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AMEND SECTION 20, PARAGRAPH 11, INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, BILLS OF LADING

MARCH 25, 1930.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. BURTNESS, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. R. 3141]

The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 3141) to amend paragraph (11) of section 20 of the interstate commerce act, as amended, having considered the same, report thereon with a recommendation that it pass.

The bill has the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, as will appear by the letter attached and which is made a part of this report.

It is also approved generally by the shippers' organizations of the country, including the National Industrial Traffic League, whose representative appeared before the committee in support thereof.

Hon. JAMES S. PARKER,

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
Washington, September 25, 1929.

Chairman Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to your request, the commission has given careful consideration to H. R. 3141, introduced by Representative Mapes, entitled "A bill to amend paragraph (11) of section 20 of the interstate commerce act, as amended," and I am authorized to submit the following:

H. R. 3141 is identical with H. R. 12773, introduced by Representative Newton in the Seventieth Congress, first session. A report on H. R. 12773 was submitted to you by former Commissioner Esch on behalf of the commission under date of May 15, 1928. That report still represents the views of this commission, and a copy thereof is therefore submitted herewith as its report on H. R. 3141. Respectfully submitted.

FRANK MCMANAMY, Chairman of Legislative Committee.

Hon. JAMES S. PARKER,

Chairman Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MAY 15, 1928.

MY DEAR CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to your request, the commission has given careful consideration to H. R. 12773, introduced by Congressman Newton, entitled "To amend paragraph (11) of section 20 of the interstate commerce act, as amended," and respectfully submits the following:

The fifth proviso to paragraph (11) of section 20 of the interstate commerce act relating to loss and damage claims makes it unlawful for a carrier to provide for a shorter period for giving notice of claims than 90 days or for the filing of claims than 4 months. Under the terms of the above bill this proviso would be modified by eliminating the provision with respect to notice of claims and by providing that the carriers shall fix no shorter period than nine months for the filing of claims.

It is not now the practice of the carriers to require notice of claims which are to be subsequently filed so that there is apparently no good reason why that portion of the proviso should not be eliminated.

Under the terms of the uniform bill of lading the filing of claims is required to be made within six months on domestic traffic and nine months on export traffic. The obvious purpose of the carriers in fixing a period within which claims must be filed is to facilitate prompt investigation of such claims and to permit the development of facts which might be difficult of ascertainment where the claim was not presented until long after the transaction on which it was based had occurred. A period of six months for the filing of claims on domestic shipments was approved by the commission as reasonable in Bills of Lading (52 I. C. C. 671, 740). Under the terms of the present act, which merely fixes the minimum period which the carriers must allow for the filing of claims, the carriers are not ⚫estopped from providing for a 9-month period on domestic traffic as well as on export or import traffic if they desire to do so. The shippers' position is understood to be that goods are sometimes sold on as long as six months' credit and that as the consignee may not call the consignor's attention to a shortage until the bill is paid, the 6-month limitation operates to prevent filing a claim in some instances. As this is a commercial situation for which the carriers are not responsible and as the parties to the commercial transaction are apparently in a position to make appropriate arrangements which would enable the consignor to receive prompt advice with respect to such shortages, there is some question whether the commercial considerations are sufficient to warrant forbidding the carriers from providing for any shorter period than nine months for filing claims. However, if the carriers are willing to provide for the 9-month period of limitation the commission has no objection to offer as such a period would be more liberal, so far as domestic shipments are concerned, than the 6-month period which was approved by the commission as reasonable in the case above cited. The bill also provides for the elimination of the sixth proviso to paragraph (11) which reads as follows:

"Provided, however, That if the loss, damage, or injury complained of was due to carelessness or negligence while the property was in transit, or while the property was being loaded or unloaded, or was due to unreasonable delay in transit or in loaded or unloading, then no notice of claim or filing of claim shall be required as a condition precedent to recovery, but in no case under this proviso shall suit be instituted after three years from the time such cause of action accrued."

Practically every claim against a carrier for loss or damage is based on alleged negligence and therefore the above proviso operates to nullify in a very substantial measure the other provisions of paragraph (11) purporting to establish limitations for the filing of claims and the institution of suits. There appears to be no good reason why claims based on the alleged negligence of the carrier should not be subject to the same periods of limitation as are claims of any other character. The fact that loss or damage has occurred is ascertainable by the shipper just as quickly in the one instance as in the other. We are of opinion that this proviso, because of its ambiguity, and inconsistency when read in connection with the other provisions of paragraph (11), should be eliminated as proposed in the bill. In connection with the elimination of this proviso we call attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Barrett v. Van Pelt (268 U. S. 85), which involved a similar proviso. In this case the Supreme Court held that, in order to secure the advantage of the exceptions contained in the proviso, the claimant must establish the negligence referred to in the proviso, and it seems to me that this is a burden which is greater than that of filing a claim.

As to the form of the bill, we would suggest the punctuation be made to conform to the punctuation existing in the present law. We therefore suggest, that, after the word "whatsoever," in line 10, page 2, a comma be inserted; also that a comma be inserted after the word "transported," in line 21, on the same page. Respectfully submitted.

JOHN J. ESCH (For Legislative Committee).

