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social advance with the growth of social aspiration brings about certain alleviations in the struggle with want through the principle of solidarity; but then he contends that these results are only a diminution of evils, never the attainment of a positive good. As we have seen, Hartmann follows Schopenhauer in regarding sympathy as having to do with suffering only, and does not recognise it under the form of a mutual participation in pleasurable activity.

Finally, it may be asked what Hartmann says respecting the influences of advancing science and art on human happiness. May not these at some distant time, when extensively studied and appreciated, yield a considerable surplus of enjoyment? Theoretical (as distinguished from practical) science is regarded by our author only in its bearing on external good, including moral relations, and is said to effect no appreciable result either in material or moral wellbeing. The enjoyments to be derived from the pursuit of science are not dwelt on here. In treating of the first stage of the illusion, however, Hartmann tells us that with the growing division of labour in science the joy of original discovery will be reduced to a vanishing quantity. This is a bold assertion, since it might appear to an ordinary intelligence that the spread of scientific activity over a much larger field would involve an increase in any enjoyment connected with this activity. It is plain, however, that Hartmann assigns no importance to the pleasures connected with the receptive side of scientific study (which he thinks are more than counterbalanced by the pains of effort), and that the pleasure of science is with him, as with Schopenhauer, the intense delight which is the peculiar prerogative of creative genius. Such an arbitrary limitation does not call for further remark.

With respect to art, our author allows that the receptive enjoyment' (as distinguished from the productive) is a considerable quantity. Yet he does not enter on the inquiry how far this may in the future become an ingredient of the daily life of all classes of society. All that he says with respect to the progress of art is that it is not to be over-estimated, since though our modern art is richer in ideas it is less perfect in form than classic art. This, of course, does not prove much, since it is a question whether the step from Greek to contemporary art is to be taken as a link in the chain of art-progress. What one really wants to know, is not whether a certain people in antiquity reached a development of art which is as high as any modern development, but (a) whether there is a general tendency for art to improve as national life as a whole, and the human race move onward; (b) whether this same social development is not accompanied by a general growth of artistic sense; and (c) whether this twofold æsthetic advance does not involve a very large addition to the sum of human enjoyment. But this is not the first time we have found Hartmann displaying a singular skill in missing the true import of a question.

Enough, perhaps more than enough, has been said to show what Hartmann's process of observation and calculation with respect to the several constituents of human and social progress really amounts to. It has even less pretensions to a rigorous method than the process underlying the investigation of human life in its statical aspect as something coexisting and persisting at the present time. But, in truth, both modes of examination may alike be said to make but the very feeblest pretence to the character of exact numerical computation. Hartmann's method differs,

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indeed, only in form from that rough mode of heaping together a few arbitrarily selected features of life which may be said to mark the boundary of unreasoned and reasoned pessimism. With very much parade of scientific method, it is essentially unscientific, inexact, superficial, and strongly suggestive of a pre-existing unreasoned conviction.1

1 Hartmann's pessimism is dealt with in a not unjustifiable tone of irony in a recently published work, 'Der Moderne Pessimismus,' by Dr. E. Pfleiderer. Pertinent objections to its reasonings are also to be found, as I have observed, in Johannes Huber's 'Der Pessimismus,' and in Volkelt's Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus.' Finally, Professor Bona Meyer, in a little work entitled 'Weltelend und Weltschmerz,' brings to bear on it what some may think an unnecessary gravity of argument. It has already been remarked that Dühring seeks to meet and to upset the pessimist's view of human life and of the future prospects of the race.

CHAPTER XI.

PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS.

We have now completed our examination of the pessimists' arguments, and may gather up the results as follows: First of all, the metaphysical portico, so to speak, of this dark and gloomy edifice was found, after a slight inspection, to contain numerous cracks and flaws, and to offer anything but a certain and safe approach to the pessimists' desired restingplace. Again, the physical groundwork of the structure has proved itself, on a close scrutiny, to be essentially unstable, being built of nothing but purely fanciful hypotheses, and what is more, of hypotheses which frequently run directly counter to experience, and which involve incoherent and self-contradictory conceptions. Once more, the psychology of pessimism, when its tangle of unexamined ideas is unravelled, shows itself to be radically erroneous. Lastly, the attempt to prove pessimism directly by an appeal to observation, must be regarded as a signal failure, since the method of observation pursued is wanting in those conditions of completeness, impartiality, and precision, which can alone give to a method a scientific value.

Such being the fruits of our investigation, we may, perhaps with safety, and even with profit, take our leave of pessimism as a system claiming by right of invincible arguments the adhesion of thoughtful minds. So far, it has

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certainly made out no such claim; and before it can substantiate its right a very great deal must be done in the way of a preliminary definition of the problem, and of a determination of the methods proper to such an inquiry.

In taking leave of pessimism, moreover, we are really concluding our inquiry into the complete scientific constructions of life-value. As yet there exists, so far as I know, no systematic attempt to ground a favourable view of life on a solid scientific basis. What has been done is very valuable, no doubt, but cannot be said to provide an adequate foundation for optimism. It is neither complete nor scientifically exact.

In order to illustrate this, let us glance for a moment at the quasi-scientific optimism of the last century. As we have seen, the English ethicists of this period agree for the most part in affirming the coincidence of the individual and the general happiness.1 Here, no doubt, is a proposition which, if true, supplies a basis for an optimistic view of social and moral relations. According to this, it would seem that everybody most certainly secures his own happiness when he helps on the happiness of others. Here, then, we seem to have a singularly happy illustration of a preestablished harmony,' by which an increase of the unit shall result in a more than proportionate increase of the aggregate. But do the facts support this cheering view? The affirmation cannot, I think, be accepted as true, except within certain limits. As I hope to show by-and-by, a wise pursuit of individual happiness will only take a man a

It is true the happiness of the individual in a future state was commonly referred to as a necessary make-weight in certain cases, but, in general, the agreement was insisted on even when the present life only is considered.

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