sides the every-day one of taxation, in which the share of each party in the benefit of a scheme of mutual protection is sufficient compensation for the correlative burden that it is compelled to assume. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 44 L. ed. 729, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 20 Mor. Min. Rep. 466. At least if we have a case within the reasonable exercise of the police power, as above explained, no more need be said.

"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 42 L. ed. 260, 17 Sup. Ct. 864. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare. Among matters of that sort probably few would doubt that both usage and preponderant opinion give their sanction to enforcing the primary conditions of successful commerce. One of those conditions at the present time is the possibility of payment by checks drawn against bank deposits, to such an extent do checks replace currency in daily business. If, then, the legislature of the state thinks that the public welfare requires the measure under consideration, analogy and principle are in favor of the power to enact it. Even the primary object of the required assessment is not a private benefit as it was in the cases above cited of a ditch for irrigation or a railway to a mine, but it is to make the currency of checks secure, and by the same stroke to make safe the almost compulsory resort of depositors to banks as the only available means for keeping money on hand. The priority of claim given to depositors is incidental to the same object and is justified in the same way. The power to restrict liberty by fixing a minimum of capital required of those who would engage in banking is not denied. The power

to restrict investments to securities regarded as relatively safe seems equally plain. It has been held, we do not doubt rightly, that inspections may be required and the cost thrown on the bank. See Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 35 L. ed. 1051, 12 Sup. Ct. 255. The power to compel beforehand, co-operation, and thus, it is believed, to make a failure unlikely and a general panic almost impossible, must be recognized, if government is to do its proper work, unless we can say that the means have no reasonable relation to the end. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 188, 44 L. ed. 725, 728, 20 Sup. Ct. 633. So far is that from being the case that the device is a familiar one. It was adopted by some states the better part of a century ago, and seems never to have been questioned until now. Danby Bank v. State Treasurer, 39 Vt. 92; People v. Walker, 17 N. Y. 502. Recent cases going not less far are Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489, 496, 53 L. ed. 295, 300, 29 Sup. Ct. 174; Kidd, D. & P. Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co. 217 U. S. 461, 54 L. ed. 839, 30 Sup. Ct. 606."

§ 80. Analogous decisions-Sheep-dog fund cases.Many states, notably Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan and Massachusetts, exercising the police power for the promotion of the sheep industry and public welfare, have enacted statutes imposing a tax or license upon dogs in a stated sum, collecting the same from the owner, placing the collections in a public fund, and distributing the same through state officers in payment of damages to owners of sheep killed by dogs. These statutes have been universally upheld by the courts.

The Ohio act was attacked as being an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power of the state and an

unreasonable exercise of the police power. The court said in sustaining this law:

"While the dog as a species, possesses many valuable traits which by some are denominated virtues, it is nevertheless known of all men, that he possesses vicious traits which are especially inimical to the important industry of raising sheep and wool. If the government were powerless to protect this industry from the ravage of dogs, it would indeed be important to protect its citizens in the enjoyment of property, than which none other is more essential to the public welfare. But such power is unquestionably vested in the general assembly as a police power, and, in the judgment of the general assembly a per capita tax on dogs has been deemed a means of securing the necessary protection to sheep owners; and, as the choice of means was within the power and discretion of the general assembly, its judgment is not subject to judicial control. The original statute on this subject (which has been, in substance transferred to Revised Statutes above quoted) (passed May 5, 1877, 74 Ohio L. 177) was entitled 'An Act for the protection of wool growers and the confiscation of dogs,' a subject not only within the police powers of the general assembly, but one deserving of its consideration. 18

$81. Analogous decisions-Whisky cure cases.The Supreme Court of Minnesota sustained an act to establish a fund for the foundation and maintenance of an asylum for inebriates, requiring all sellers of liquors to pay ten dollars a year to the state treasurer, through the county treasurers, in addition to the usual license, the fund to be disbursed by a state commission in the

18 Holst v. Roe, 39 Ohio St. 340, citing Van Horn v. People. 46 Mich. 183; Cole v. Hall, 103 EL. 30; Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind. 62: McGlone v. Wornock, 129 Ky. 274, 111 & W. 688; Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass 136

erection and operation of a state asylum for inebriates. The court in its opinion points out that the act is an exercise of the police power upon a subject clearly within that power, saying:

"This act regards the traffic as one tending to produce intemperance, and as likely, by reason thereof, to entail upon the state the expense and burden of providing for a class of persons rendered incapable of selfsupport, the evil influence of whose presence and example upon society is necessarily injurious to the public welfare and prosperity, and, therefore, calls for such legislative interposition as will operate as a restraint upon the business, and protect the community from the mischiefs, evils and pecuniary burdens flowing from its prosecution. * **That these provisions unmistakably partake of the nature of police regulations, and are strictly of that character, there can be no doubt, nor can it be denied that their expediency or necessity is solely a legislative, and not a judicial, question. * * Regarding the law as a precautionary measure, intended to operate as a wholesome restraint upon the traffic, and as a protection to society against its consequent evils, the exacted fee is not unreasonable in amount, and the purpose to which it is devoted is strictly pertinent and appropriate. It could not be questioned but that a reasonable sum imposed in the way of an indemnity to the state against the expense of maintaining a police force to supervise the conduct of those engaged in the business, and to guard against the disorders, and infractions of law occasioned by its prosecution, would be a legitimate exercise of the police power, and not open to the objection that it was a tax for the purpose of revenue, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Reclaiming the inebriate, restoring him to society, prepared again to discharge the duties of citizenship, equally promotes the public welfare, and tends to the accomplishment of like

beneficial results, and it is difficult to see wherein the imposition of a reasonable license fee would be any the less a proper exercise of this power in the one case than in the other. The purpose to which the license fund created by the act is designated is more consonant to the idea of regulating the traffic and preventing its evils than is the case under the general license law, which devotes the fees received to common school purposes, and we are not aware that any objection has ever been urged against that law on that account."19

This case is cited with approval by Professor Freund in his work on the Police Power, Sec. 623.

§ 82. Analogous decisions-Firemen's fund cases. -Statutes imposing a liability upon fire insurance agents, based upon the amount of the insurance effected by them, for the benefit of a fund to care for injured firemen have been upheld in the states of New York, Illinois and Wisconsin.20

§ 83. These laws an exercise of taxing power—Attributes and limitations of taxing power.-It is important to inquire as to the right to tax and the extent of this right, for it is this power of the state that is invoked to sustain all insurance and compensation acts. "The power of taxation," says Judge Cooley,21 "is an incident of sovereignty, and is possessed by the government without being expressly conferred by the people. It is a legislative power; and when the people, by their constitutions, create a department of government upon which they confer the power to make laws, the power of taxa

19 State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312.

20 Fire Department v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 440; Fire Department v. Wright, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 453; Exempt Fireman's Fund v. Roome, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 391, 394; Firemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511, 74 Am. Dec. 115; Fire Department v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 136.

21 Cooley Taxation (2d ed.), p. 4.