and the third accepted the principles of separate alliances between states only on condition that they in turn accepted compulsory arbitration, were publicly registered and accepted by the League as being in accordance with the principles of the Covenant and the Declaration outlawing aggressive war. The document thus recast was laid before the Commissions of the League in both French and English texts, having been given official status by resolution of the Assembly after reference had been made to it by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France and others.

The one unquestioned contribution of the "American Plan" was the definition of the aggressor as the state which refused a summons to an appropriate tribunal. This definition was accepted unanimously. It was equally unanimously agreed that without it there would have been no progress in the rest of the discussion. As the American project dealt only with the establishment of general principles, leaving the development of details for negotiations, it had stated the test of aggression in bald phrases and in the most general terms. The Protocol developed the principles in great detail by indicating the appropriate judicial, arbitral, or mediatory organs for securing peaceful settlement of the various classes of international disputes. In this process of development of the general principles it was interesting to note that the European delegations placed the emphasis upon what they called compulsory arbitration, while the American suggestions had tended to emphasize the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice. At bottom, however, there was no difference of opinion. The real difference between the project presented by the American committee for outlawing aggressive war and the scheme finally adopted in the Protocol lies in the method of the enforcement of peace. The American suggestion was to leave each nation entirely free to apply pressure against the aggressor, relying upon the threat of uncertainty as to what the other states might do as an

effective agency for keeping an aggressive state from proceeding to the overt act of war. The sanction was entirely permissive and not obligatory. In the Protocol, on the contrary, the states members of the League are reminded of their obligation, already entered into in the Covenant, to assist a victim by contributing to its defense. This cooperative defense of nations becomes the sanction, or method of enforcement of the peace. The League does not become a super-state, for each government decides for itself the way in which and the extent to which it will meet the obligation. The Council merely reminds each government of its duties and leaves it to respond freely of its own accord. Plans, with reference to definite dangers of war, however, may be worked up in common. It is in this setting that we come upon the separate treaties of alliance in the Protocol. They are henceforth entirely changed. They are merely the first line of defense against definite dangers. They are no longer secret and menacing, but are to be open so that they may be joined by any other member of the League; their terms are to be published, and they are to employ compulsory arbitration and all the mechanism of peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus ends the old "balance of power" system in Europe.

The Protocol goes so far in other directions that the importance of this reform seems likely to escape attention. It may yet turn out to be the most important practical measure in the whole proposal. For this is a reform built upon the experience of history, whereas the other elements in the Protocol, as in the Covenant itself, are to a certain extent the artificial creations of experiment. There is nothing experimental in this field. The making of alliances is as old as nations and has been one of the essential bases of the modern state system. If this method can now be deprived of its menace by making it purely contributory to the pacific settlement of disputes, we may find here the means for modifying international relationships without war, by the varying pressures of states bound together for

specific purposes, much as the group system works inside the structure of parliaments. It would indeed be a paradox if this method, so long fraught with danger to international peace, should furnish us with the best guarantee of escape from that danger. Diplomatic formations and other instruments of international politics would still function and so furnish a way for nations to escape the crystallization of a status quo. But this can only work out to a satisfactory issue if the peoples concerned devote to the new methods of international politics at least the same degree of technical skill and intelligent appreciation of the problem in hand as they have in the past devoted to the problems of defense through military and naval organizations.

Of the projects for disarmament in the plan presented by the American committee, that which called for an international inspection is already partly embodied in the Protocol (Article 7), but only as a means for securing evidence concerning the menace of aggression through armaments. The reason for this was clearly stated in the debates. The whole disarmament problem is left for the World Conference to be called by the League of Nations for June 15 next, to which non-member states are also invited. At this Conference an American delegation would have the chance to advocate the adoption of a permanent organization devoted to the creation of an adequate technical substitute for the mechanism of war. It is now generally recognized that this can be done without endangering the necessary machinery of defense.

October 31, 1924

James Thomson Shotwell

PROTOCOL FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES1

Animated by the firm desire to ensure the maintenance of general peace and the security of nations whose existence, independence or territories may be threatened;

Recognising the solidarity of the members of the international community;

Asserting that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and an international crime;

Desirous of facilitating the complete application of the system provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations for the pacific settlement of disputes between States and of ensuring the repression of international crimes; and

For the purpose of realising, as contemplated by Article 8 of the Covenant, the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations; The undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, agree as follows:

Article I.

The signatory States undertake to make every effort in their power to secure the introduction into the Covenant of amendments on the lines of the provisions contained in the following articles.

They agree that, as between themselves, these provisions shall be binding as from the coming into force of the present Protocol and that, so far as they are concerned, the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations shall thenceforth have power to exercise all the rights and perform all the duties conferred upon them by the Protocol.

Reprinted from League of Nations official publication Annex II to A. 135. 1924 (containing the French and English texts of the Protocol).

Article 2.

The signatory States agree in no case to resort to war either with one another or against a State which, if the occasion arises, accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant and of the present Protocol.

Article 3.

The signatory States undertake to recognise as compulsory, ipso facto and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the cases covered by paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, but without prejudice to the right of any State, when acceding to the special protocol provided for in the said Article and opened for signature on December 16th, 1920, to make reservations compatible with the said clause.

Accession to this special protocol, opened for signature on December 16th, 1920, must be given within the month following the coming into force of the present Protocol.

States which accede to the present Protocol, after its coming into force, must carry out the above obligation within the month following their accession.

Article 4.

With a view to render more complete the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article 15 of the Covenant, the signatory States agree to comply with the following procedure:

1. If the dispute submitted to the Council is not settled by it as provided in paragraph 3 of the said Article 15, the Council shall endeavour to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or arbitration.

2.

(a) If the parties cannot agree to do so, there shall,