2d Session SENATE 101-31 THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR SEPTEMBER 14, 1990.-Ordered to be printed Mr. PELL, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, REPORT [To accompany EX N, 94-2 and Treaty Doc. 101-19] The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred the two treaties between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on (1) the Limitation of Underground Weapon Tests, signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974, and (2) Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET), signed in Washington and Moscow on May 28, 1976, with an Agreed Statement relating to paragraph 2(c) of Article III of the PNET, signed on May 13, 1976, and the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, and the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (the Protocols), both signed at Washington on June 1, 1990, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with two declarations to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Weapon Tests and the Protocol thereto, and recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification thereof. I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF THE TREATIES PURPOSE The treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, and the Protocol thereto, referred to as the Threshold Test Ban (TTB Treaty), and the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, and 39-119 (Star Print) the Protocol thereto (PNE Treaty), taken together, will govern the conduct of all underground nuclear explosions by the Parties, those for weapon tests as well as those for peaceful purposes. All nuclear explosions other than underground nuclear explosions are prohibited by the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (the Limited Test Ban Treaty), which entered into force in 1963. The TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty are closely interrelated. The TTB Treaty imposes a yield limitation and other conditions on underground nuclear weapon tests, while the PNE Treaty imposes the identical yield limitation on individual underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and other limitations and conditions on the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The PNE Treaty was negotiated pursuant to Article VIII of the TTB Treaty which provides that the United States and the Soviet Union will negotiate and conclude an agreement governing underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The two treaties are expressly linked to each other by a number of provisions, including the entry-into-force provision of the PNE Treaty, which provides for the simultaneous exchange of instruments of ratification of both treaties. PROTOCOLS TRANSMITTED BY PRESIDENT On June 28, President Bush transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a protocol to the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty, or TTBT), and the protocol to the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, or PNET). The protocols were signed during the Washington summit meetings on June 1, 1990. SUMMARY OF THE TTB TREATY AND THE NEW PROTOCOL The TTB Treaty, including a Protocol which is an integral part thereof, was signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974. The treaty provides for both a limitation of 150 kilotons on all underground nuclear weapon tests carried out by the Parties and for the exchange of data to ensure verification of compliance by national technical means. The treaty consists of a preamble, five operative articles, and a Protocol. The new Protocol substantially expands upon the protocol originally negotiated. The protocol provides that, in the case of every nuclear explosion over 50 kilotons conducted by either side, the other side has the right to gain on-site yield measurement through hydrodynamic methods (known as CORRTEX) and the right to confirm geology and hydrodynamic yield measurements. Also in instances of tests over 50 kilotons, each side has the right to use three designated seismic stations. Seismic monitoring or hydrodynamic measurements can be used alone or in combination. On-site inspections are allowed for tests over 50 kilotons if hydrodynamic methods are not used and for tests between 35 and 50 kilotons. In addition, regardless of test yields, each side is allowed to conduct hydrodynamic measurements of up to two tests a year for five years and of a test each year thereafter, unless otherwise agreed. SUMMARY OF PNE TREATY AND THE NEW PROTOCOL The PNE Treaty, including a Protocol which is an integral part thereof, was signed in Washington and Moscow on May 28, 1976. An associated Agreed Statement dated May 13, 1976, concerning the treaty was initiated in Moscow, and is included as an attachment to the text of the treaty. In his letter of submittal to the President, Secretary Baker said that, the Agreed Statement relating to paragraph 2(c) of Article III of the PNET, signed on May 13, 1976, and transmitted to the Senate on July 29, 1976, will apply to the PNET as originally contemplated." This treaty, which was negotiated pursuant to Article III of the TTB Treaty, establishes procedures for the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE's), designed to meet the three basic criteria considered essential by the Ford administration for an acceptable agreement: (1) Underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes must not provide weapon-related benefits otherwise precluded by the TTB Treaty; (2) The fact that PNE activities are not contributing to such benefits must be adequately verifiable; and (3) The PNE Treaty must be consistent with existing treaty obligations, including, in particular, the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Negotiation of the PNE Treaty was necessitated by the expressed Soviet interest in providing for a program of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the concomitant U.S. desire to obtain effective limitations on nuclear weapon tests. The PNE Treaty is designed to ensure that weapon-related benefits otherwise precluded by the TTB Treaty cannot be obtained by a Party in the course of a PNE program whether the explosions are carried out on its own territory or on the territory of a third state pursuant to an arrangement for providing PNE services to such a third state. The treaty was negotiated specifically to provide a regime for the conduct of PNE's by nuclear weapons states and it in no way alters the fact that acquisition of nuclear explosive capability, albeit for ostensibly peaceful purposes, by a non-nuclear weapon state would inevitably mean the simultaneous acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. The PNE Treaty provides for a limitation of 150 kilotons on all individual underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and for an