strongly in favor of the enactment of a fair-employment-practice bill at the earliest possible moment.

I do not believe that even the opponents of this particular piece of legislation would deny that the conditions exist for which this is an attempted remedy. Prejudice and discrimination are facts. They are a part of the reality of life which we must face.

It is not contended for a moment that prejudice can be cured by legislation. That can be achieved only by education. But certain discriminatory practices which spring from prejudice can be curbed, and among them is the practice of discrimination in employment, that is, the refusal of a job to an individual not on the basis of his qualifications but because of his religion, race, or nationality background. The mere fact that these practices are common is no justification why they should be permitted to continue nor for the position that Congress can do nothing or should do nothing about it.

Under the Constitution, it is the duty of the Congress to act in furtherance of the purposes for which our Government was formed. These purposes include "to promote the general welfare" and "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

The right to the pursuit of happiness by competing for a job on an equal basis with others is an essential part of our liberty. Equality of opportunity for all is one of our basic American tenets. One applicant for a job may have better qualifications than another by reason of experience, training, or education, and an employer who does not take these into account in making his decision would, of course, be foolish. But, on the other hand, it is equally short-sighted to disqualify from consideration a whole category of applicants, blacklist them from the start as undesirable, and remove them from the field of competition with others, regardless of their individual capabilities. To base such disqualification on a person's religion or race or where his parents came from is not only shortsighted but un-American.

Now there is nothing revolutionary or of wild-eyed radicalism about the fairemployment-practice bill now before Congress, although you may hear many of its opponents so classify it or claim it is Government interference with the right of free enterprise.

Actually, it is merely a proposal to apply one of our long established principles of government; namely, to safeguard by specific legislation one of the fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution.

The bill would establish as a part of our Federal law this protective legislation for equality of opportunity that already has been written into the statutes for six States-New York, New Jersey, Indiana, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. I am sorry that Pennsylvania is not on that list, too, but the State Senate at the last session of the legislature saw fit to permit the FEPC bill there to be bottled up in committee.

The bill now before the House subcommittee relies strongly on the elements of education and moral suasion to bring about a change in unfair employment practices. The Commission of five members apointed by the President which would be created under this bill is specifically directed to try to achieve a remedy by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. It is only in the event that such a method fails to bring about the desired improvement in the specific case brought before the Commission on a complaint that punitive legal action is resorted to.

And even such action by the Commission is subject to an appeal to the courts. In fact, the courts are given the power in entering a decree to enforce the Commission's order as it was rendered, modify it, or set it aside in whole or in part.

This bill approaches the whole problem in a spirit of moderation and common sense, and there is no basis for the statements of its opponents to the effect that a tryrannical bureaucracy is being set up which could tell an employer whom he must hire.

The experience in every State where commissions are operating has been that there is very little need to resort to exercise of the full powers of the commission and the courts. And I believe the same thing is true of the Philadelphia Fair Employment Commission, which was created a little more than a year ago. The question is frequently raised as to why, since the activity of the States and muncipalities in this direction is expanding, it should be necessary to have a Federal law. It is my feeling that this is a national problem and requires treatment on that basis. Prejudice and bigotry, and the employment discriminations which are a form of expression of these evils, are not confined within State lines.

The need for Congress to enact this bill is twofold: There is an economic need and a moral need. First, the practices complained of deprive our national economy of the productive value of the work of individuals who are denied an opportunity to make full use of their talents, their education, and their training. These are vitally needed in our economy to carry out America's program of full employment and full production.

Second, we must make effective in everyday life at home the principles of democracy which we are helping to spread abroad in other countries of the world.

I do not maintain for a moment that this law we seek would be a cure-all or panacea, or that if it is enacted that all discrimination will end, but the mere expression by the Federal Government of its abhorrence of these evil practices, written into the body of its statutes, will have a tremendous preventive and educational effect. I will encourage and hasten action by other States where similar bills are under consideration. Moreover, a national commission will be of great help to State commissions in setting standards of procedure and coordinating policies in addition to acting administratively in its own sphere.

It will be a start into enactment into law of the great program recommended by the President's Commission on Civil Rights and which the President has repeatedly urged upon the Congress since he first took office.

STATEMENT OF THE INTER-RACIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, IN SUPPORT OF H. R. 4453

The Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act which has the same purpose and the same basic procedure as that set forth in H. R. 4453 was enacted May 14, 1947, or approximately 2 years ago. It is administered by the Connecticut Interracial Commission which is a budgeted State agency established by statute in 1943.

During this 2-year period approximately 115. formal complaints have been filed with or by the commission alleging unfair employment practices. In addition nearly as many informal complaints alleging discrimination in employment have also been investigated.

