not only on people in government, but I suspect that in the business community as well. I even wonder whether conceivably there may not be some interest that they have exerted over some of our national TV networks.

Last night I heard Howard K. Smith come out editorially for ABC in support of the canal giveaway; the night before, Eric Severeid very forthrightly came out in support of the treaty. I do not know yet what NBC's position is. But it does seem to me that that is an area of potential conflict of interest that warrants serious investigation.

The only other point I would make, Mr. Chairman, has to do with this question of separation of powers and the primary concern of the subcommittee. I would cite and read from the testimony by the legislative attorney for the American Law Division of the Library of Congress, Mr. Kenneth Merrin.

It is clear that Congress has often asserted an exclusive right to dispose of Federal territory and property. It is also apparent that both the Executive and the Senate have recognized that claim in past dispositions of property in the Canal Zone to Panama. Therefore, while it is impossible to make a categorical assertion that article IV, section 3, clause 2 is either exclusive or concurrent, it appears that those powers have been recognized as exclusive for purposes of disposal of property in the Canal Zone to Panama.

Of course, those were inconsequential dispositions of property in contrast to what we are contemplating here today.

I think the virtue of guaranteeing that the entire Congress cast a vote on this is that the Founding Fathers, in their wisdom, initially assumed that you gentlemen in this body would be representing States and simultaneously that those of us serving in the House would be representing people. Both entities should have a voice on so serious a subject.

POLLS CONSISTENT

If one examined the polls on this subject, they show overwhelming opposition to ratification of this treaty.

Opinion Research, for example, conducted one recently indicating 76 percent opposition. The American Conservative Union polled senatorial offices just about a week and a half ago; 66 Senators responded to that poll. The opposition to the treaty was running about 94 percent.

I have spoken to colleagues in both the House and the Senate who have put this question on questionnaires to their districts. The opposition runs about 90 percent.

The Council on Inter-American Security, which has been polling on this subject for the previous 3 months, has had consistent returns in the neighborhood of 90 percent opposition.

So, I would hope and pray that the House indeed would be forced to render a judgment on this. General Torrijos, the dictator of Panama, indicates that there will be some kind of national plebiscite or referendum to determine whether Panamanians support it. I would not trust any referendum conducted by any dictator.

On the other hand, I think that we can have the closest thing to a national referendum if we guarantee that those people who are represented in government, the American electorate, have an opportunity to render a judgment on the merits of this treaty. They can do that with their votes in the congressional elections of 1978.

It seems to me that, based not only on the historical precedence, but I think the unequivocal language of the U.S. Supreme Court, from Wilson v. Shaw in 1907 down through the last decision in 1974, that the Supreme Court has clearly upheld the fact that the United States owns that Canal Zone. We are sovereign in that zone.

We could never even have begun the construction of the zone had that not been the case from a constitutional point of view. That being the case, the article IV, section 3, clause 2 provision of the Constitution it seems would clearly indicate that the Senate and the House should both render a judgment. It would be my hope and prayer, very frankly, that that judgment would be consistent with what are in America's long term best interests.

That, in my judgment, is not running away from this situation but facing up to it foursquare, acknowledging that we have not only economic and national security interests involved, but so does the entire free world for that matter. In that sense, the United States would be doing a disservice to free world interests to contemplate yielding up this canal to probably one of the tiniest countries in Christendom that is not even in a situation to exercise self government or enjoy human rights so long as it is under the repressive regime of General Torrijos.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Crane. You made a fine statement.

Does the administration give any indication, other than holding briefing sessions, that it is going to submit any portion of the treaty or the conveyance of the property to the House?

Mr. CRANE. To the best of my knowledge, no, sir.

Senator ALLEN. What do you feel the sentiment of the House is on this question?

Mr. CRANE. I think sir, that at the present time-an overwhelming majority would vote against alienation of the canal.