Section 20, paragraph (11), Interstate Commerce Act, will read as follows, new matter inclosed in black brackets and part omitted stricken through in italics:

(11) That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company subject to the provisions of this act receiving property for transportation from a point in one State or Territory or the District of Columbia to a point in another State, Territory, District of Columbia, or from any point in the United States to a point in an adjacent foreign country shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United States or within an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill of lading, and no contract, receipt, rule, regulation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed; and any such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company so receiving property for transportation from a point in one State, Territory, or the District of Columbia to a point in another State or Territory, or from a point in a State or Territory to a point in the District of Columbia, or from any point in the United States to a point in an adjacent foreign country, or for transportation wholly within a Territory, or any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company delivering said property so received and transported shall be liable to the lawful holder of said receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover thereon, whether such receipt or bill of lading has been issued or not, for the full acutal loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United States or within an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill of lading, notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limitation of the amount of recovery or representation or agreement as to value in any such receipt or bill of lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission; and any such limitation, without respect to the manner or form in which it is sought to be made is hereby declared to be unlawful and void: Provided, That if the loss, damage, or injury occurs while the property is in the custody of a carrier by water the liability of such carrier shall be determined by and under the laws and regulations applicable to transportation by water, and the liability of the initial or delivering carrier shall be the same as that of such carrier by water: Provided, however, That the provisions hereof respecting liability for full actual loss, damage, or injury, notwithstanding any limitation of liability or recovery or representation or agreement or release as to value, and declaring any such limitation to be unlawful and void, shall not apply, first, to bagagge carried on passenger trains or boats, or trains or boats carrying passengers; second, to property, except ordinary livestock, received for transportation concerning which the carrier shall have been or shall hereafter be expressly authorized or required by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish and maintain rates dependent upon the value declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property, in which case such declaration or agreement shall have no other effect than to limit liability and recovery to an amount not exceeding the value so declared or released, and shall not, so far as relates to values, be held to be a violation of section 10 of this act to regulate commerce, as amended; and any tariff schedule which may be filed with the commission pursuant to such order shall contain specific reference thereto and may establish rates varying with the value so declared and agreed upon; and the commission is hereby empowered to make such order in cases where rates dependent upon and varying with declared or agreed values would, in its opinion, be just and reasonable under the circumstances and conditions surrounding the transportation. The term "ordinary livestock" shall in

clude all cattle, swine, sheep, goats, horses, and mules, except such as are chiefly valuable for breeding, racing, show purposes, or other special uses: Provided further, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under the existing law: Provided further, That all actions brought under and by virtue of this paragraph against the delivering carrier shall be brought, and may be maintained, if in a district court of the United States, only in a district, and if in a State court, only in a State, through or into which the defendant carrier operates a line of railroad: Provided further, That it shall be unlawful for any such receiving or delivering common carrier to provide by rule, contract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter period for [giving notice of claims than ninety days,] the filing of claims than [four] nine months, and for the institution of suits than two years, such period for institution of suits to be computed from the day when notice in writing is given by the carrier to the claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or parts thereof specified in the notice: [Provided, however, That if the loss, damage, or injury complained of was due to carelessness or negligence while the property was in transit, or while the property was being loaded or unloaded, or was due to unreasonable delay in transit or in loading or unloading, then no notice of claim or filing of claim shall be required as a condition precedent to recovery, but in no case under this proviso shall suit be instituted after three years from the time such cause of action accrued:] And provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph (12) the delivering carrier shall be construed to be the carrier performing the line-haul service nearest to the point of destination and not a carrier performing merely a switching service at the point of destination: And provided further, That the liability imposed by this paragraph shall also apply in the case of property reconsigned or diverted in accordance with the applicable tariffs filed as in this act provided.

O

2d Session

No. 993

PANAMA CANAL, FERRY AND HIGHWAY

MARCH 25, 1930.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. DENISON, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. R. 4293]

The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 4293) to provide for a ferry and a highway near the Pacific entrance of the Panama Canal, having considered the same, report thereon with a recommendation that it pass.

After the passage of the original act of Congress authorizing the acquisition of territory from the Republic of Panama and the construction of an interoceanic canal therein, a treaty was made between the United States and the Republic of Panama by which the United States acquired a strip of land across the Isthmus of Panama, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, 10 miles wide, being five miles on each side of the proposed canal. There was reserved to Panama out of this 10-mile strip the territory then comprising the city of Colon on the Atlantic side and the city of Panama, the capital of the Republic, on the Pacific side. At that time, 1904, practically the only method of transportation in the Republic of Panama was by ships and other small watercraft that traveled along the coast of the Republic on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides.

In negotiating the treaty with Panama no provision was made for allowing the inhabitants of Panama to cross the Canal Zone from one part of the Republic to the other. The Canal and the Canal Zone which passed under the jurisdiction of the United States completely divided the Republic of Panama into two divisions and no arrangements were made for those on either side of the Republic to reach the other side except by boat. This was evidently an oversight, and was due, no doubt, to the fact that at that time there were no improved highways or railroads in the Republic of Panama; motor transportation had not then been far enough developed, nor had it reached the Republic of Panama in any form. The people of Panama had always

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