109 WHITE, J., dissenting. testified that the Committee had considered the request for an executive session and determined that the rule did not require it. The Committee's construction of its own rules is entitled to great weight. United States v. Smith, 286 U. S. 6; Christoffel v. United States, 338 U. S. 84. "To place upon the standing rules of the [Congress] a construction different from that adopted by the [Congress] is a serious and delicate exercise of judicial power." United States v. Smith, supra, at 48. Here, the Committee under its rule does not deem it to be unjust injury where the truth about the witness or a third person is brought out in a public hearing in pursuance of a valid legislative purpose. This reading of Rule IV-A is not bizarre, irrational or so out of keeping with history as to permit a court to ignore it because it would prefer a different construction or an entirely different rule. The House of Representatives has its own rule concerning executive sessions, Rule XI (m), which, according to the testimony at petitioner's trial and as contrasted with the rule of the Committee, has been construed by the House to afford no protection at all to the witness himself. Moreover, § 103 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 193 provides that "[n]o witness is privileged to refuse to testify to any fact upon the ground that his testimony to such fact. . . may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous." Whatever other problems may inhere in the rule of the Committee, of the House or in the statute, the Committee's construction of its own rule heralds no break with the tradition of the House or of Congress in affording privacy to a witness when the hearing may be a fishing expedition or an inquiry into mere rumor but permitting a public session when the matter to be brought out is both pertinent to a legislative purpose and nothing but the unvarnished truth. "The Constitution commits to the [House] the WHITE, J., dissenting. 374 U.S. power to make its own rules; and it is not the function. of the Court to say that another rule would be better." United States v. Smith, supra, at 48. Nor is there substance in petitioner's claim that the Committee erroneously failed to act upon the telegraphic request. Under the rule, all that is required is that the Committee consider whether to hold the session in an executive hearing. Cf. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260. Here, the Committee on its own motion, even before the telegram was transmitted, had given full consideration to whether petitioner should be questioned in private. Whatever would have been the prejudice resulting from disregarding the telegram and totally failing to consider whether the questioning should be conducted in secret, there is no room for complaint on this record since the Committee had already deliberated on the matter. Once it made its assessment, as it did here, it discharged any obligation which its own rules imposed. III. If "testimonial compulsion is an intensely practical matter" and "every exemption from testifying or producing records thus presupposes a very real interest to be protected," United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S., at 332, much of this discussion is really beside the point. Petitioner was convicted for refusing to answer four questions, each refusal constituting a separate count in the indictment. He was found guilty on all four counts, his sentences to run concurrently. His conviction must stand if his refusal to answer any one of the questions was unjustified. Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140, 147; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 85; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 115. The first question which petitioner refused to answer was: "Mr. Yellin, where did you reside prior to September 1957?" Petitioner refused to respond because to him it was ob 109 WHITE, J., dissenting. vious where "this line of questioning will probably lead" and, expressly disclaiming Fifth Amendment protection, declined to answer on First Amendment grounds. Petitioner's conviction on Count 1 should stand quite independently as against the claim to an executive session for it is difficult indeed to ascribe any reality to the view that petitioner may not be compelled, in a public hearing held by a legislative committee in pursuit of information pertinent to a legislative purpose, to answer, or to refuse to answer, a question about his residence prior to 1957 because of danger to his reputation. Oversight of congressional committee procedures should not be based upon such frivolous grounds. In my view, petitioner's executive session argument is totally without support, and therefore I dissent. Opinion of the Court. 374 U.S. UNITED STATES v. MUNIZ ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 464. Argued April 22-23, 1963-Decided June 17, 1963. A federal prisoner can sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover damages from the United States for personal injuries sustained during confinement in a federal prison and resulting from the negligence of a government employee. Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, distinguished. Pp. 150-166. 305 F. 2d 253, 285, affirmed. J. William Doolittle argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Douglas, Morton Hollander and Howard E. Shapiro. John J. Abt and Richard D. Friedman argued the cause for respondents. With them on the briefs was Charles Andrews Ellis. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether a person can sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover damages from the United States Government for personal injuries sustained during confinement in a federal prison, by reason of the negligence of a government employee. For reasons to be developed below, we hold that such suits are within the purview of the Act. This litigation, brought here by the Government as a single case, arises from two separate suits for personal injuries brought by respondents Henry Winston and Carlos Muniz in the United States District Court for the 128 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671-2680. 150 Opinion of the Court. Southern District of New York. Both sought damages for personal injuries suffered while they were confined in federal prisons. The district judge granted the Government's motions to dismiss in both cases on the ground that such suits were not permitted by the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed, four judges dissenting. 305 F. 2d 264, 287.2 Because the decision below involves an important question in the construction of the Federal Tort Claims Act and because two Courts of Appeals had previously reached a contrary result, we granted certiorari. 371 U. S. 919. 3 Winston alleged that in April 1959, while he was confined in the United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, he began suffering dizziness, loss of balance, and difficulty with his vision. Upon Winston's initial complaint, the prison medical officer's diagnosis was borderline hypertension; the treatment, a reduction in weight. Winston's symptoms nevertheless recurred with increasing severity over the next nine months; he was unable to keep his balance and fell frequently. He also began to suffer periodic loss of vision. Despite repeated complaints to the prison officers, Winston was given no further treatment, except some dramamine for his dizziness. In January 1960, Winston's attorney became alarmed by his condition and had him examined by a consulting physician. In February 1960, an operation successfully removed the benign brain tumor which had caused Winston's difficulties, but his sight could not be saved. 2 The orders of the District Court were initially reversed by a panel of three judges, one judge dissenting. 305 F. 2d 253, 285. On rehearing en banc, the panel decisions were upheld. 305 F. 2d 264, 287. 3 James v. United States, 280 F. 2d 428 (C. A. 8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U. S. 845; Lack v. United States, 262 F. 2d 167 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Jones v. United States, 249 F. 2d 864 (C. A. 7th Cir.). |