I think that that majority is going to grow with the, increasing communications from constituents. My mail-and I have not yet solicited any input from my district through a questionnaire—has run about 7,000 letters. So far, I have two letters supporting alienation of the canal. All of the rest are violently opposed.

During the August recess when I was home, I had people coming up to me identifying themselves as Democrats and Republicans indicating that it was their sincere hope that we would not consider giving up our canal. I did not have one individual approach me during the August recess supporting alienation.

As best I can determine in the House, as in the Senate, that sentiment is overwhelming in opposition to alienation. I think House Members, of course all being up for election in 1978, will be a lot more accountable to the views of their constituents.

Senator ALLEN. Do you feel that a delay in the taking of action by the Senate and the House would improve the treaty's chances of being ratified? Or would it harm the chances?

Mr. CRANE. My own feeling, Mr. Chairman, is that time is not on the side of the State Department or the administration on this question. The argument has been advanced by the administration that they will educate the public to an understanding of the merits of the give

away. It seems to me, having listened to most of the arguments that they have put forth to date, that they are easily refuted and that, as Americans become more apprised of the significance, economically and strategically of that canal, they will be hardened in their position of opposition rather than weakened.

Senator ALLEN. Why should the canal be given away and the Panamanians paid to take it?

Mr. CRANE. Well, if I were David Rockefeller, I could give you a very easy answer to that. That would be the servicing of my loans and the loans of many of those big New York banks. We are contemplating not only giving the canal away but, of course, reimbursing the Panamanian Government to the tune of $50 to $70 million a year on top of that.

I can clearly understand the banks' position. What I find it difficult to understand is the position of those who would side-maybe coincidentally-with the major banks in the United States. They are some of the same people who voted against the Lockheed bailout. They are some of the same people who also voted against bailing out New York City. I think they were right on those issues. The banks should have assumed the responsibility for bad loans they have made.

I think the banks in this instance should assume responsibility for bad loans that they have made. Beyond that very selfish and narrow interest of our big banks, frankly, I cannot figure out any valid reason why any elected Representative or Senator should be supporting this treaty.

Senator ALLEN. Is it carrying good-neighborliness too far?

Mr. CRANE. I think it is more than carrying good-neighborliness too far, Mr. Chairman. I think it is a demonstration of a point that Governor Reagan stressed earlier: American weakness. There is movement in the direction of fortress American in an era when no great nation of the world can afford to isolate itself.

Second, when I put this within the context of what we are doing with Cuba, what we have done thus far in Rhodesia, the cold war relationship we are setting up with the Republic of South Africa, the fact that we are no nearer solutions with Greece and Turkey over the hot issue of Cyprus, the fact that Italy and France are threatening internally to go Communist, and Great Britain is no longer a major component of NATO, that we are contemplating severing our ties with Nationalist China, and simultaneously contemplating withdrawing from South Korea, we are establishing a frightening and appalling foreign policy trend. I would say that we have gone, in terms of our foreign policy, from containment-when the boast was properly made that the President of the United States was the most powerful man in the world and we clearly controlled the air spaces of the world and the sea lanes and we had overwhelming missile superiority to détente which Frank Barnett has described détente as the word to describe the gravesite of containment. What appears to have followed détente is in many respects a very old policy; that is appeasement.

We seem to be doing the greatest violence to our friends and simultaneously seeking to make accommodations through appeasement with those people committed to our destruction.

DECLINING AMERICAN STRENGTH

Senator ALLEN. If the treaty is ratified, would this, in your judgment, foreshadow a declining influence and prestige around the world for the United States?

Mr. CRANE. I think, Mr. Chairman, we are already suffering a declining influence and prestige. I think, in fact, our performance in the Republic of South Vietnam was certainly one of the sorriest chapters in the American national record.

I think what has transpired since then in terms of the United States' unwillingness to exercise an appropriate veto to keep those people out of the United Nations, our great silence on the human rights question with Cambodia, where an estimated one-fifth of the population has been systematically exterminated since the Communists came to power, the betrayal of allies and then finally capitulation on a point here, where there is no dispute by responsible authorities over whether it is American territory, can only be viewed with great glee and satisfaction if one sits in the politburo.

