Miraflores with the terminal dam and locks between two hills, Cerro Aguadulce on the west side of the sea-level section of the canal and Cerro de Puente on the east side, on a natural perimeter that would have supplied the same arrangement as at Gatun. This plan, had it been followed, would have enabled lake-level navigation from the Atlantic Locks to the Pacific, with a summit-level anchorage at the Pacific end of the canal to match that at the Atlantic end. Regrettably, Stevens was under great pressure to start construction. Advocates of the "sea-level" proposal, stung to the quick by their defeat in Congress, were poised ready to take advantage of a major change in the approved program as evidence of weakness in the high-level plan. Opponents of any canal at all were also seeking some means to delay the enterprise. These two forces together represented a political and economic strength that could not be disregarded. Stevens' foundation explorations, necessarily made in great haste, proved unsatisfactory, and he did not dare to jeopardize the project by further delay. Twenty days later, on August 23, 1906, still confident that this important question would rise again, he voided his plan marking it, "not to be destroyed but kept in this office," and proceeded with the approved plan for separating the Pacific Locks. In 1907, after having brought construction to a point where the success of the project was a certainty, Stevens resigned his positions as Chief Engineer and Chairman of the Isthmian Canal Commission, to which combined offices he had been appointed by President Roosevelt in recognition of his contributions. He was succeeded by Colonel George W. Goethals under whose able direction the work was carried forward. PANAMA CANAL OPENED FOR TRAFFIC Notwithstanding this shift in administrative control of the canal enterprise from, civilian to military in 1907, the Stevens proposal to combine the Pacific Locks did not die. Colonel William L. Sibert seriously studied it and, on January 31, 1908, formally submitted a definite plan that reflected his appreciation of marine needs as the basis for navigational planning. But, unfortunately, the Sibert proposal likewise was not approved for reasons then deemed adequate. In this connection, it is pertinent to comment that after the resignation of Rear Admiral Walker in 1905 there was no experienced navigator on the Isthmian Canal Commission. Thus, one can only ponder what might have been the result had such a person been readily available for consultation with Stevens and Sibert on marine planning. In the light of later operational and engineering knowledge, developed in 1941-44, when there was such consultation between experienced engineers and marine operating officials, it is indeed regrettable that the StevensSibert proposals were not adopted. Colonel Goethals headed the project to the end, making a number of important but non-basic changes, which included a widening of Culebra (Gaillard) Cut and the locks. He developed the first permanent operating organization under the Panama Canal Act of 1912 and, as the first Governor of the Panama Canal, opened the canal to traffic on August 15, 1914, and overcame the early slide crises. He and his associates won great fame as builders of the Panama Canal. In this connection, it should be explained that the original concept of the functioning of the canal enterprises as a civil agency under the Panama Canal Act was dual: in peace, as an interoceanic public utility under a Governor; in war, under the supreme control of the Commanding General of U.S. Army on the Isthmus. In either status, the operational mission of the waterway remained as the transit of vessels under the obvious assumption that the Panama Canal, like other transportation facilities in the United States, would serve in war as well as in peace. DEFENSE CONCEPTS BECOME ASCENDANT After the opening of the canal to traffic, the great builders left the Isthmus; operation and maintenance became matters of routine, and the project was uncritically accepted. The rapid development of the airplane and other modern weapons following World War I, dramatized by periodic fleet exercises off Panama, made considerations of defense matters of increasing concern; those of marine operations became secondary. 