So, I would say that it is a mixed picture. I would also say that Guatemala presents the problem that we also have in a lot of other countries, and El Salvador is one of them: What do you do in the case of a country which has a Communist guerrilla threat, because our view is, as you know, that should that threat eventuate into a Communist victory, then any hope for future improvements is gone. Mr. KOSTMAYER. How do you characterize the threat? How serious or in terms of numbers of guerrillas, for example? Mr. ABRAMS. I would not characterize it as serious today. I think the Guatemalan army has really been very effective over the past few years. In areas, you know, there is a substantial Communist guerrilla apparatus working and getting help from outside, but I do not think Mr. KOSTMAYER. The report says that the insurgency in Guatemala-this is the Kissinger Commission report. The insurgency in Guatemala is at a much lower level. There are only about 2500 guerrillas in four groups loosely organized under an umbrella organization. Guerrillas lost critical ground in the fall of 1982, and have not yet recovered. Mr. ABRAMS. That's correct, and in the period since that report was written, they have not made any further progress. Mr. KOSTMAYER. Well, something seems to be out of balance. There doesn't seem to be a substantial threat. You've agreed with the group, which I think is certainly moderate or right of center, that characterized in fairly harsh terms the Government there, and, yet, we're asking for very substantial amounts of military aid. Something seems out of kilter here. Mr. ABRAMS. Well, you know, we've had now 31⁄2 years in which the Government of Guatemala has overthrown the Lucas Garcia regime and then came the Rios Montt government. Now, the Rios Montt government made really substantial improvements in human rights situations in Guatemala, I believe. It was a real improvement over an astonishingly brutal regime under Lucas Garcia. Now, how did the United States respond to the improvements that were made? And they were real. If one asked, for example, the AFL-CIO, was it easier to operate free trade unions under Rios Montt than under Lucas Garcia, if one asks in the newspapers, was it easier to have political life, did the Christian Democrats, for example, come out from literally living under ground, under Rios Montt, the answer is yes. Now, how did the United States respond in terms of foreign aid? What additional assistance did we give to the Rios Montt government? The answer is none. In part, because of congressional objections. The lesson there, it seems to me, for the Guatemalan Army officers is, there is nothing in it for you. Why make human rights improvements if the Americans don't care and do not reward those improvements, and that, I think, is one of the reasons that Rios Montt was overthrown. Now, the Mejia government has somewhat, I would say, to my surprise, continued a large number of the improvements that Rios Montt began, rather than slipping back into the Lucas Garcia type of behavior. The question I think you have to ask is, does there not come a point at which we should recognize such improvements as have been made and encourage further ones. And, it depends in part, of course, on how you think the situation is going. When were there improvements? And, I would once again say that- Mr. KOSTMAYER. Improvements above what? I mean, if this is accurate, brutal behavior of the security forces, in the cities, they have murdered those even suspected of dissent, in the countryside, they have, at times, killed indiscriminately. I mean, they used to be worse? Mr. ABRAMS. There is no question, and I'm sure that the Kissinger Commission members would agree with this- Mr. KOSTMAYER. And, this is current. This is fairly current. Mr. ABRAMS. I don't actually know how current it is. But, I mean, when did the Commission actually visit-probably 6 months ago or something like that. Mr. KOSTMAYER. This is a January 1984 publication date of the report. So- Mr. ABRAMS. You know, I think you do know, that the question of scale is crucially important. There is no question that the security forces in Guatemala are to this day engaging in the murder and torture of some opponents of that government. There is a big difference, though, between doing it to one person or doing it to a 100,000 people. One of the differences is that you have to determine whether the government is making any effort at all to slow it down and stop it. And, again, I can only say that I think attention should be paid when a distinguished and international figure as Lord Colville spends weeks and weeks all over Guatemala and comes up with the U.N. report that he did, which paints a very different picture from the one one is accustomed to getting from human rights groups. If we do not take an account of progress, if, when there is a reduction in brutality, a reduction in the amount