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ton Conference shows that if a conference makes no provision for its own reassembling, the subsequent recriminations between the interested parties may tend to make matters worse instead of better. On the other hand, if a conference recurs automatically, the questions in dispute can be brought up without involving the national honor of any of the parties to it. The whole trend of diplomatic history points the moral in this direction. The case of the Brussels Conference and the question of the Congo is especially in point.
Moreover, it is essential to set up permanent machinery to deal with the technical questions which are involved in measures of disarmament if for no other reason, because of the rapid changes taking place in this field with the progress of discovery in chemistry and mechanism in aviation. It is essential to have a technical oversight of a subject which is continually varying. There is no other way to safeguard the progress of pacific policies.
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
ARTICLE 19 the Covenant of the League of Nations but a
ARTICLE 20 device which at the Peace Conference at Article 21
ARTICLE 22 Paris was strongly urged by Marshal Foch in the interests of the pacification of Europe. The Commission charged with the duty of investigating how the various H.C.P. were carrying out the terms of this Treaty could hardly be objected to by a Power which entered into it in good faith. In any case, it is the opinion of highly qualified military experts of the United States that this country would have no objection to the application of the plan so earnestly advocated by Marshal Foch at the Peace Conference,
OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ARTICLE 23
It is to be noted that this section of the ARTICLE 24 Treaty successfully overcomes one of the chief ARTICLE 25
criticisms of the Covenant and the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. It limits the prerogatives of the Council so that its position is little more than that of an advisory body.
The relation of the Council to the new machinery which it is proposed to set up is a matter of great importance. According to this Treaty, the Council would tend to become more and more an instrument of conciliation and its administrative functions would become inoperative. There is no superstate left in the structure of this Treaty.
On the other hand, the sphere of operation of the Council is a large and important one. Its function in the political sphere is left untouched. It can still serve to lessen the dangers arising from provocative political policies. This Treaty does not touch upon any of those topics. Consequently, the sphere of operation of the Council does not fully appear. The Treaty deals only with security and disarmament. It is an attempt to reduce this dual problem to the dimensions of a contract dealing with strictly technical matters. The Council of the League is not called upon to act outside its legitimate sphere in the enforcement of the Treaty or in its administration. Instead of regarding this limitation of its functions as lessening its validity, however, it, in reality, strengthens its position in the sphere in which it is necessary and legitimate.
Treaties of Mutual Assistance
Articles 26 and 27 are taken from the Draft ARTICLE 27 Treaty of the Temporary Mixed Commission. ARTICLE 28
In Article 28, a small but important change has been made from the text of the T.M.C. It stands now sub
ctantially as in the draft prepared by Colonel Requin which
, decidedly preferable to the text as finally adopted. As ere given, Colonel Requin's plan places a great premium upon publicity of engagement in the case of partial treaties. All publicly announced treaties accepted by the League of Nations as coming within the meaning of this Treaty and of the Covenant may be carried out automatically. This privilege of immediate action is of the greatest consequence in making defense effective. There is, therefore, the greatest possible premium placed upon making these agreements public. For “in all other cases of aggression" they must “inform the Council of the measures which they are contemplating.” This means that where there are secret agreements or where occasions of aggression arise foreseen in the known treaties, the allies or signatories of these partial treaties must proceed through the machinery of the League of Nations or this Treaty. No greater incentive for publicity of engagements could be found than this which makes the security of the H.C.P. dependent to a large degree upon having announced its engagements to the world through registration with the League of Nations. Freedom for automatic and immediate action may easily be, in cases like these, a matter of life and death.
Parties to the Treaty
Articles 29, 30, 31 need no further comment.
TEXT OF THE
TEMPORARY MIXED COMMISSION
For purposes of study and comparison, the text of the treaty prepared by the Temporary Mixed Commission is given below. Its history and purposes have been discussed in some detail in the Introduction. But at the time that was written, the Government of the United States had not expressed its opinion concerning this first serious effort of an organ of the League to secure agreement upon the disarmament problem. On July 10, 1924, however, the State Department made public its comment on this Draft Treaty. As this reply is in a sense the final document in the history which is outlined here, --so far, at least, as American participation is concerned, -it forms a fitting close to this survey of texts and commentaries.
Text of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance
PREAMBLE The High Contracting Parties, being desirous of establishing the general lines of a scheme of mutual assistance with a view to facilitate the application of Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of a reduction or limitation of national armaments in accordance with Article 8 of the Covenant “to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations," agree to the following provisions:
I. PACT OF NON-AGGRESSION The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that aggressive war is an international crime and severally undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its commission.
A war shall not be considered as a war of aggression if waged by a State which is party to a dispute and has accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Council, the verdict of the Permanent Court of International Justice, or an arbitral award against a High Contracting Party which has not accepted it, provided, however, that the first State does not intend to violate the political independence or the territorial integrity of the High Contracting Party.
II. GENERAL ASSISTANCE The High Contracting Parties, jointly and severally, undertake to furnish assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Present Treaty, to any one of their number should the latter be the object of a war of aggression, provided that it has conformed to the provisions of the present Treaty regarding the reduction or limitation of armaments.
MENACE OF AGGRESSION In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being of opinion that the armaments of any other High Contracting Party are in excess of the limits fixed for the latter High Contracting Party under the provisions of the present Treaty, or in the event of it having cause to apprehend an outbreak of hostilities, either on account of the aggressive policy or preparations of any State party or not to the present Treaty, it may inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations that it is threatened with aggression, and the SecretaryGeneral shall forthwith summon the Council. The Council, if it is of opinion that there is reasonable