The settlement of disputes by international arbitration is a method too well known in America for it to be further elaborated here. It, however, should not be lost sight of as a device particularly appealing to Americans.

Limited pacts of non-aggress on offer perhaps the most interesting and fruitful methods of the limitation of armaments between potential enemies. A notable suggestion for a pact of this kind has been made with reference to Germany and a definite offer embodying hopeful terms of settlement was formally offered for the consideration of the other powers concerned by the Chancellor o Germany in December, 1923. For at least a generation there should be no war between the chief Powers interested in the Versailles T.eaty, without a national referendum. It was, however, linked up with other demands so that it did not receive any serious attention on the part of French or British. There is no reason why this should not be revived, with other conditions attached, when the Ruhr question finally comes up for settlement.

These are merely illustrations. It is clear that unless one frankly accepts the principle of agreements limited to two or more parties as a method for reaching general agreements later, the general agreements will never be reached on any large scale. The variety and complexity of international politics point to the local negotiations and partial agreements as to their way to proceed. Those who cling to general and uniform agreements seem to be under a misapprehension as to the nature of international affairs. There is no such thing as a European much less world-state system with a policy of its own to which the representatives of the various states are to be invited to adjust their policies. Foreign politics are but the extension of home politics. They rest fundamentally upon the same basis of self interest and, if they are directed toward the welfare of other states as well as our own, it is not because we are primarily interested in the other states but because we recognize that our own welfare is fundamentally bound up with our maintaining friendly and helpful relations with them. In a sense there is no such thing as foreign politics, if by the

term we mean the politics which center in an external interest apart from our own. It is well to get this point clear, for the phrase itself has apparently invited a good deal of explaining. This being so, we should adjust our theories to our practice and proceed accordingly, point by point, for only by a frank recognition of realities will we make any permanent progress.

IX

The Treaty of Disarmament and Security

Throughout the winter and spring of 1924 a small, informal group of Americans interested in this problem had been meeting to see whether there was any possibility of stating it so as to include the American viewpoint, as well as the European. The group was entirely detached from any official connection, or even any institutions or other organizations. It was composed simply of a few individuals working on their own account, although in touch with some of the most important leaders of the movement in Europe. The members of the group were:

GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS, American representative on the Supreme War Council,

DR. ISAIAH BOWMAN, executive head of the technical experts of the American Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference,

DR. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, Professor in International Law at Columbia University,

PROFESSOR JOHN BATES CLARK, former Director of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,、

DR. STEPHEN P. DUGGAN, Director of the Institute of International Education of the Carnegie Foundation, GENERAL JAMES G. HARBORD, former Chief of Staff of the American Army,

DR. F. P. KEPPEL, former Assistant Secretary of War,

MR. DAVID HUNTER MILLER, legal adviser to the United States Government at The Paris Peace Conference,

DR. HENRY S. PRITCHETT, President of the Carnegie Foundation,

DR. JAMES T. SHOTWELL, Professor of History at Columbia University, a member of the American Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, and a Commissioner of the Labor Section of the Treaty.

After various disarmament plans had been considered the attached Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security was adopted by the group as containing the most hopeful suggestions which it could form toward a solution of the problem. It was of course understood by all members of the group that the text here adopted was not to be regarded as the last word in drafting. It was not to be expected that a group drawn together as this one has been should prepare the final text in so complicated a matter. This indeed was not the purpose of the group. Its task was to indicate in a definite and clear way the policies which should be followed and the institutions and organizations which would have to be created or amended if world disarmament were ever to become a reality. Whether this has been achieved or not is for others to say.

Meanwhile copies of the American text having reached Europe the Council of the League of Nations decided at its June meeting to circulate it as an official text of the League to those Governments represented upon the Council. This involves bringing it up at the Assembly meeting in September along with the Draft Treaty which the Temporary Mixed Commission has submitted. The Assembly of the League will have to take some account of the action with reference to both.

The text of the Treaty follows. Appended is a textual commentary. It may be well, however, to summarize here in a few words the chief contributions which the Treaty contains.

First of all there is to be a world parliament on disarmament. It is to meet at least once every three years. This is the "Permanent Advisory Conference" described in Article 14. Upon it would fall to a large extent the duty of encouraging and stimulating those policies which make for disarmament. It would have in its Permanent Technical Committee (Article 15) a sort of cabinet or general staff-a General Staff for Peace. With this would naturally be associated the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations (Articles 18 to 22). In practice, and indeed in redrafting the Treaty, it might very well turn out that these two commissions should work as one. This would certainly be the case if the United States, Germany, and Russia were in the League. (The Articles with reference to the League's investigating committee have been repeated from the League Treaty of Mutual Assistance.) So long as these three great Powers are not members of the League, however, it will be necessary to center this machinery upon the Conference rather than upon the organs of the League.

The next important point is of course the definition of "aggression". It must be clearly kept in mind that this is not a treaty dealing with the basis of peace and the causes of war in general. It is dealing only with the specific problem of stopping people from fighting and arming to fight. Therefore in judging the responsibility of a State for aggression we are not concerned here with the further responsibilities involved in provocative policies. That is left aside to be settled by other devices. It is not the subject of this Treaty. There are those who will be strongly averse to proceeding toward the elimination of war until the injustices of the world are settled and who will therefore demand that we proceed by an entirely different path. Logically their claim would seem to be a good one, but historically it is not ustified. The elimination of force as between individuals or sections of the community has been due not so much to the elimination of causes of quarrel as to the bettering of the procedure by which disputes are settled. If war is a better way of settling

disputes than can be devised in terms of peace, then this whole procedure looking toward the elimination of war is wrong. This Treaty is intended simply as a contribution toward the substitution of peaceful methods for redressing grievances between nations, for the world historic methods by way of armaments and fighting. But, once more, it does not redress the grievances.

Critics will claim as well that it is an impossibility to assign responsibilities for war, but that again is more than this treaty envisages. It assigns not the responsibility for a war but the responsibility of a nation for going to war, which is a much more definite fact. To put the matter in simpler terms, it is as though one were to deny to an individual the right of private revenge and to ensure that he would keep the peace by making it a misdemeanor for him to carry arms or at least to carry them in a way that in itself was a standing menace to his neighbors. The technical statement as to what should be allowed in such instances should be the problem of the Permanent Advisory Conference and its experts. Their conclusions would be communicated to the Court for its information, and to the signatories as suggestions for policy,—and the whole process should further clarify outstanding issues and educate public opinion.

Attention should especially be called to the need of developing much further a point that has only been sketched in this Treaty, namely, the establishment of demilitarized zones between nations (Article 13). This again should be worked out, as has been pointed out above, with regard to specific frontiers; but the incentive must be kept alive by the demands of an enlightened public opinion. Similarly, the article that deals with Disarmament itself (Article 12) is-purposelyleft vague. That will call for elaboration and careful study by the first Technical Committee, if not before. But in these broad terms it states the main intent and purpose of the Treaty as a whole.

The next important question that arises is what would be left of the Treaty if all mention of the League of Nations were