3 William L. Sibert and John F. Stevens, "The Construction of the Panama Canal” (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1915), pp. 139-46 contains a summary of the Sibert proposal and its disposition. In the excitement preceding World War II, the Congress authorized construction of a third set of larger locks, primarily as a defense measure, known as the placed a new set of larger locks (140'X1200') near each of the existing locks but at some distance away to afford greater protection through dispersal and increased lock capacity for large naval vessels. The new locks were to be joined with the existing channels by means of by-pass channels." Significantly, the plan included a number of construction features for future changing of the canal to "sea-level." Thus, discerning students recognized the Third Locks Project as renewing the old "battle of the levels" in a new formthat of "conversion." The Third Locks Project layout at the Atlantic end of the canal, which duplicates an operationally sound arrangement at Gatun, is likewise sound. At the Pacific end, however, the proposed new channel layout contained three sharp bends-29°, 47°, and 37°-in succession from north to south. The latter, if it had been completed, would have created operational problems and navigational hazards of the gravest character. Construction started in 1940 and was pushed vigorously until suspended in May, 1942, because of shortage of ships and materials more urgently needed elsewhere for war purposes. No excavation was accomplished at Pedro Miguel; that at Gatun and Miraflores was substantially completed. Some $75,000,000 was expended. WAR EXPERIENCE INSPIRES PLAN FOR CANAL IMPROVEMENT The suspension of the Third Locks Project, however, afforded an opportunity, while there was still time left to make such a study, for its re-examination in the light of operational needs demonstrated by marine experience. This was at a period when the Panama Canal was the scene of many military and naval expeditions on their way to and from combat zones in the Pacific. This, it should be also noted, was before the advent of the atomic bomb. These studies conclusively established that the principal marine operational problems of the existing Panama Canal are: 1. Dangerous traffic bottleneck at Pedro Miguel and lack of a Pacific summit anchorage. 2. Double handling of vessels at separated Pacific Locks. 3. Effect of fog in Culebra (Gaillard) Cut on capacity and operations. 4 Public Law 391, 76th Congress, approved August 11, 1939 (535 Stat. 1409). Third Locks Project, at an authorized cost of $277,000,000. The proposed layout 5 H. Doc. 210, 76th Congress, 1st sess. (1939). House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Executive Hearings on H.R. 4480, 79th Congress, 1st sess., Nov. 15, 1945, p. 4. 4. Lockage surges in Cut caused by operating Pedro Miguel Locks. (3′ max. amplitude). 5. Limited operating range of Gatun Lake water level (87′–82′). 6. Navigational hazards in the restricted Cut (300' min. bottom width). 7. Inadequate dimensions of present locks for largest vessels (110'X1000′)." From the nature of these inadequacies, it is obvious that locating the Pedro Miguel Locks at the south end of Culebra (Gaillard) Cut, where it created a traffic bottleneck and other problems, was the fundamental error in operational design of the Panama Canal. Under the basic assumption that the prime function of the Panama Canal is the safe and convenient transport of vessels, it is self-evident that the wide channels of Gatun Lake afford safer and more convenient navigation than can any necessarily restricted channel at sea-level. Moreover, the advantages of unrestricted lake navigation outweigh the minor hazards and time lost by passage through locks. Thus, the best operational solution is not provided by lowering the Gatun Lake water level to sea-level, or to some intermediate-level, but by raising it to its highest feasible elevation. The obvious economic operational solution thus is a major improvement of the existing canal according to what is known as the Terminal Lake-Third Locks Plan, which includes the following program: 1. Removal of the bottleneck Pedro Miguel Locks. 2. Construction of all Pacific Locks in continuous steps near Miraflores. 3. & 4. Elevation of the intermediate Miraflores Lake water level (54') to that of Gatun Lake to serve as an anchorage during fog periods and to dampen surges. 5. Raising the summit water level to its optimum height (Approx. 92′). Diagrammatic side elevation of the Panama Canal-drawing shows the canal modified and adapted to the Terminal Lake-Third Locks proposal. The present lake and lock canal is unshaded; the sea-level proposal is shaded. 6. Widening Culebra (Gaillard) Cut. 7. Construction of a set of larger locks. These modifications will remove the traffic choke at Pedro Miguel, correct present operational dissymmetry and simplify canal control, increase channel depths, and improve navigation, mitigate the effect of fog, reduce marine accidents, decrease transit time slightly, conserve water, and increase capacity. Thus, the plan supplies the best operational canal practicable of economic achievement. This plan was publicly revealed by its author on May 20, 1943, in an address before the Panama Section of the American Society of Civil Engineers, under the title, "The Marine Operating Problems, Panama Canal, and the Solution." Attended by high Army, Navy, and Canal Zone officials, the presentation aroused the interest of the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, Rear Admiral C. E. Van Hook, who was present. He later submitted the plan to the Navy Department. On September 7, 1943, the Secretary of the Navy forwarded it to the President. Subsequently, this proposal was approved in principle by the Gov 7 Hon. Willis W. Bradley, "What of the Panama Canal?," Congressional Record, Vol. 94, Pt. 10 (Apr. 21, 1948), p. A2449 and "The Whys of the Panama Canal," Congressional Record, Vol. 95, Pt. 12 (Mar. 4, 1949), p. A1303 contain extended discussions of marine problems. 