prepared to die and retire; he did not permit them to be cut off, but was cut off himself instead; he restrained the curse of their own law from falling on them, and rather perished himself by a foul and accursed lot, which that same law pronounces to be the vilest and most polluted of deaths." (p. 49, 50.)

Our space does not permit us to follow Mr. M. in the further application of this argument. The last view which he maintains, is intended to explain the passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews, treating of the death of Christ, and his departure from the earth. The preceding view referred to unbelieving Jews, this to the believing. Now, how was the death, and departure of Christ, represented as affecting the believing Jews? This question will be answered by considering the principal object of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews. His object was to persuade them, that the observance of the Mosaic Law was no longer necessary; and as the Hebrew Christians were very reluctant to admit this, he endeavours to show, that though the ancient ritual ceased, Christianity contained points which bore a resemblance to it, and which might be considered as substitutes, or equivalents for it. Among other points, the sprinkling of the blood of Christ is viewed as equivalent, nay, more than equivalent to all the sprinklings of the ancient ceremonial, as, therefore, acquitting the Jewish believers in Christ, not only for many partial neglects of the Law, as the ancient sprinklings did, but for a total neglect, or cessation of its observance, it being designed to be superseded by the unritual morality of Christianity. So, also, the ascension of Christ into heaven is beautifully compared to the entrance of the High Priest into the holy of holies. By the entrance annually of the High Priest into the most holy place, with the blood of sprinkling, for the purification of the people from all their ceremonial neglects and offences, was the ritual for one year completed, all their ceremonial deficiencies made good, and all ceremonial offences pardoned. So, by the entrance of Christ into heaven once for all, were the Jewish ceremonies completed, not for one year, but for ever; the Christian High Priest had not only entered, but remained in the most holy place; and while he remained there, the

ceremonial system was finished, no rites were required, no neglects could be incurred, every Jew believing in Christ was absolved from "dead works" of the ceremonial law, "to serve the living God" in moral righteousness, unconnected with ceremonies. "Let, then, the ordinances go," exhorts the writer to the Hebrews," and the Lord 'put his laws into the mind, and write them in the heart,' and let all have 'boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by this new and living way which he hath consecrated for us,' 'provoking each other to love and good works."" (p. 63.) We here, with regret, take leave of our acute and eloquent Lecturer.

National Establishments of Religion, considered in connection with Justice, Christianity, and Human Nature. By John Taylor. London, Smallfield & Son; Manchester, Forrest. pp. 240.

IT is no matter of surprise that this excellent work obtained one of the prizes offered by the Committee of the Protestant Society for the protection of Religious Liberty, for Essays on National Religious Establishments, in answer to Lectures delivered by Dr. Chalmers on this very important practical subject. The work itself richly merited the award which was made; and is well deserving of the serious and attentive perusal of all who value Christianity as the gracious gift of the Father of mercies. The work is divided into seven chapters, illustrated by notes. In the 1st Chapter, the Author enters into the question, "Whether the idea of Civil Government involves a Right to Legislate upon matters of Religion." In the 2d, "Whether Civil Interference with Religion is sanctioned or permitted by Christianity." In the 3d, he illustrates "The idea of an Established Church." In the 4th, he clearly points out "The tendency of Ecclesiastical Establishments." In the 5th, he describes "The actual operation of Religious Establishments." In the 6th, he considers "The supposed efficacy of the territorial distribution of an Establishment." And in the concluding chapter, "The Voluntary Principle, and its results." Throughout, his statements, reasonings, and conclusions, are plain, perspicuous, and convincing; or,

if we must in any measure qualify this encomium, it would be in reference to some of the opinions broached as to the non-existence of any right on the part of Civil Government to provide for the education of the whole people. Sophistical upholders of Church Establishments, may have argued from this right to that of State interference in Religion; but the cases are by no means parallel; and Mr. Taylor himself has shown that they are not. Ignorance is the prolific parent of crime; and therefore, in numberless cases does grievously interfere with human rights, property, national and individual improvement and happiness. Grant the right of the Civil power to provide for the universal, unsectarian education of the community, it by no means follows, that the same power can justly interfere with, or trammel, or tax the consciences and property of its citizens for religious doctrines and usages. The one may be considered essential to the thorough realization of the blessings which men ought to obtain in civil society; the other is a matter which rests solely between man and his Creator.

