In future the position will be different. In no case is any State signatory of the Protocol entitled to undertake on its own sole initiative an offensive war against another signatory State or against any non-signatory State which accepts all the obligations assumed by the signatories under the Protocol.

The prohibition affects only aggressive war. It does not, of course, extend to defensive war. The right of legitimate self-defence continues, as it must, to be respected. The State attacked retains complete liberty to resist by all means in its power any acts of aggression of which it may be the victim. Without waiting for the assistance which it is entitled to receive from the international community, it may and should at once defend itself with its own force. Its interests are identified with the general interest. This is a point on which there can be no doubt.

The same applies when a country employs force with the consent of the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations under the provisions of the Covenant and the Protocol. This eventuality may arise in two classes of cases: either a State may take part in the collective measures of force decided upon by the League of Nations in aid of one of its Members which is the victim of aggression; or a State may employ force with the authorisation of the Council or the Assembly in order to enforce a decision given in its favour. In the former case, the assistance given to the victim of aggression is indirectly an act of legitimate selfdefence. In the latter, force is used in the service of the general interest, which would be threatened if decisions reached by a pacific procedure could be violated with impunity. In all these cases the country resorting to war is not acting on its private initiative but is in a sense the agent and the organ of the community.

It is for this reason that we have not hesitated to speak of the exceptional authorisation of war. It has been proposed that the word "force" should be used in order to

avoid any mention of "war"-in order to spare the public

that disappointment which it might feel when it found that, notwithstanding the solemn condemnation of war, war was still authorised in exceptional cases. We preferred, however, to recognise the position frankly by retaining the expression "resort to war" which is used in the Covenant. If we said "force" instead of "war," we should not be altering the facts in any way. Moreover, the conclusion that war is still possible in specific cases has a certain value, because the term describes a definite and well-understood situation, whereas the expression "resort to force" would be liable to be misunderstood, and also because it emphasises the value of the sanctions at the disposal of the community of States bound by the Protocol.

4. COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

Article 3.

The general principle of the Protocol could not be accepted unless the pacific settlement of all international disputes without distinction were made possible.

This solution has been found, in the first place, in the extension of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

According to its Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court is, in principle, optional. On the other hand, Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, offers States the opportunity of making the jurisdiction compulsory in respect of all or any of the classes of legal disputes affecting: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. States have only to declare their intention through the special Protocol annexed to the Statute. The undertaking then holds good in respect of any other State which assumes the same obligation. It may be given either unconditionally or on

condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain other States; either permanently or for a fixed period.

So far such compulsory jurisdiction has only been accepted by a small number of countries. Most States, more particularly the Great Powers, have abstained because they did not see their way to accept compulsory jurisdiction by the Court in certain cases falling within one or another of the classes of disputes enumerated above, and because they were not sure whether, in accepting, they could make reservations to that effect.

It was for this reason that the Assembly in its resolution of September 6th, requested the First Committee to render more precise the terms of Article 36, paragraph 2, in order to facilitate its acceptance.

Careful consideration of the Article has shown that it is sufficiently elastic to allow of all kinds of reservations. Since it is open to the States to accept compulsory jurisdiction by the Court in respect of certain of the classes of disputes mentioned and not to accept it in respect of the rest, it is also open to them only to accept it in respect of a portion of one of those classes; if the maximum is optional so is the minimum. In giving the undertaking in question, therefore, they are free to state that it will not be regarded as operative in those cases in which they consider it to be inadmissible.

We can imagine possible and therefore legitimate reservations either in connection with a certain class of dispute or, generally speaking, in regard to the precise stage at which the dispute may be laid before the Court. While we cannot here enumerate all the conceivable reservations, it may be worth while to mention merely as examples those to which we referred in the course of our discussions.

From the class of disputes relating to "the interpretation of a treaty" there may be excluded, for example, disputes as to the interpretation of certain specified classes of treaty such as political treaties, peace treaties, etc.

From the class of disputes relating to "any point of inter

national law" there may be excluded, for example, disputes as to the application of a political treaty, a peace treaty, etc., or as to any specified question or disputes which might arise as the outcome of hostilities initiated by one of the signatory States with the consent of the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Again, there are many possible reservations as to the precise stage at which a dispute may be laid before the Court. The most far-reaching of these would be to make the resort to the Court in connection with every dispute in respect of which its compulsory jurisdiction is recognised contingent upon the establishment of an agreement for submission of the case which, failing agreement between the parties, would be drawn up by the Court itself, the analogy of the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 dealing with the Permanent Court of Arbitration being thus followed.

It might also be stated that the recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court does not prevent the parties to the dispute from agreeing to resort to a preliminary conciliation procedure before the Council of the League of Nations or any other body selected by them, or to submit their disputes to arbitration in preference to going before the Court.

A State might also, while accepting compulsory jurisdiction by the Court, reserve the right of laying disputes before the Council of the League with a view to conciliation in accordance with paragraphs 1-3 of Article 15 of the Covenant, with the proviso that neither party might, during the proceedings before the Council, take proceedings against the other in the Court.

It will be seen, therefore, that there is a very wide range of reservations which may be made in connection with the undertaking referred to in Article 36, paragraph 2. It is possible that apprehensions may arise lest the right to make reservations should destroy the practical value of the undertaking. There seems, however, to be no justification for

such misgivings. In the first place, it is to be hoped that every Government will confine its reservations to what is absolutely essential. Secondly, it must be recognised that, however restrictive the scope of the undertaking may be, it will always be better than no undertaking at all.

The fact that the signatory States undertake to accede, even though it be with reservations, to paragraph 2 of Article 36 may therefore be held to constitute a great advance.

Such accession must take place at latest within the month following upon the coming into force or subsequent acceptance of the Protocol.

It goes without saying that such accession in no way restricts the liberty which States possess, under the ordinary law, of concluding special agreements for arbitration. It is entirely open to any two countries signatory of the Protocol which have acceded to paragraph 2 of Article 36 to extend still further, as between themselves, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, or to stipulate that before having recourse to its jurisdiction they will submit their disputes to a special procedure of conciliation or even to lay down that, whether prior to or subsequent to the opening of the case, it shall be brought before a special tribunal of arbitrators or before the Council of the League of Nations rather than to the Court.

It is also certain that, up to the time of the coming into force or acceptance of the Protocol, accession to paragraph 2 of Article 36, which will thenceforth become compulsory, will still remain optional, and that if such accession has already taken place it will continue to be valid in accordance with the terms under which it was made.

The only point which may cause difficulty is the question what is the effect of accessions given to the Protocol if the latter becomes null and void. It may be asked whether such accessions are to be regarded as so intimately bound up with the Protocol that they must disappear with it. The reply must be in the negative. The sound rule of in