8 A.S.C.E. "Transactions," Vol. 114 (1949), p. 558. ernor of the Panama Canal for the major modification of the existing canal. According to the report of a 1949 Congressional investigation, it can be accomplished at "comparatively low cost." Moreover, no doubt exists as to its soundness because a similar arrangement at Gatun has been tested since 1914 and found eminently satisfactory. ATOMIC BOMB RESURRECTS SEA-LEVEL PLAN The spectacular advent of the atomic bomb in 1945 injected a new element into the canal picture. Under the force of its impact, canal officials sought authority to conduct an "overall review" of the entire interoceanic canals question in the light of the then newest developments in the "military and physical sciences." 19 This was before the hydrogen bomb. Accordingly, the Congress, in 1945 enacted legislation " authorizing the Governor of the Panama Canal to make a comprehensive investigation of the means for increasing its capacity and security to meet the future needs of interoceanic commerce and national defense. The law also provided for a festudy of the Third Locks Project, a study of canals at other locations, and for consideration of any new means for transporting ships across lands. Thus was launched the second major canal crisis in the 20th Century. It served to resurrect the corpses of the 1902 "battle of the routes" and the 1906 "battle of the levels" with a rehashing of all the main arguments of the earlier struggles on the basis of the newer term, "security," rather than the older one, "vulnerability." Under a far more extreme interpretation of the "security" factor of the statute than was intended by the Congress that enacted it, the investigation was directed toward obtaining authorization for a Sea-Level Project at Panama, with the "security" and "national defense" factors as paramount, and money costs not a "governing consideration." 12 In line with the 1905-06 precedent, the naval representative on the Board of Consulting Engineers for the greater part of this engineer investigation was the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks. In the ensuing public hysteria centered on the dangers of the atomic bomb and other modern weapons, the long-range and fundamental mission of the Panama Canal to provide efficient and economic transit of vessels was generally overlooked. 13 The report of the 1946-47 Isthmian Canal Studies 1 recommended only the Sea-Level Project for major canal construction at Panama, initially estimated to cost $2,483,000,000. With the exception of the two terminals, this project provides for constructing a virtually new Panama Canal of 60′ minimum depth in navigation lanes and of 600′ width between sloping sides at a depth of 40′ on a new alignment somewhat removed from the present channel, which it crosses several times. The project includes a tidal lock (200′×1500′) and a navigable pass at the Pacific end, many miles of dams for flood control reservoirs on both sides of the projected canal, diversion channels and other structural features. This program would result in abandonment of the greater part of the existing waterway and the investment that it represents. Although the 1947 report contained studies of plans for a Terminal Lake-Third Lock Project, which it did not recommend, it offered a relatively minor program for improvement of the present canal installations "to meet the needs of commerce" as a preferred alternative to the major improvement of the existing waterway as recommended to the President in 1943 by the Secretary of the Navy. Transmitted by the President to the Congress on December 1, 1947, and without presidential approval, comment or recommendation, the report promptly encountered sharp opposition. The Congress took no action on this report. Instead, in 1949, it authorized an investigation of the organizational and financial aspects of the canal enterprise," for which study Representative Clark W. Thompson of Texas, a retired Marine Corps Reserve officer, served as Chairman. This investiga H. Rept. 1304, 81st Congress. 1st sess. (1949), p. 2. 10 Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, op. cit., p. 5. 