when the moment arises, doubts may well occur as to what measures are necessary and appropriate to give effect to the obligations assumed under the above provisions. These problems require full consideration in order that States may know beforehand what their attitude should be.

Article 12 defines the conditions of such investigation. It is not expressly stated that the problem will be examined by the Council in collaboration with the various Governments, but the Council will naturally, if it deems it necessary, invite the respective Governments to furnish such information as it may require for the purpose of carrying out the task entrusted to it under Article 12.

Article 13, paragraph 1.

The statement in Article II, paragraphs 1 and 2, contains many references to Article 13.

As I have already pointed out, in case sanctions have to be applied, it is highly important that there should exist some organ required to express an opinion as to the best way in which obligations connected with sanctions could be carried out by the Contracting Parties. As you are aware, this organ, according to the Covenant, is the Council. In order that the Council may effectively fulfil this duty, Article 13 empowers it to receive undertakings on the part of States, determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately in order to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising, in this connection, out of the Covenant and the present Protocol.

It is also necessary to emphasise the fact that the means which the States signatories to the present Protocol have at their disposal for the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of Article II vary considerably in view of the differences in the geographical, economic, financial, political and social situation of different States. Information as to the means at the disposal of each State is therefore indispensable in order that the Council may in full understanding give its

opinion as to the best method by which such obligations may best be carried out.

Finally, as regards the question of the reduction of armaments, which is the final goal to which our efforts are tending, the information thus furnished to the Council may be of very great importance, as every State, knowing what forces will be available for its assistance in case it is attacked, will be able to judge to what extent it may reduce its armaments without compromising its existence as a State, and every State will thus be able to provide the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments with very valuable data. I should add, moreover, that Article 13, paragraph 1, does not render it compulsory for States to furnish this information. It is desirable that States should furnish the Council with this information, but they are at liberty not to do so.

Article 13, paragraphs 2 and 3.

The provisions of Article 13, paragraphs 2 and 3, refer to special agreements which were discussed at such length last year. In view of the fact that, according to paragraph 2, such agreements can only come into force when the Council has invited the signatory States to apply the sanctions, the nature of these agreements may be defined as follows:

Special agreements must be regarded as the means for the rapid application of sanctions of every kind in a given case of aggression. They are additional guarantees which give weaker States an absolute assurance that the system of sanctions will never fail. They guarantee that there will always be States immediately prepared to carry out the obligations provided for in Article 11 of the Protocol.

In accordance with Article 18 of the Covenant, it is expressly stated that these agreements will be registered and published by the Council, and it has also been decided that they will remain open for signature to any State Member of the League of Nations which may desire to accede to them.

4. RAISING OF SANCTIONS: PUNISHMENT OF THE AGGRESSOR Article 14.

Article 14 is in perfect keeping with the last paragraph of Articles 10 and 11. In the paragraph in question, the coming into operation of the sanctions depends upon an injunction by the Council; also it devolves upon the Council to declare that the object for which the sanctions were applied has been attained. Just as the application of the sanctions is a matter for the States, so its rests with them to liquidate the operations undertaken with a view to resisting the act of aggression.

Article 15.

Paragraph I is similar to Article 10 of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance drawn up last year.

Paragraph 2 is designed to prevent the sanctions provided for in Article II from undergoing any change in character during the process of execution and developing into a war of annexation.

In view of the observations of various delegations regarding the punishment of the aggressor, I should add that it would be incorrect to interpret this article as meaning that the only penalties to be apprehended by the aggressor as the result of his act shall be the burdens referred to in paragraph 1. If necessary, securities against fresh aggression or pledges guaranteeing the fulfilment of the obligations imposed in accordance with paragraph I might be required. Only annexation of territory and measures involving the loss of political independence are declared inadmissible. "Territory" shall be taken to mean the whole territory of a State, no distinction being made between the mothercountry and the colonies.

5. REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

Articles 17 and 21.

Although it has not been possible to solve the problem of the reduction of armaments by means of the clauses of

the document submitted to the Assembly for approval, our work paves the way to it and makes it possible.

The reduction of armaments will result, in the first place, from the general security created by a diminution of the dangers of war arising from the compulsory pacific settlement of all disputes.

It will also ensue from the certainty which any State attacked will have of obtaining the economic and financial support of all the signatory States, and such support would be especially important should the aggressor be a great Power, capable of carrying on a long war.

Nevertheless, for States which, owing to their geographical position, are especially liable to attack, and for States whose most important centres are adjacent to their frontiers, the dangers of a sudden attack are so great that it will not be possible for them to base any plan for the reduction of their armaments simply upon the political and economic factors referred to above, no matter what the importance of such factors may be.

It has also been repeatedly declared that many States would require to know what military support they could count on, before the convening of the Conference, if they are to submit to the Conference proposals for great reductions of armaments; this might necessitate negotiations between the Governments and with the Council before the meeting of the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments provided for in Article 17. The undertakings referred to in Article 13 of the Protocol should be interpreted in the light of the above.

In drawing up the general programme of the Conference, it would also be necessary, as stated in paragraph 2 of Article 17, for the Council, apart from other criteria, “to take into account the undertakings mentioned."

In view of the close interdependence of the three great problems involved, namely, the pacific settlement of disputes, sanctions against those who disturb the peace of the world, and reduction of armaments, the Protocol pro

vides for the convening by the Council of a general Conference for the Reduction of Armaments and for the preparation of the work of such a Conference. Furthermore, the application of the clauses concerning arbitration and sanctions will be conditional on the adoption by the said Conference of a plan for the reduction and limitation of armaments.

Moreover, in order to preserve the connection between the three big problems referred to above, it is provided that the whole Protocol will lapse in the event of the nonexecution of the scheme adopted by the Conference. It devolves upon the Council to declare this under conditions to be determined by the Conference itself.

The last paragraph of Article 21 provides for the case of the partial lapsing of the Protocol which has been put into force. Should the plan adopted by the Conference be regarded as having been put into effect, any State which fails to execute it, so far as it is concerned, will not benefit by the provisions of the Protocol.

Article 19.

6. THE COVENANT AND THE PROTOCOL

The present Protocol emphasises and defines certain obligations arising out of the Covenant. Those of which the present Protocol makes no mention are not affected in any manner. They still exist. Examples which might be quoted are those laid down in Article 16, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, namely, the obligation of the States to give one another mutual support in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the application of the economic and financial sanctions or the obligation of the States to take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to forces which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League.

Moreover, as the Swiss Delegation suggests, attention should be directed to the fact that the present Protocol does not in any way affect the special position of Switzer