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In Iowa the stricter view is held. Here the constitution requires simply that the proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals, but the supreme court of that state held that entry by title only was insufficient, and declared A invalid constitutional amendments approved by the people, because the legislative entry was deemed insufficient. The more general judicial interpretation of such provisions has, however, been different. In California the court wavered for a while but finally held an identifying reference in the legislative journals to be sufficient; and the same view has been adopted by the courts of Maryland,"1 Kansas,* South Dakota, and Florida. In a recent Michigan case the court said: "We are impressed that those cases which require an entry of the resolution in full as passed have much the better of the argument,” but did not find it necessary to pass upon this question because it found the entry to be sufficient in either case. The supreme court of Nebraska has also taken the view that full entry is required, although its statement with respect to this matter was perhaps not necessary to the decision of the case before the court."

entry had been thought sufficient. The committee's view, therefore, has little weight as a precedent. South Carolina House Journal, 1906, pp. 47-49.

39 Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543 (1883); State v. Brookhart, 113 Iowa, 250 (1901).

40 People v. Strother, 67 Cal., 624; Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal., 465; Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal., 479; Oakland Paving Co. v. Tompkins, 72 Cal., 5; Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal., 73.

41 Worman v. Hagan, 78 Md., 152.

42 Constitutional Prohibitory Amendment, 24 Kan., 700.

43 State v. Herried, 10 S. D., 109.

44 West v. State, 50 Fla., 154.

45 People v. Loomis, 135 Mich., 556. In re Senate File No. 31, 25 Neb., 864, 883-886.

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Where entry in full is required there is of course little room for argument, but even here where cases have arisen the Colorado court has been very liberal in its attitude. In Nesbit v. People it was found that the senate and house journal entries of a proposed amendment did not agree and that full entry was not correctly made, but the court decided to overlook this informality and sustain the amendment; and the same position was taken in the later case of People v. Sours."" In the Michigan case of People v. Loomis, referred to above, the court, while leaning strongly to the view that entry in full was necessary although this was not specifically required, took the position that even if entry in full were required a slight informality in the entry would be overlooked; here an amendment had been proposed in the house and entered in full; the senate amended the proposal and entered it in full as altered; the house then adopted the senate amendments, but did not enter the amended proposal in full on its journals, and such entry was said to be sufficient to comply with a requirement of full entry. In the Montana case of Durfee v.

48 19 Colo., 441.

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47 31 Colo., 369. In Colorado, where "full entry" is specifically required, the rule as interpreted by the courts is more liberal than in Iowa, where there is no such specific requirement. The Kansas and Colorado courts have called attention to the fact that if the rule regarding journal entry is strictly construed an amendment may be defeated by the carelessness of a clerical employee, even after its approval by the people. Constitutional Prohibitory Amendment, 24 Kan., 711. People v. Sours, 31 Colo., 382. In the Kansas case Judge Brewer said: "The records of the proceedings of the two houses are made, not by the houses themselves, but by clerical officers. True, they are under the control of the respective houses, but in fact the records are made by clerks. May they defeat the legislative will? The constitution does not make amendments dependent upon their approval or their action."

48 The facts in this case are almost parallel with those in Re Senate File No. 31, 25 Neb., 864, 883, 884.

Harper," full entry upon the journals of the two houses was not made although this was specifically required, and the proposed amendment was therefore held invalid. Similarly in Nevada, where an entry upon the journals was required, no entry whatever was made, and the proposed amendment was held invalid because of failure to comply with a specific constitutional requirement.50

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The question has frequently arisen whether, under constitutions giving the governor the veto power over legislation, this executive power also extends to legislative acts proposing constitutional amendments. Several of the earlier constitutions 1 specifically gave this power to the governor, but this practice did not continue, and the only constitutions now in force which contain provisions regarding the governor's participation in the proposal of amendments are those of Kentucky, Delaware and Alabama; these constitutions expressly provide that the governor's approval shall not be necessary. The practice, however, developed, and has in some cases continued of submitting for the governor's approval resolutions or bills proposing constitutional amendments.52 This practice still continues in Arkansas 53 and in some other states. In Arkansas, such 49 22 Mont., 354.

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50 State v. Tufly, 19 Nev., 391. In this case it is said that "no entry of the proposed amendment was made upon the journal of either house," but it may be that the court considered "entry" to be equivalent to full entry," and meant simply that full entry had not been made. However, an examination of the journals shows no entry of any sort which can be identified as that of the amendment under consideration.

51 Delaware, 1792, 1831; Louisiana, 1845.

52 Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, 4th ed., pp. 492, 593. See also Green v. Weller, 32 Miss., 677.

53 Arkansas acts, 1903, p. 485. In Arkansas there is a statute which specifically provides that the governor shall have a veto over proposed amendments. As to the binding force of such a statute see

Pp. 152-154.

submission to the governor, even if his veto power were formally recognized, would constitute no serious limitation upon legislative power, for the governor's veto in that state may be overcome by the vote of a majority of all members elected to each house. In several of the states where it has been customary to submit proposed amendments to the governor for approval, conflicts have arisen between the legislative bodies and the governor; and in judicial proceedings resulting from such conflicts, the courts have held that no executive veto exists with reference to proposed amendments. A review of the judicial decisions upon this point will indicate the present situation.

Perhaps the most interesting case involving the governor's veto of proposed amendments is that of State ex. rel. Morris v. Mason. 54 Here the legislature of Louisiana proposed an amendment for the creation of a lottery; and in accordance with the practice in that state the proposal was submitted to the governor for approval. The governor vetoed the proposal; the legislature then denied that he had any constitutional power to do so, and the legislature's position was upheld by the supreme court. The necessity of questioning the governor's power was purely accidental in this case. When the proposal was passed, the lottery advocates had a sufficient majority in each house to overcome a veto without questioning its propriety, but before the governor's veto was given the state senate had lost by death one member whose vote was necessary to overcome the veto. The lottery party thus found it necessary either to question the veto power or to lose all that they had sought to gain by corrupting the legislature. It may be worth noting that the proposed lottery amendment was defeated when submitted to the 54 43 La. Ann., 590 (1891).

people. Since the decision of State v. Mason, the practice has continued in Louisiana of submitting proposed amendments to the governor for approval, but such action is in no way necessary.

So in Michigan the usual practice was to submit proposed amendments to the governor for approval, but this practice was departed from in 1907, and the supreme court of Michigan held that the governor's approval was unnecessary. In cases which have arisen in North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska a similar view has been taken. 56

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In the Maryland constitution it is provided that each amendment shall be proposed by a separate "bill," and here it was contended with some plausibility that such a proposal should be subject to the governor's veto power as well as other bills. In 1904 a proposed amendment was adopted by the legislature, but was not submitted to the governor, although it had been the practice to do this; however, the governor vetoed the proposal and declined to submit it to the people, but was required to do so by mandamus. The Maryland court said that the word "bill" was used in the amending clause simply to express a proposal or project, and not in the same manner as the word was used elsewhere in the constitution to refer to bills which should become law by legislative enactment and executive approval. 57

The doctrine is well-established that executive approval is not required for the legislative proposal of constitu

55 Murphy Chair Co. v. Attorney-General, 148 Mich., 563 (1907).

56 State v. Dahl, 6 N. D., 81 (1896); Commonwealth v. Griest, 196 Pa. St., 396 (1900); In re Senate File No. 31, 25 Neb., 864 (1889); See also Koehler v. Hill, 60 Ia., 543, 558.

57 Warfield v. Vandiver, 101 Md., 78 (1905).

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