Of the 100 formal complaints dismissed as of this writing 78 were filed by individuals and 22 by the commission. The latter were issued against discriminatory regulations practices or policies which were in conflict with the law in that they excluded or discriminated against a racial, religious, or national group in matters involving employment although not directed against any specific individual.

Of the 100 complaints dismissed in 60 percent of these, the commission found evidence of discriminatory practices prohibited by the law and was able to effect a satisfactory adjustment. This meant that either the complainant was employed or offered employment or that in the event there was no individual complainant that a discriminatory practice was eliminated.

Complaints received may be grouped roughly into three categories; denial of restriction in or separation from employment because of race, color, creed, national origin, or ancestry.

The most common allegation has been refusal to employ on account of color or race followed by restrictions in priviliges and conditions of employment with relatively few complaints being filed because of alleged discriminatory discharges or lay-offs.

Although unemployment compensation claims in Connecticut have increased approximately 50,000 over last year, few complaints have been filed alleging discriminatory separations. On the basis of these figures it is evident that getting employers to consider minority workers for employment is the paramount problem and that once they are employed attitudes change and the prejudices and fears against them as employees seem to dissipate.

The commission realizes that the law has been successful largely through the cooperation of employers, labor unions, and other agencies. Prior to the passage of the law many large employers were hesitant to alter their employment policies to admit minority workers not because they were personally opposed to such action but because they were apprehensive of the reaction of their employees and their customers. With the enactment of the law, many of these same employers have commenced to employ minority workers not because of complaints filed

against them or because of any persuasion or coercion on the part of the commission but rather because they felt that the law gave them an official support hitherto lacking.

For example, in Hartford many Negro office workers were employed by insurance companies as contrasted with the former pattern of employing Negroes only in maintenance, custodial, and service capacities. The Southern New England Telephone Co. employed its first Negro telephone operators in Connecticut 1 year ago and also has several clerical workers in their New Haven office.

This degree of voluntary compliance has been one of the most significant results of the Fair Employment Practices Act.

To date all complaints in which discrimination was evident have been settled without the commission having to hold hearings. This is also true in the other States having fair employment laws. Although not invoked the commission nevertheless believes that this power to hold public hearings has been responsible for the willingness of many respondents to accept the commission's proposals for adjusting a complaint.

No formal hearings have been held by the commission as they have not been found necessary in settling complaints. No court actions have been brought by or against the commission under the law.

When the Connecticut Fair Employment Practice Act was passed its opponents predicted dire happenings such as walk-outs, demonstrations, or loss of patronage because of the introduction of minority workers into industrial mercantile service or other establishments. None of these predictions have occurred, and on the contrary, in several instances where the adjustment of a complaint has resulted in the employment of a minority worker for the first time additional workers from these groups have subsequently been employed.

In settling complaints where discrimination is present the commission not only attempts to obtain a satisfactory adjustment for the complainant but, what is more important, tries to effect the adjustment in a manner that will prevent further discrimination by changing the employer's attitude and policy toward minority workers. The commission, therefore, has consistently endeavored to gain acceptance for the law through education rather than through prosecution or pressure.

The fact that there has been evidence of discrimination in more than 60 percent of the complaints filed indicates the necessity for the law. The commission believes it has proved an effective implement in opening up employment opportunities for minority groups and that it can be administered in a manner that will assure the continuance and increase of these opportunities by voluntary efforts on the part of the employers.

The statute establishing the inter-racial commission in 1943 stated that the commission shall investigate the possibilities of affording equal opportunity of profitable employment to all persons. To implement this the commission carried on an educational program among employers, labor unions, civic, and church groups and the public to remove employment barriers and prejudices against minority workers, with the enactment of the Fair Employment Practice Act in 1947, the commission's powers were augmented and among those specified in the law was that of fostering through education and community effort or otherwise good will among the groups and elements of the population of the State. Consequently the commission has not diminished its educational efforts but has regarded the law as an effective educational tool for integrating minority workers into employment.

The commission believes that this policy has been responsible for the acceptance of minority workers in employment in Connecticut in areas which hitherto were closed to them and also has enabled them to satisfactorily adjust to date all complaints in which they felt discrimination in employment was present without recourse to the hearing procedure.

Mr. POWELL. Our first witness this morning is the Senator from Illinois, Paul H. Douglas.

TESTIMONY OF HON. PAUL H. DOUGLAS, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Senator DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank the committee for the courtesy which they have extended to me in giving me the privilege of testifying.

I take it that one of the legal and social difficulties in the field of civil rights lies in the fact that our early constitutional guaranties of freedom were designed to protect men against discriminatory action by governments and not against such action by fellow citizens.

