conference out September 21, 1976.13 The conference report was adopted by the House on September 27, and by the Senate on September 28, 1976, and the bill was signed by the President on October 1, 1976 (Public Law 94-441).

ARMS SALES

The continued large-scale sales of armaments, particularly to the Middle East, stimulated increased congressional interest in gaining additional control or oversight over this program.

The major provision of law which gave Congress approval or disapproval authority over cash sales of arms was contained in section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act. This section (the NelsonBingham amendment) adopted in 1974 required that any letter of offer to sell defense articles or services in the amount of $25 million or more would be submitted to the Congress prior to being issued, and would not be issued if the Congress, within 20 calendar days after receiving such statement, adopted a concurrent resolution stating that it objects to the proposed sale. This provision would be waived, however, if the President certified that an emergency existed which required such sale in the national security interests of the United States. The first test of section 36(b) in 1976 came on February 17, when Congress received seven separate notifications of proposed sales to Saudi Arabia:

Congressman Rosenthal, on February 19, and Congressmen Drinan and Ottinger, on February 26, introduced resolutions to disapprove these sales (H. Con. Res. 554 through 568). Open hearings on these resolutions were held by the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs on March 1, 1976, and the resolutions were tabled by the full committee on February 23 and March 3.14 No resolutions of disapproval for these proposed sales were introduced in the Senate. A more controversial and precedent-setting use of section 36(b) occurred in March 1976 and concerned the proposed sale by the United States of airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft to NATO. On February 27, the Department of Defense notified Congress, pursuant to the requirements of section 36(b), of its intention to issue a letter of offer to NATO for the sale of 32 AWACS aircraft at a cost of $2.2 billion. On March 4, Senator Eagleton introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 99, and on March 8,

13 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation bill, 1977. Report to accompany H.R. 14260, June S. 1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Rept. No. 94-1228. Ibid. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation bill, 1977. Report to accompany H.R. 14260. June 29, 1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Rept No. 94-1009. Ibid. House. Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30. 1977. Conference report to accompany H.R. 14260, Sept. 21, 1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess.. Rept. No. 94-1642.

14 U.S. Congress. Committee on International Relations. Proposed Foreign Military Sales to Middle East Countries-1976. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Feb. 23, Mar. 1, and Sept. 21, 1976.

Congresswoman Schroeder introduced House Concurrent Resolution 576 to disapprove this sale.

The principal objection to this sale focused primarily upon the proper use and functioning of section 36 (b) itself. Opponents of the sale alleged that the notification was premature in that NATO had not decided to purchase these aircraft and that the notification was therefore also inaccurate in that the number of aircraft to be sold, the prospective purchaser(s) and the total cost were not yet known and were probably not as represented in the notification to Congress. The Department of Defense maintained, on the other hand, that early notification of this prospective sale was required by section 36(b) before specific details of the sale had been negotiated.

The House International Relations Committee and the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on these respective resolutions. Although neither committee approved these resolutions of disapproval, both expressed reservations concerning the method of notification. Senator Humphrey, chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, indicated to the Department of Defense that as the negotiating process in this sale advanced, the committee desired to be kept informed of developments and, if there were significant changes in any of the particulars of the sale, that a new notification should be submitted.15 The House International Relations Committee adopted a resolution indicating that it did not have sufficient information with which to fulfill its responsibilities under section 36(b) with respect to this proposed sale. The resolution further requested the President to submit a revised statement when more specific information concerning the proposed offer of sale became available. The resolution also stated that the committee had made no judgment with respect to the proposed offer of sale and would consider a new submission without prejudice.16

On March 25, 1976, the Department of Defense submitted under section 36(b) a notification of proposed sale of six C-130 cargo planes to Egypt. According to press reports, the Department of State had earlier notified the relevant congressional committees informally of this proposed departure from previous U.S. policy in an attempt to test congressional reaction and thereby to avoid a possible legislativeexecutive confrontation and a potentially embarrassing vote on the emotionally charged issue of making military equipment available to Israel's prime antagonist. Press reports indicated that several Senators (including Senators Humphrey, Javits, and Case) had suggested to the Secretary of State that the sale be conducted through commercial channels rather than through Government channels." But a commercial sale would have had less symbolic importance, and the President apparently wanted the issue to be resolved by Congress. Also, legislation then in conference (S. 2662, the Security Assistance Authorization for fiscal year 1976) would have banned commercial sales of more than $25 million without congressional approval.