of murder, a reduction in the amount of torture, an increase in political life and there sure has been an increase in political life, we don't recognize it. We are sending out the wrong message. Mr. KOSTMAYER. I just would argue whether or not there has been a real reduction or not. There doesn't seem to have been a very substantial reduction. Wouldn't they get a stronger signal if we gave them less money? Mr. ABRAMS. We are giving them no money. How could you give them less? Mr. KOSTMAYER. Well, you have requested in the administration bill last week, $10.3 million military aid, $10 million FMS and $300,000 in IMET. That was in the Broomfield substitute, I believe. Mr. ABRAMS. Well Mr. KOSTMAYER. You know more about these things than I do. Mr. ABRAMS. It's obvious that you cannot pick out a dollar figure and say that that is, from the human rights point of view, the exact amount, and a dollar less is terrible and a dollar more is even better. But, I think that there comes a time when you have to say look, we're going to have no influence over the behavior of the Guatemalan Government and Guatemalan military if, in the face of improvements, in the face of an election that they are about to hold, we continue to say that nothing has changed in Guatemala. That's just closing our eyes to the facts. Mr. KOSTMAYER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Solomon? Mr. SOLOMON. First, Mr. Secretary, let me just compliment you on your report, and the usual good job you do. Let me also commend you on your courtesy to members. You have a lot more restraint than I would have sitting over there. Unfortunately, as a Member of Congress, I don't have to be courteous when we get tit for tat. So, just in response to my good friend from Pennsylvania, let me Mr. KOSTMAYER. I can vouch for that. Mr. SOLOMON. I know you can. I believe in tit for tat. I believe in that very strongly, as you know. But, when the gentleman made a statement about human rights practices being worse, with a kind of inflection in his voice, that was a ridiculous statement to make. So, I'd just like to make that point. I don't have to be courteous either. Mr. KOSTMAYER. You aren't. Mr. SOLOMON. But, I am until someone else isn't. That's the main thing. Dealing with 2,500 Communist guerrillas is not an insignificant problem. If anybody has ever fought such guerrillas, they know that the guerrillas have the force of 20 and 30 and 40 and 50 times that of an organized army. I think one good example is the one single terrorist who killed 240 Marines in Lebanon. There's a ratio of 1 to 240 that we're dealing with. So, it really isn't insignificant. There still is a serious problem in Guatemala. Mr. KOSTMAYER. If the gentleman will yield just a Mr. SOLOMON. I'd be more than glad to. Mr. KOSTMAYER. I was not characterizing it, the Kissinger Commission was characterizing it in that way. I was reading directly from the Kissinger Commission report. I agree with them, but it is their interpretation. I think it's an accurate one. It is theirs, though. Mr. SOLOMON. Well, I think the 2,500 is accurate, but I would not agree that it's insignificant. But, anyway, Mr. Secretary, on page 6, of your prepared statement you say the phrase quiet diplomacy fails to convey either the intensity of our efforts or the depth of our concerns. And, you go on to say that quiet diplomacy refers only to the confidentiality of the channels we use, and not to the intensity of our representation. I agree with that. You go on to say that these kinds of diplomatic activity have proven their effectiveness in a number of countries. Can you give us some examples of those countries? Just a couple? Mr. ABRAMS. Well, you know, I will. I hesitate to do it only because in a sense it violates the principle that we're not going to then talk about confidential communications. But, I'll give you the example of South Korea as one where I don't recall in the last 31⁄2 years, any public statement by this Government criticizing the Government of South Korea on human rights grounds. I don't recall any. But, it's been a matter of discussion between us, and the Government-the Republic of Korea many times. And, we discussed it the way two friends and allies should discuss these problems. And, I think that there has been a significant improvement in the human rights situation in the Republic of Korea. For example, a series of amnesties have very significantly reduced the number of political prisoners in that country, and there has been something of an opening up there, which we all hope will continue. We don't deserve the credit for that; the Government deserves the credit for that. But, it's an example, I think, of where an ongoing dialog between the United States and a friendly government can have good human rights effects. I'll give another example, and, again, with some reluctance, but we've had a continuing dialog with the Government of South Africa over a wide range of human rights issues, on some of which we have had absolutely no impact, and on others of which, I think, we have had some impact. On legal questions, I think we've had some impact, and I think that if you look at the legal situation regarding dissent, for example, the number of people banned or efforts to prevent murder of prisoners, abuse of prisoners by prison guards, I think there has been some significant change in the Republic of South Africa. One could go on. I think it's fair to say that one of the things that we do with-in a case like Argentina, let's say, or, for that matter, Uruguay today, we adhere to the theory, as you know, that really the best thing you can do for human rights is to return a country to democracy. And, so, what we have done in a number of countries which are under or were under military rule, is to maintain contacts with the military as we could, to argue to them that it is important that they maintain their timetable for a return to civilian government. This happened in Argentina. It is scheduled to happen in Uruguay this year, and that's something that we spent a lot of time on in these confidential channels. Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Secretary, that leads me to another question. Further down in your testimony, on page 7, you say that there are "extremist groups which deliberately seek to provoke Government repression and torture in an effort to polarize society and undermine democratic institutions." What dilemma does this type of activity pose for the quiet diplomacy approach that we take? Mr. ABRAMS. Well, of course, these are groups that we can't—we don't have any association with, that are engaging in this kind of behavior. The problem is this, let's suppose that the efforts were as stated, that there is an increase in terrorist activities, bombings, killings, kidnapings, and the Government begins to respond with brutality. We're faced with the dilemma of how we respond to that. That is, do we press them just privately and say look, you're falling right into this trap, this is exactly what they want you to do, or do we, at the same time, condemn them publicly? And, the problem there is, of course, that the public condemnation, in some cases, is going to reduce the effectiveness of our private-appeals to them, that they will be angry at this public condemnation, and won't want to talk to us about it or won't see us any longer as friends who understand their problems. Of course, if we don't say anything publicly, then very often we get attacked for not having a human rights policy. If I can give an example of this on a very broad scale, I think that the effectiveness of the Carter administration human rights policy with regard to South Korea was very significantly reduced when it became known that President Carter wanted to pull the troops out of Korea. That led the Korean Government to say this man does not understand our security problem. Therefore, when advice was given by the U.S. Government on human rights questions, it was easy for the South Korean military to ask, "What kind of advice is this? These people have no idea of the situation we're in.' I think that when we talk to the South Korean Government about it, they know that we understand their security situation, and they know that such advice that we give is in the context of our shared concern about the security threats to them from North Korea. So, I think this works the same way when you're dealing with terrorist groups, where when they know that we really do understand the threat they are under, it makes it more likely that they're going to take our advice. Mr. KOSTMAYER. Would the gentleman yield to me? Mr. SOLOMON. I'd be more than glad to. Mr. KOSTMAYER. Thank you very much. This phenomenon of groups deliberately provoking governments into taking repressive action, I'm sure, occurred. But, how widespread is it? We all know it's a phenomenon, but it just occurs to me that it would be a very rare one that when governments become repressive, that it's in almost every instance, not because a group wants them to become repressive, but, because groups don't want them to become repressive. Now, on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being the least, 10 being the most, could you describe, could you tell me how widespread this phenomenon is? As I say, I don't question it exists. I'm sure that it's a deliberate tactic of terrorist groups, but is it really in the whole problem that you deal with every day, is it a widespread phenomenon? Mr. ABRAMS. I have to say yes, I would say it is widespread. I mean, an example that I would give is Argentina, that is that one of the reasons that there was a military takeover was, in a sense, the beginnings of a collapse of order. One of the reasons there was a military takeover in Turkey was that there was a total collapse of order in that country. |