11 Public Law 280, 79th Congress, approved December 28, 1945 (59 Stat. 663). 12 See statement of Board of Consulting Engineers, quoted in Panama American, Aug. 5, 1946. p. 3, cols. 4-6. 13 Summarized with discussions in A.S.C.E. "Transactions," Vol. 114 (1949). pp. 607–906. 14 H. Res. 44, 81st Congress quoted in Congressional Record, Vol. 95, Pt. 2 (Feb. 28, 1949), p. 1617. tion resulted in the first basic change 15 in the permanent canal operating organi. zation that was established in 1914. The new Act requires that transit tolls be established at rates that will place the operation of the canal enterprise on a self-sustaining basis--a new principle in Isthmian Canal Policy with far-reaching implications affecting the future economic management of the Panama Canal and interoceanic commerce. This subject is now under further Congressional study.1 CLARIFICATIONS RESTORE OPERATIONS AS BASIC FOR PLANNING Meanwhile, in the Congress, the "security" and "national defense" premises, on which the recommendation for the Sea-Level Project was primarily based, were vigorously challenged. As to the atomic bomb, Representative Willis W. Bradley, a retired naval officer, summarized his views: "As far as I can ascertain, the greatest authorities on modern weapons of war who have given this subject serious attention hold uniformly that any canal would be critically vulnerable to the atomic bomb, regardless of type; that a sea-level canal would be in the same security class as a lake canal; that a sea-level canal could be closed for prolonged periods of time beyond any hope of speedy restoration; and that a sea-level canal cannot be considered secure in an atomic war. These same authorities also agree that the atomic bomb is irrelevant as a controlling factor in the planning of operational improvements for the Panama Canal." 17 Representative, now Senator, Thomas E. Martin of Iowa, a retired Army officer, developed the national defense clarification, repeatedly stressing that protection of any type of canal, wherever located, is "an over-all governmental responsibility, and that its defense, like that of the seaports, airports, railroads, highways, and productive centers of the United States depends upon the combined industrial, military, naval, and air power of this Nation as obtained in both world wars, and not upon passive defense measures, such as may be embodied in inherent characteristics of canal design.' 19 18 Here it should be stated that leading atomic warfare authorities, who studied the problem of Canal Zone defense in 1947, considered that arguments as to relative vulnerability of types of construction are entirely without point and that the Sea-Level Project would, in effect, constitute a "Maginot Line." This view has been greatly strengthened by the later development of the hydrogen bomb, which is measured in mega-tons of T.N.T. equivalent as compared to kilo-tons for the atomic bomb. 19 In the course of extensive discussions of the Sea-Level Project recommendation, Congressional and administrative leaders often stressed the point that this project, if justified primarily for "national defense," would divert both funds and resources from projects and programs in the United States that are far more essential to national security. The combined effects of the defense clarifications have been toward eliminating the concept of inherent resistance to attack as the governing consideration in planning at Panama. Thus, it appears that the only justifiable security design feature is adequate protection against sabotage, which is chiefly an administrative function. Eventually, a group of engineers and others associated in building the Panama Canal submitted their views in a memorandum to the Congress. This memorial challenged the official cost estimates in the 1947 report, charging that the SeaLevel Project would cost several times its initial estimate $2,483,000,000-and that the Third Locks Project adapted to the principles of the terminal lake proposal (widening Culebra Cut excepted) can be accomplished at relatively low cost as compared to that of the Sea-Level Project-estimated as under $600,000,000. 15 H. Doc. 460, 81st Congress, 2d sess. (1950) and Public Law 841, 81st Congress, approved September 26, 1950 (64 Stat. 1038). 16 Hon. John J. Allen, "Panama Canal-Interim Report," Congressional Record, Vol. 100, No. 149 (Aug. 4, 1954), p. A5766. 17 Bradley. "What of the Panama Canal?." op. cit., p. A2451. 18 Hon. Thomas E. Martin, "An Interoceanic Canals Commission, the Best Solution of Panama Canal Problem," Congressional Record. Vol. 97, Pt. 14 (July 18, 1951), p. A4481. 19 Hon. Clark W. Thompson, "Isthmian Canal Policy of the United States-Bibliographical List," Congressional Record. Vol. 95. Pt. 16 (Aug. 25, 1949), p. A5580 and subsequent statements of distinguished members of Congress. 94-790 - 77 - 12 |