15 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Proposed Sale of AWACS to NATO. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, 94th Cong., 2d sess., on S. Con. Res. 99. Mar. 12, 1976. p. 33.

16 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Sale of AWACS to NATO. Hearing, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 18. 1976.

17 "Kissinger and 3 Senators Meet on Egypt Arms Issue," New York Times, Mar. 26, 1976,

In this case, there was little or no concern about these transport aircraft having any substantial military importance. Proponents of the sale saw it as a symbolic gesture to demonstrate support of the United States for the policies of Egyptian President Sadat in order to encourage Egypt's continuing constructive role toward a Middle East peace agreement. Opponents of the sale questioned the longer term implications, specifically whether this sale marked the beginning of a long-term relationship in which the United States would become a major arms supplier to Egypt.

During hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Mar. 31 and Apr. 2) and before the House International Relations Committee (Apr. 6), executive branch witnesses, headed by Secretary of State Kissinger, offered assurances that there would be no further arms requests for Egypt in 1976, and that training to be given to 20 Egyptian officers in 1976 would not involve U.S. military secrets.18 On April 13, the House committee passed a motion to table, and therefore kill, the disapproval resolutions. No disapproval resolutions had been introduced in the Senate concerning this particular sale.

As indicated above, the President on June 30, 1976, signed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329). This act, in addition to the modifications in the military assistance program already mentioned, also attempted to exert increase congressional control over the cash military sales programs of the United States. The intent of the Congress was expressed by the change in title of the Foreign Military Sales Act to the Arms Export Control Act. Among the major new provisions which were intended to give Congress additional information and control over arms sales were the following:

1. Section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act was amended to provide that the President shall submit to the Congress notification of any proposed sale for $25 million or more of defense articles or services or for $7 million or more of major defense equipment prior to issuing a letter of offer. The letter of offer shall not be issued if the Congress, within thirty (30) calendar days after receiving such notification, adopts a concurrent resolution stating that it objects to the proposed sale, unless the President states in his notification that an emergency exists which requires such sale in the national security interests of the United States.

2. Not less than 30 days prior to the issuance of an export license for the commercial sale of any major defense equipment in the amount of $7 million or more or defense articles and services of $25 million or more, the President shall transmit to Congress notification of the proposed sale.

3. No sale for the export of major defense equipment in the amount of $25 million or more, except to members of NATO, would be made through commercial channels.

4. The President may not give his consent to the transfer of U.S. defense articles from one country to another unless he so reports such transfer to the Congress 30 days prior to giving such consent.

5. The Secretary of State shall require reports to be made concerning political gifts, contributions, gifts, commissions, and fees paid in connection with sales of defense articles and services. The President may prohibit, limit, or prescribe conditions with respect to such payments.

The new provisions of the Arms Export Control Act quickly faced a test in the Congress when, on August 24, 1976, the Department of Defense forwarded six notifications of proposed letters of offer to sell

18 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Proposed Sale of C-130's to Egypt. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on Proposed Cash Sale to Egypt of Six C-130 Aircraft and Training of Egyptian Personnel, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 31 and Apr. 2, 1976. Ibid. House. Committee on International Relations. Proposed Sale to Egypt of C-130 Aircraft. Hearing and markup before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 6 and 12, 1976.

defense articles and equipment to Israel and Iran, including F-16 aircraft to Iran. On September 1, the Defense Department forwarded 37 additional notifications of proposed sales. These 37 notifications included proposed sales of some $6.024 billion to 11 different countries. Included in this group were proposed sales of 650 Maverick missiles and 850 Sidewinder missiles to Saudi Arabia.

Large sales of military equipment to Iran and to Saudi Arabia, in particular, had already attracted congressional attention. In July, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had published a staff report of its Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance concerning U.S. military sales to Iran.19 The study concluded that for at least 3 years U.S. arms sales to Iran had been out of control and the programs were poorly managed. A 1972 decision by President Nixon to let Iran buy, in general, anything it wanted, the study found, effectively exempted Iran from arms sales review procedures in the Department of State and Department of Defense.

