other supports to these higher pleasures. A man who chooses to seek his enjoyment in intellectual or other worthy pursuits gains the esteem, perhaps even the admiration, of others. This sense of dignity, taking the form of the satisfaction of self-respect, mingles with his enjoyments and perfects them. As a gentle under-current of satisfaction this consciousness of dignity appreciably increases the volume of the pleasure.

While the higher pleasures thus surpass the lower both in their extension in time and in the additional volume derivable from certain extraneous elements, they no less clearly transcend them in their purity from accompanying or succeeding pain. For one thing, it is certain that when a man's moral nature is not wholly dormant, unbridled indulgence in the lower enjoyments will be attended at the time or immediately after with a depressing sense of unworthiness, of demerit, and even of disgrace. And it is to be presumed that few men are wholly destitute of the capacity of receiving pleasure and pain from the consciousness of

merit and demerit. However this be, it is certain that sensual indulgence is in every case apt to pall, and the stage of exhaustion is attended with a sickly feeling of satiety. I do not say that a skilful man may not avoid this drawback to some extent, but any free indulgence in these pleasures (and it is of such an indulgence that I am speaking) is certain to be followed by disgust and fatigue. On the other hand, the refined enjoyments of art, &c., leave no such disagreeable after-effect.

Again, the man who erects sensual enjoyments into a chief factor of his life-happiness can hardly escape the pangs of ungratified appetite. It is obvious for one thing that he must frequently find himself in circumstances in which an immediate realisation of his wishes is impossible. Yet this is not the chief reason of his peculiar exposure to these pains. The lower sensual enjoyments are connected with energetic modes of action (instinctive appetitive action). Hence, when presented to the imagination, they at once awaken powerful active impulses. These impulses, which, owing to present circumstances, must clearly remain unrealised, together with the feeling of discord which thus arises, appear to react on the imagination of the pleasures, making it persistent in spite of any volitional effort to banish it by adding an element of intense emotional excitement or agitation. Hence the prolongation of the painful state of desire. To this it may perhaps be added that the agitation or unrest is increased by the circumstance that the ideal gratification arising from this imagination, is, as I have observed, insignificant as compared with that derivable from the representation of more refined enjoyments. Thus there is no present satisfaction adequate to the extinction of the painful excitement. On the contrary, it is probable that a sense of the inferiority of the imagined to the actual pleasure may co-operate in still further swelling the excitement of discontent and longing.

On the other hand, he who prefers the more refined enjoyments is comparatively free from these intenser modes of desire. For one thing, many of these are nearly always readily realisable. Yet even when circumstances do not allow of a present realisation, the man who chooses these enjoyments will be but little likely to suffer from the more tormenting degrees of desire. On the one hand, he is able to picture the reality so distinctly, that he

PLEASURE ESTIMATED BY SPECTATOR.

331

derives an appreciable present enjoyment which is fitted to exclude desire for anything beyond. On the other hand, this imagination, though vivid and distinct, does not force itself into consciousness with the same obstinacy as the imagination of sensual indulgences. And so it is much easier for the will to control, and, if necessary, to banish, the thought of the absent reality.

These considerations serve, I think, to show wherein the refined intellectual and social enjoyments transcend the lower sensual gratifications as estimated by the subject himself. I have no wish to underrate the intensity of these latter. As single feelings they may be vastly preferable to many of the more refined delights, though these, too, I conceive, include intense enjoyments (e.g. those of new scenery and of music). Also one must admit that when moderately indulged in they may, with skilful management, be made to furnish a considerable sum of pleasure. Nevertheless, when we take the two classes in their fullest measure and set one against another as competing for the rank of a principal factor of happiness, there is, I think, little doubt as to which is to be preferred by the wise man.

ones.

But when we call these refined enjoyments high,' we mean something more than a difference in value to the subject himself. The terms lofty, dignified, noble, &c., applied to certain orders of gratification, clearly connote a judgment passed by others. We prefer on moral grounds that other people should choose certain sources of enjoyment rather than others, and we find that the refined enjoyments are a more pleasing spectacle than the coarser That is to say, we estimate the worth of pleasures in relation to the moral or æsthetic rank of the activities of which they are the accompaniments. A man who prefers intellectual enjoyments to sensual has more dignity as an object, both for our moral appreciation and for our æsthetic contemplation. Hence the hedonist is not bound to make out that the higher pleasures are superior in quantity to the lower for the subject himself, for he is able to justify the supreme rank accorded to them by the consideration that they are accompaniments and indexes, so to speak, of mental and moral qualities, which have a vital importance in relation to the happiness of others.

CHAPTER XII.

THE REALITY OF HAPPINESS.

In order to determine whether our ideal scheme of happiness is fitted to become a reality, it is necessary, in the first place, to note the limits to which it appears to be subject from the very nature of the human mind itself. In sketching this scheme I have assumed that all men are fitted to derive pleasure from the same objects and pursuits, and that all persons having an equal degree of intelligence will, external circumstances being similar, lay the foundations of their happiness in the same terrain. Yet, it may be said that these assumptions are far from correct. As a matter of fact, different men do not find enjoyment in the same activities, but differ widely in their tastes and their notions of what constitutes happiness.

I am ready to admit that there is great diversity in men's judgments of pleasure and happiness. Our organisms are variously constituted, our natural and acquired emotional susceptibilities vary, and things which gratify one person may offend another. Yet this diversity of taste does not, I conceive, affect my contention that every wise man will seek his life-happiness in permanent objects and activities. All that the fact of diversity of taste proves is that men do not set precisely the same value on any given factor