Under feudalism, power was concentrated in the sovereign or his deputies, and it was against the arbitrary exercise of power of King John that the English barons rebelled and won the rights incorporated in the Magna Carta. Having suffered for nearly 60 years at the hands of the Stuarts, the English merchants deposed James II in 1688 and the next year won from William and Mary legal guaranties to protect the rights of free men from being violated by the Crown.

Later it was the abuse of this power by the British Government which in part caused the American Revolution. It was small wonder, therefore, that the common man in our country was fearful that the new government, even under such popular control as was provided, might become an agency to oppress the individual. Men were fearful either that an active minority might come to control the National Government and would then use it to become tyrants over the more passive majority, or that an inflamed majority would similarly oppress the members of minority groups.

As a result the Bill of Rights as fashioned by George Mason and James Madison and seasoned with the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson was adopted by the States as the first 10 amendments to the Constitution. These amendments were designed to protect the individual against the National Government so that the latter would neither impose a state religion nor forbid men from following their own faith; that it would not prevent them from assembling peacefully; petitioning for a redress of grievances, nor from having the freedom to speak their mind and to express their thoughts and feelings in print. The National Government was not to take away from the people nor to quarter troops in their houses without their consent, and men were to be secure in their houses from unreasonable searches and seizures and not to be arrested without a warrant. They were not to be tried for crimes unless first indicted by a grand jury and were to have the right of speedy trial; to know the charges against them; to be confronted by witnesses who could be cross-examined; to be represented by counsel, to have the right of a jury trial, and to be protected against cruel and unusual punishment. Property could not be taken without just compensation, nor could the Federal Government deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

These constitutional guaranties embodied in the National Constitution were primarily designed to protect the individual against the tyranny of the National Government, but so far as the protections of a fair trial were concerned, were also to be protection against the acts of agents of the State governments as well.

The provisions of the Bill of Rights have, moreover, been largely enacted into the constitutions of the separate States so that these legal guaranties are now virtually universal.

All this is extremely valuable. While the chief protection against a police state of either the Fascist or Communist type lies in the human spirit rather than in any words on parchment, the very existence of such provisions makes our ideals more tangible and

firmly held; gives us a point of reference by which we may judge our conduct and helps to snuff out in their early stages tendencies toward tyranny on the part of government which might otherwise develop.

But these constitutional guaranties do not in themselves protect the individual against the actions of other powerful individuals to deprive him of certain essential freedoms and rights. To the founding fathers this did not seem necessary. The members of the white population were overwhelmingly farmers, and except in the coastal regions of the South and the Hudson Valley, these men were on terms of substantial equality with each other. Secure on their farms, they could, like John Taylor, of Carolina, and Nathaniel Macon, adopt an independent attitude, and if driven from public life, could make an honest and comfortable living from the soil. Most white men could, therefore, stand on their own feet and did not need protection against the powerful.

There would, however, have been a natural reluctance on the part of the founding fathers to lay down rules for the regulation of social and business intercourse. We all recognize the right of men in their social life to choose their own friends and associates. No sensible person would propose that the State should prescribe the persons whom we may or may not invite into our homes, or admit to our clubs or churches. These are matters for men and women to decide for themselves. It is, of course, the hope of all decent people that these choices maye be made in a friendly spirit and with refined and discriminating judgment so that the mighty forces of social emulation may operate to raise the level of character and conduct. if men makes choices of which we disapprove, then few would think of trying to implement our rights by regulatory action on the part of the Government, for, as it is colloquially said, "that is their affair."

But

Until recently the average man probably regarded private employment and the furnishing of educational, health, and recreational facilities by private bodies as being substantially similar in character to these social choices. It was thought to be an employer's prerogative to hire and fire whom he wished. It was his business and he was free to exercise his choice. If he disliked red-headed men that was his privilege. Similarly, if he did not want union advocates, Negroes, Jews, or Baptists in his employ, that was also his affair.

Privately financed schools and colleges, moreover, were and still are privileged to restrict attendance to or favor admissions from given racial, religious, or social groups, and to discriminate, albeit somewhat secretly and shamefully, against others.

Similarly, while private hospitals did not appreciably discriminate in admitting white patients, they did discriminate against Negroes, and in the selection of a medical staff, Negroes tended to be barred and Jews frequently found it difficult to gain a place. Similarly, in housing, men frequently sought to protect themselves against neighbors whom they believed would be obnoxious by entering into compacts or covenants not to sell or rent to members of a given racial and religious group, notably Negroes and to a lesser but real extent Jews, and the same provisions were applied by hotels and restaurants, and in certain cases, by theaters.