aggregate yield limitation of 1.5 megatons on group nuclear explosions for such purposes. A group explosion consists of substantially simultaneous individual explosions located within a specified geometrical relationship to one another. The Protocol sets forth rights to hydrodynamic measurements comparable to those in the TTBT protocol with the significant difference that, since there is no weapons design information to protect, the monitoring can be quite intrusive. Accordingly, the meas uring device which is essentially a coaxial cable which gives yield information based on the speed and degree of its melting, is implanted in the same hole as the device rather than in a parallel hole. When hydrodynamic measurement is used and group explosions with an aggregate yield above 150 kilotons is involved, a local seismic network is allowed. On-site inspection is allowed if hydrodynamic measurement is not chosen. II. BACKGROUND Following the development of atomic weapons in the early 1940's and their first and only use in 1945 at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the post-war years were marked by a race between the United States and the Soviet Union to develop, test, and deploy atomic and, later, hydrogen weapons. In the 1950's, Britain and France moved toward creation of their own independent arsenals. Early efforts to turn away from nuclear weapons entirely came to naught, but, under pressure from other nations, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, did agree to discuss a comprehensive ban, and a voluntary moratorium on testing came into place in 1958. Although President Eisenhower announced in 1959 that the United States would no longer be bound, and although the French tested, the tripartite moratorium lasted until 1961, when the Soviets tested and the United States tested two weeks later. Discussions in that period focussed on the concept of a complete ban, but the United States and the Soviet Union could not resolve their differences on various significant matters, including the numbers of annual, on-site inspections and the numbers of control posts and unmanned seismic stations. LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963 By mid-1963, however, it was clear that an agreement might be achievable which did not deal with underground tests, but banned other testing. Accordingly, three power meetings began on July 15, and a treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, was negotiated in 10 days. It prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion by the parties, in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The treaty allows nuclear explosions underground, but only if there will be no radioactive debris outside the territorial limits of the nation conducting the explosion. The treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963. On September 24, after extensive hearings and almost 3 weeks of debate, the Senate consented to ratification in an 80-19 vote. President Kennedy ratified the treaty on October 7, and it entered into force on October 10. THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATIES In 1974, President Nixon signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which applied further limits on nuclear testing by restricting underground nuclear weapons tests to an explosive yield of 150 kilotons. However, the specified entry into force was delayed until March 31, 1976, and the treaty was not submitted to the Senate by the President pending negotiation of companion treaty covering peaceful nuclear explosions. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) was signed by President Ford in 1976, and he transmitted the two treaties to the Senate late in his term. In 1977, the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings and, by unanimous vote, ordered the TTB and PNE Treaties reported favorably, but reporting was delayed pending completion of action on and reporting of the Panama Canal Treaties on the calendar. In mid-1978, the Administration concluded that a push to gain Senate consent to ratification of the TTBT and PNET could stir up a fight which would jeopardize the prospects for a complete ban. Accordingly, the Committee voted to reconsider the vote of approval and to return the treaties to the Committee calendar. Citing customary international law, both sides have committed themselves to observance of the TTB/PNE Treaties for the last decade, although the Reagan administration has reported to Congress that the Soviets have "likely" exceeded the 150 kiloton ceiling on numerous occasions. This contention is disputed by scientists and others who question the accuracy and interpretation of the Administration's yield measurements. Since the agreements have not been ratified, two important provisions related to verification have not been implemented: (1) provisions under the PNET for on-site monitoring of pre-announced groups of nuclear explosions with an aggregate yield above 150 kilotons; and (2) exchange of data and test calibration information under both treaties that would improve each side's verification confidence level, unless undercut by deception. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN During the Carter administration the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom conducted lengthy negotiations on a CTB. By 1979, almost all issues had been resolved or appeared resolvable. The sides were moving toward agreement that weapons tests would be banned and that a moratorium would be placed indefinitely on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Verification was to be both through international arrangements specified in the treaty and special arrangements among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. The treaty provided for verification by National Technical Means (NTM), as well as an international exchange of seismic data. Any participant could request an on-site inspection of a suspicious event, which could either be granted or the event could be explained. In the case of the original three parties, it was agreed that ten stations would be located in both the Soviet Union and the United States. The number of seismic stations to be placed in Britain was not resolved. The three countries could also request inspections that would have to be granted unless explanations were provided. Denials of inspection demands would have to be taken into account in assessing a party's compliance record. In a major effort to gain JCS, DOD, and DOE support for the emerging treaty, President Carter shortened the proposed initial duration of the treaty from five to three years, thereby reducing the period of time during which the United States would not be able to conduct reliability or developmental testing for its nuclear weapons programs. After heated dispute, a decision was made that |