The United States is either a crippled giant or a giant that lacks any will to stand up and be heard, to provide leadership against aggression. I think another evidence of this was the sorry performance of this country with respect to the most adventuresome action the Soviets have taken in the postwar era. That was to subsidize mercenaries in Angola to suppress an indigenous nationalist movement.

NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE TO REQUIRE NEUTRALITY

Senator ALLEN. Much has been said about the preservation of the right of the United States to intervene to protect the neutrality of the canal after the year 2000. Do you find, in your study of the treaty, any provision granting to the United States a right to intervene to protect the neutrality of the canal?

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Chairman, I do not.

I think, in that connection, one must examine the provisions of that treaty side by side with the statements made by Dr. Romulo Escobar Bethancourt before the Panamanian National Assembly on August 19. There, Dr. Escobar made this specific statement:

"We are not giving the United States the right of intervention." He goes on to make further observations that I think have to be disproven by those American negotiators who are championing this treaty. They cannot disprove the statements based upon the contents of the treaty, as I have read it, and I think any other reasonable person would read it.

This includes the flat-out refusal to guarantee the right of intervention to the United States to preserve the neutrality of the canal or to defend it after the year 2000, but even to guarantee the neutrality of the canal. They insisted that they could not make an absolute guarantee of the neutrality in time of internal insurrection, according to Dr. Escobar.

We backed off of that kind of a qualifying statement. We did not want that in the record as a spelled-out provision. So, the treaty is silent on that point. Dr. Escobar says, however, they flatly refused under that condition to guarantee the neutrality of the canal.

I think, in addition to that, there are other assurances that we have heard from some of the administration spokesmen that are refuted or challenged by Dr. Escobar. One of these is the assumption that we would have some kind of preferential treatment for passage of our war vessels or commercial vessels during time of war. Dr. Escobar rejects that. He says there is absolutely no such guarantee; we will be treated as any other country. That means, if we were at war with the Soviets, Soviet vessels in line would actually be going through the canal before our own.

In addition to that, the Panamanian Government would not guarantee that the canal will be kept open under any and all circumstances. They commented on the possibility of earthquakes and landslides; those are reasonable conditions under which one might not be able to continue to maintain the operation of the canal. But they said, further, that if it was not profitable, they would not maintain it. We responded by saying that, if that were the case, we or other nations could help bail them out. They still rejected putting any language in there giving a positive guarantee that the canal would be kept open.

It seems to me that the burden of proof is on the administration to take the Escobar speech and to demonstrate, by analyzing provisions of the treaty, the falsity of the remarks made by Dr. Escobar or else explain to us why he is very specific in his reference to these points and the treaty manages to be most elusive and vague in commenting on any one of them.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you very much for your fine testimony. My time is up. Senator Hatch?

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

JOINT CHIEFS NOT ALLOWED TO SPEAK FREELY

I have heard all these arguments that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support this and therefore we should support it. Do you have any comments with regard to that?

Mr. CRANE. Yes, indeed. I think that one of the most important points that was raised at the time of General Singlaub's removal was that, henceforth, nobody serving in the military would have the freedom to speak out forcefully on any issue contrary to an administration position.

In effect, what we have managed successfully to do is to gag the military on this point.

Senator HATCH. Do you have any other evidence that that has taken place in the military?

Mr. CRANE. I think one can speculate on the position of the Joint Chiefs, which I am doing. On the other hand, considering what happened to General Singlaub, I think it is reasonable speculation. The point was covered in many newspaper commentaries, both liberal and conservative. I think, if you look at the testimony of Adm. Thomas Moorer, former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he specifically made reference to that point.

Senator HATCH. Can I interrupt you there for a second? I think the public has not been told how important Admiral Moorer's testimony is or the testimony of the other admirals who have testified here. Moorer said in his statement: