of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government at Nanking, and was appointed President of the Commission to draw up Codes of Law for China.

SALARY OF THE JUDGES

As to the pay of the judges, I may say that it is a subject that I can mention without embarrassment. Our pay is not so high as to justify the imputation of mercenary motives. The salaries are paid in Dutch florins. Assuming that the florin is at pai, which at present it is not, we would receive salaries of about $6,000 a year. But we get something in addition, in the form of a per diem while we are actually sitting. This is called a duty allowance; and we also receive a smaller per diem as a subsistence allowance. The President of the Court, in order to support the dignity of his office, receives a special allowance. A judge may possibly get as much as $12,000 in one year, but in order to do so he must sit about seven months out of the year.

TWO OFFICIAL LANGUAGES

A question is often asked as to the languages used in the Court. The Court has two official languages, English and French, which are used in all our proceedings. The hearings are in English and French, and all opinions are rendered and all decisions given in both languages. The Statute authorizes the Court in certain cases to permit other languages to be used. That power has already been exercised, where it was evident that counsel could not adequately present their arguments unless they were permitted to use their own tongue; but, so far, counsel have in such

cases been required eventually to file an official version of their argument in either French or English as well as in the language orally used.

THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITY OF JUDGES

I have said that there are fifteen members of the Court, and that the full Court, sitting as a trial court, consists of eleven members; of the eleven judges, if they can all be present, and, if not, of judges and deputy judges sufficient to make up the number. In case of necessity, nine may constitute a quorum. But there is one case in which the full Court may consist of more than eleven judges, and that is where a nation, appearing as a suitor, has none of its citizens on the bench. Now, the judges are not elected as citizens of any particular country. The Statute specifically provides that they shall be elected without regard to their nationality, but that in their selection regard shall be paid to the different legal systems of the world. But, when the drafting of the Statute was in progress, a question naturally was raised as to whether a judge should be disqualified on grounds of interest if his country happened to be one of the litigants. After mature reflection, it was decided, and most wisely decided, that, instead of disqualifying a judge because his country was a litigant, the right should be given to the unrepresented country to name a judge to be added to the Court. Only those who have had experience in international business can fully comprehend the importance of this decision. The great doubt that nations feel when they go before tribunals or into international conferences is that their case may not be fully understood, because they may be

unable to convey to the minds of persons of a different nationality the ideas they have in their own minds. When we come to study languages and to examine them very closely, we find that every language expresses phases of thought which are not readily or precisely conveyed in the words of any other language, and it requires careful analysis and interpretation to effect correct and adequate interchanges of meaning in such cases. A nation feels an additional assurance that its views will be understood when one of its own nationals takes part in all the deliberations of the tribunal, private as well as public.

The right to name a national judge was actually exercised by Germany in the Wimbledon case, in which Germany was one of the parties. As there was no German on the Court, the German Government, exercising its right under the Statute, designated, as its national judge, Dr. Walter Schücking, of Berlin, so that in this case there were twelve judges instead of eleven. There might, of course, for the same reason, be thirteen or fourteen, or even more.

ACTUAL WORK OF THE COURT

Although I may be in danger of exceeding the limit fixed for the broadcasting of what I may say, I desire to speak briefly of the work of the Court. The Court has rendered eight advisory opinions, and pronounced one judgment. The judgment was rendered in the case of Wimbledon, which related to the status and use of the Kiel Canal under certain provisions of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles of 1919. The first of the advisory opinions related to the legality of the appointment by The Netherlands Government of what is

called its Workers' Delegate to the Second International Labor Conference. The second advisory opinion related to the question whether the international labor organization had anything to do with international regulation of agricultural labor. The third question was allied to the second.

The fourth question, while it was submitted with a request for an advisory opinion, essentially involved an international dispute which was submitted to the Court for its determination. A dispute arose between France and Great Britain as to the validity, in an international sense, of certain decrees that had been issued by the French Government in Tunis and in the French zone in Morocco, and also by the local governments, in relation to the nationality of certain resident foreigners. The British Government contested the validity of the decrees in the international sense, on the ground that they exceeded the powers of a protecting state, and secondly, on the ground that they violated the treaties between the two countries. The dispute was brought before the Council of the League of Nations, but, relying on a clause in the Covenant, France contested the jurisdiction of the Council on the ground that the question involved was one purely of domestic jurisdiction, concerning only the protecting and the protected power. The Council did not undertake to determine this question. On the contrary, it held the question in abeyance, and, while it was so doing, the British and French Governments came to an agreement under which the Council was to submit the question to the Court for an advisory opinion, it being further stipulated that, if the Court should hold that the matter was not one of exclusive domestic competence, then the two

powers would submit the whole dispute for final judicial or arbitral decision on the merits. Thus, while there was in form a request for an advisory opinion the parties agreed to accept the Court's opinion as a binding decision of the preliminary question. This went beyond the implications of an "advisory opinion". An advisory opinion is not necessarily conclusive. There is an implication that the parties are not legally bound to follow it. But, in the Tunisian and Moroccan case, the parties had agreed to accept it.

I am exceeding my time, and fear that I am deranging the radio, but I do want to say something about the opinion of the Court in the Eastern Carelian case, which relates to a territory lying between Finland and Russia. This territory was dealt with in a treaty of peace between Finland and Russia, but disputes subsequently arose as to the interpretation and obligation of the treaty. The matter was brought by Finland before the Council of the League of Nations. Russia was not a member of the League. The Council therefore hesitated to deal with the matter. Eventually a resolution was adopted to the effect that it would be agreeable to the Council if some power in diplomatic relations with Russia would suggest to Russia the submission of the matter to the League. Such a suggestion was made, but the Russian Government repulsed it and declined to accept the interposition of the League. The matter was then brought back to the Council, and the Council eventually sent it to the Court with a request for an advisory opinion on the basis of proofs or representations which, as the request said, the parties might equally submit.

When the request was received by the Court, the parties, including Russia, were notified, but again