Mr. Taylor has set the question of the right of the Magistrate to interfere in religion, in a striking light in the following passages:"If the civil power can appropriate, by a rightful force, any proportion of the instrumentality which conscience dictates to be used in the support of each man's own religion (an appropriation which a government must always make wherever it interferes with religion), where is the employment of this rightful force to cease? If the magistrate can properly interfere with one class of means for the promotion of religion, why may he not interfere with another class? If the civil authority can justly deprive one man of a portion of his property, and apply it to the diffusion of another man's religious opinions; if it can, by so doing, rightfully (as, in so doing, it does actually) restrict man's ability to diffuse his own religious principles to the utmost; and can deprive him of the power of obeying the dictates of conscience in religious matters, as far as he might,-why may not the same authority restrict still further his power of supporting and promoting his own religious views? Why may it not limit still more his power of obeying conscience in religion? Why may it

not prevent any injury or opposition to the state-religion, either by argument or action? Why may it not act generally upon the principle, which it has assumed, of meddling with religion in whatever manner it thinks proper? Why may it not, with these views, place a restriction upon the personal liberty of its subjects, or take away even life itself?

"It appears difficult, if not impossible, to say why the civil ruler may not interfere with the liberty and life of his subjects, as rightfully as with their property, if he think it necessary for the promotion of religion. The right of a government to promote religion at all, includes the right and duty to promote it by the most effective means which the civil authority can use. Not to employ the most powerful means for advancing an object which demands our most vigorous efforts, is to be lukewarm in the cause, to fail in a necessary part of duty. Now, as as it is clearly supposed that the interference of the civil power is necessary for the proper success of religion, the question of what methods of interference must be used, becomes merely a question of policy, fluctuating with circumstances, and not a question of right and wrong. Should the civil governor feel persuaded that certain erroneous views of religion, certain views which, in his opinion, lead to everlasting perdition, may be utterly destroyed by banishing, imprisoning, or executing, all persons who profess them, he could not be proved to be in the wrong in acting upon this conviction; if it be admitted that he has a right, and consequently that it is his duty, to promote by civil power that which appears to him to be religious truth. Once let it be granted that force may be used for the establishment of religion (as it is, in levying a compulsory payment for that purpose-as it is, wherever civil authority exerts itself), and the consequence is inevitable, that force may be justly employed to any degree which may be thought expedient. Should the ruling power of a state, therefore, think fit to take away the lives of certain heretical religionists, in order to prevent the corruption of others; should it perceive that the death of a few persons would be thus advantageous to the everlasting welfare of multitudes, and tend, in various ways, to preserve the true faith,-it would be

justified in acting upon this conviction, as the conservator and guardian of religion."

The spirituality and disinterested benevolence of Christianity are, in the second chapter of this work, shown to be diametrically opposed to the very principles on which Church Establishments are necessarily founded. The plea, that if not directly authorised by the Gospel, they are sanctioned by Judaism, is shown to be altogether fallacious; the nature and circumstances in which the theocratic government of the Jewish people was founded, having no parallel whatever, in the condition and circumstances of any nation professing discipleship to Jesus.

On "the idea of an Established Church," Mr. Taylor truly remarks, "Whatever modifications the constitution and policy of a religious Establishment may undergo, in accordance with the advancing intelligence and liberality of the age; no mere modifications can destroy the injustice of the principle upon which every Established Church is founded. Though it may be stated that such a church has no right, and makes no claims, to punish Dissenters, and does not attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the consciences of others; and though it may be asserted that the civil power has partaken of the same liberal spirit, when, in ceasing to persecute men for religious differences, it ceases to be guilty of the highest offence which man can commit against man: still, the very idea of an Established Church must include claims, and assumptions of authority, both on the part of the state and its favoured sect, which are incompatible with Christianity and the rights of mind, and which continue to involve the principle by which all usurpations in religious matters may be justified."

After exposing the false assumptions of Dr. Chalmers in relation to this subject, his ignorance or suppression of historical facts, in his consideration of it, the author concludes: "It appears, therefore, that the union of civil and ecclesiastical power is involved in every idea of an ecclesiastical Establishment, although the State may merely endow the church, without interfering with its internal economy, or regulating its doctrines. In the very act of selecting a religious sect and creed, for the purpose of endowment, and in continuing the support