The administration, on June 11, 1976, had submitted to the Congress a prenotification of the intention to sell 2,000 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia. At that time, questions had been raised by Members of Congress over the magnitude of the sale, which_many considered to be far in excess of feasible Saudi defense needs. It was feared that such a large sale could allow Saudi Arabia to transfer these missiles to other Arab states, where they might be used against Israel. Because of this congressional concern, the administration delayed its formal notification of the proposed sale of Sidewinders, and on August 26 and 27, 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session to testify on this proposed sale. During the course of this testimony, it was reported, Kissinger also revealed administration plans to sell Saudi Arabia 1,500 Maverick air-to-ground missiles and 1,000 TOW antitank missiles. The proposed sale of Maverick missiles raised additional concern in the Congress. Saudi Arabia was already receiving 1,000 Mavericks based on a February order, and an additional 1,500 units of this sophisticated missile again seemed excessive for the 114 operational F-5 aircraft that Saudi Arabia would possess by 1981.

At the end of August, therefore, Senators Humphrey, Javits, and Case initiated negotiations with the administration in order to eliminate the Maverick sale and substantially reduce the Sidewinder sale. The administration, during this period, agreed to reduce the sale initially to 1,000 Sidewinders and 1,000 Mavericks, and finally to the 850 Sidewinders and 650 Mavericks that were finally submitted to Congress on September 1.

The Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance held public hearings on the proposed sale of 160 F-16 aircraft to Iran on September 16 and on the proposed sale of Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia on September 21. The full committee held hearings on both subjects on September 24. On that day the committee considered and rejected a concurrent resolution by Senators Clark and Biden disapproving 19 sales to the 3 Persian Gulf countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait). The full committee then approved Senate Concurrent Resolution 161, introduced by Senator Nelson, disapproving the sale of Maverick

19 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Military Sales to Iran. A staff report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, July 1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess., committee print.

missiles to Saudi Arabia (Senator Proxmire had offered a similar resolution, S. Con. Res. 193).20 The measure was sent to the Senate and placed on the calendar for subsequent floor action.

Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, Mr. Rosenthal and others introduced resolutions to disapprove the proposed sales to Saudi Arabia and to Iran (H. Con. Res. 738 through 740, 747, 750, 755, 756, 757, 760, 764, 765, 766, 769, 770, 774-777). A subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee held a hearing on these resolutions on September 21 but delayed action pending the Senate committee action.21 After the Senate committee vote, the House committee hastily called a meeting for Monday, September 27, at 10:30 a.m. Under House rules, the committee would have had to act on a resolution of disapproval by Monday in order to insure floor action by Friday, October 1, the last day of the 30-day period allowed for congressional action. The committee, however, was unable to produce a quorum at 10:30 a.m. on a Monday morning, and no action was taken. This effectively killed any chance for a resolution of disapproval to succeed.

The decision by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to object to the sale of Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia had, moreover, caused an uproar in the administration. There were press reports that Saudi Arabia was contemplating a new oil embargo against the United States in retaliation for being thus singled out by the Congress. On September 27, the measure was withdrawn from the calendar on a unanimous consent request by Chairman John Sparkman (with only five members on the floor). Senator Sparkman indicated that he had received a call from Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller "telling me that the administration was greatly disturbed about the committee's decision on the sale of Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia." Sparkman indicated that his action in re-referring the issue to the committee would give Secretary of State Kissinger, who had returned from his African shuttle mission the day the committee voted against the sale, the opportunity to present his arguments for proceeding with the sale. Senator Case, ranking Republican member of the committee, who had not been informed of Sparkman's action, called it "an inexcusable breach of courtesy." Sparkman later apologized to Case, saying that "I should have waited until I could have gotten in touch with the Senator."

Secretary of State Kissinger testified before the committee in executive session on September 28. He indicated that a veto of the Maverick sale would have serious foreign policy consequences and could affect "our basic relationships with Saudi Arabia and the prospect of stability and moderation in the Middle East." Based on his testimony, the committee reversed its vote to disapprove the sale and tabled the resolution.

The vote on the sale of missiles to Saudi Arabia reflected the dilemma of the committee in attempting to exercise control over administration arms sales polices. "To single out Saudi Arabia is a danger," Senator

20U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Sale of Missiles to Saudi Arabia. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 161, Rept. No. 94-1305, Sept. 24, 1976.

21 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Proposed Foreign Military Sales to Middle Eastern Countries-1976. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Feb. 23, Mar. 1, and Sept. 21, 1976, pp. 65-100.