25

a proposition to prohibit the manufacture, sale or trade in intoxicating liquors. All together were carried down with. the prohibitory law, against which there was a very large majority. Perhaps the other five, or four of them at least, would have been quite to the people's mind under other circumstances.2 In Pennsylvania in 1889, when two amendments were submitted, one to prohibit the liquor traffic and the other to make some harmless and apparently beneficial change in the conditions regulating the exercise of the suffrage, both were voted down by very large majorities. In Louisiana in 1896, when the legislature attempted to amend the constitution of that state, by the method afterward adopted by the convention of 1898, practically disfranchising the negroes, the people rejected not only this one amendment affecting the suffrage, but some twenty others as well, without reason or discrimination, and in Nebraska in 1896, the people disposed of ten amendments in the same thorough fashion. In this case the concrete thing at which they were trying to vent their disgust was a proposition of the legislature, that it should itself fix the rates of salaries of the various executive officers of the state, and otherwise enlarge its own powers. The honorarium of these officials hitherto had been definitely limited by the constitution.26 In 1898 in California, when seven amendments and a proposition to call a convention were submitted to popular vote, only one amendment and

25 In several cases during the past ten years proposals submitted at one election and defeated in California and Louisiana have been submitted again and adopted, although apparently there were no reasons for a change in the popular opinion.

26 Dr. Oberholtzer was mistaken as to the facts concerning the Nebraska election of 1896. Twelve proposals were submitted and all of them received a majority of the popular vote cast upon the question of their adoption or rejection, but were lost because not receiving a majority of all votes cast at the election.

that a very important measure in reference to the executive department, was saved from the general débâcle. . . ." "In some instances this tendency produces quite a contrary result. Thus a measure having popularity with the electors will sometimes exert an influence to help through a proposition to the passage of which the people are indifferent, or perhaps really hostile. In South Dakota in 1896, when a proposal was made to repeal a 'prohibition' clause which had earlier been inserted in the constitution of the state, three other amendments were carried along, which, although of rather a colorless character, might not have fared so well had it been a question of enacting rather than rescinding the prohibitory liquor law. Some such influence would seem to have been at work, too, in Minnesota, in 1896, when it was proposed to tax the property of sleeping, drawing room and parlor car companies, telegraph and telephone companies, express companies, and insurance companies doing business within the state. The people were so much elated with the idea of getting a revenue out of these corporations, which earlier had seemed to be escaping the tax gatherer, that five other propositions were approved at the same election, though by much smaller majorities.

9927

Five amendments submitted to the people of Oregon in 1900 were rejected, among which was a harmless proposal repealing a provision of the constitution which excluded free negroes from the state; this proposal was defeated evidently not on its merits but because of the company in which it was found. Mr. F. N. Judson, speaking of the Missouri mortgage tax amendment of 1900, said: “There was little discussion in the state during the campaign over the merits of the amendment and it seems to have been

27 Oberholtzer, 169-171.

carried on account of the vigorous campaign for certain other amendments submitted at the same election." 28 Speaking with reference to the Missouri initiative and referendum amendment of 1908, a supporter of that measure said: "The powers that fought us relied on the idiosyncrasies of the voters this time. When they found that our amendment was likely to be submitted by the legislature, they hurriedly passed a very unpopular amendment to increase the salaries of the members of the legislature first, so as to have it at the head of the constitutional amendments and the first one the voter would see. Then they denounced this unmercifully as a salary grab by the legislature, thinking the voters would get started to vote No and would vote No all the way down the line-and I have no doubt that it had a powerful influence in the country in cutting down our majorities.'

99 29

But although there is a tendency for popular or unpopular proposals to carry other measures with them to success or defeat, too much emphasis should not be laid upon this fact. As Dr. Oberholtzer says: "Nevertheless, it would convey an erroneous impression were we to leave the subject without calling attention to the many cases in which the people can say yes and no at the same breath and really with a knowledge, it would appear, of what those words mean. In November, 1898, three amendments were referred to popular vote in South Dakota, all of first-rate importance. one to introduce into the state's political system the Swiss referendum and initiative (23,816 for, and 16,483 against), another to confer suffrage on women (19,698 for, and 22,983 against), a third to introduce a dispensary system by which the state would take charge of the liquor business

28 New York State Library Review of Legislation, 1901, p. 63. 29 Equity vol. xi, p. 23 (Jan., 1909).

(22,170 for, and 20,557 against). The returns show therefore that the people accepted two of the amendments, but rejected that one in reference to woman suffrage. Although only about one-half of the persons voting for candidates at this election chose to vote upon the amendments, of those so doing there is a fair presumption that they recorded their wishes with respect to the different subjects submitted to them. The people of California in 1894 voted on ten different amendments, approving of seven and disapproving of three, among the latter being a foolish proposition to move the capital of the state, and a proposition to increase the salaries of the members of the legislature, a project, as I have already noted, for which the people rarely evince any enthusiasm. In a word, not a little evidence is at hand to show that there is method often in what at first sight the casual onlooker might be tempted to call pure madness." 30

It

Although it would be impossible to say that the people always show wisdom in the proposals which they adopt or reject, still we must admit that they frequently show discrimination even upon relatively unimportant measures. is the rule, rather than the exception, that when several proposals are submitted some are adopted and some rejected. In the Missouri election of 1908, for example, the initiative and referendum amendment was adopted by a majority of about forty thousand, and the proposed amendment increasing the compensation of members of the legislature was rejected by a similar majority; of the eight proposals submitted at this election two were adopted and six rejected. Similar cases occur at most of the elections at which several proposals are submitted.

The people of the states have come to distrust their legis

30 Oberholtzer, 171-172.

latures, and any proposals to increase the compensation of members of these bodies are usually voted down; such proposals are frequently submitted. The same attitude is ordinarily taken toward the increase of salaries of state officers. In California amendments increasing the salaries of legislators and of state officers were adopted after several proposals of a similar character had been rejected, and in Louisiana the salaries of several state officers were increased between 1899 and 1908. But the voters of Florida in 1906 rejected an amendment increasing the salaries of supreme and circuit judges, although such an increase seemed necessary in order to induce able lawyers to accept these positions. In 1897 the voters of Michigan declined to increase the salary of the attorney-general of that state although the compensation of eight hundred dollars fixed by the constitution was notoriously inadequate; and the voters of South Dakota in 1904 and 1908 declined to increase the annual salary of their attorney-general beyond one thousand dollars. Proposed amendments increasing the salaries of the governor and lieutenant-governor were rejected by the voters of Texas in 1908. It is a well-known fact that large salaries are opposed by voters when they have an opportunity to express themselves, and the judgment of a rural voter as to what is a large salary for executive or other governmental work is frequently not in agreement with that of persons better informed as to such matters. It is true, of course, that the efforts of legislators to increase their salaries have not in many cases been efforts which should succeed, and they were perhaps wisely checked by the electors. But the popular control over the salaries of state officers has often been exercised in a short-sighted manner, by refusing compensation sufficient to obtain efficient men for the service of the state.

In summing up our experience with the constitutional