On March 3, 12, and 24, 1976, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty. On May 20, 1976, the committee favorably reported the treaty and recommended its ratification. In a declaration added to the resolution of ratification the committee noted that the ratification applied only to the initial 5-year period of the treaty and that normal authorizing and appropriating legislation would be required for the release of funds under the Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation Regarding Material for Armed Forces that was appended to the treaty.

On June 21, 1976, the Senate approved the treaty 84-11. By a vote of 91-4 the declarations added to the resolution of ratification by the committee were also approved. The treaty was ratified by Spain at a later date and on September 21, 1976, it entered into force. The treaty and its supplementary agreements will remain in effect for 5 years, after which they may be extended for another 5-year period should the two governments agree to such an extension. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee added the fourth point to its declaration, which was made a part of the resolution of ratification, to make known the Senate's "expectation" that Senate advice and consent will be sought by the executive branch "prior to entering into any extension agreement" with Spain for another 5 years.*

The chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Representative Thomas E. Morgan, pointed out, in a March 24, 1976 letter to Senator John Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that unless the Senate included a reservation to the Spanish Treaty preventing it, the authorizing language included in that treaty would effectively eliminate, in the case of that particular treaty, the constitutional role of the House of Representatives in authorizing appropriations relative to the fulfillment of security treaty commitments. Chairman Morgan asked that such a reservation be attached to the Spanish Treaty by the Senate. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee filed its report on the treaty it took particular note of the authorization issue and dealt with it through point 5 of its declaration. Subsequent to Senate ratification of the Spanish Treaty, and passage of the implementing legislation by the Senate, the House International Relations Committee held markup sessions on the implementing bill on July 29, and August 4, 1976, and formally recommended its passage, thereby reaffirming the House's right to pass on this legislation. The House passed the implementing legislation (S. 3557) in lieu of H.R. 14940, on September 14, 1976. The conference report on S. 3557 passed the House on September 30, and the Senate on October 1. The President signed S. 3557 (Public

3 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Spanish Base Treaty. Hearings on Ex. E., 94th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 3, 12, and 24, 1976. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

• Congressional Record [daily ed.], vol. 122, June 21, 1976, pp. S9964-S9978, S9996. For consideration of issues related to the Spanish treaty by the House International Relations Committee see: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation With Spain. Hearings on H.R. 14940, 94th Cong., 2d sess., June 8 and 16, 1976. Also see U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Markup sessions on S. 3557, 94th Cong., 2d sess., July 29, and Aug. 4, 1976. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on implementing legislation for the Spanish treaty was released on June 11, 1976, S. Rept. 94-941. The House International Relations Committee report on implementing legislation was released on Aug. 5, 1976, H. Rept. 94-1393. The conference report on implementing the Spanish treaty was filed in the House on Sept. 28,

Law 94-375), which authorized the appropriation of one-fifth of the amounts called for in the various categories of the Spanish Treaty."

DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY

When the Congress chose not to resume military assistance and sales to Turkey in late July 1975, the Turkish Government announced that the Defense Cooperation Agreement of July 3, 1969, governing "common defense cooperation between Turkey and the U.S.A. and all other related agreements had lost their validity." This action resulted in the suspension of activities at certain key intelligence collecting installations maintained by the United States in Turkey.

Since then the U.S. Government has sought to resolve the problem. The Turkish Government viewed as a "positive" step, the partial lifting of the embargo on arms sales to Turkey by congressional action on October 3, 1975. However, this was not considered by the Turks to be justification for permitting the U.S. to resume use of the bases. On October 28, 1975, the United States and Turkey reopened negotiations, and on March 26, 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger and Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan S. Caglayangil signed a new 4-year Defense Cooperation Agreement. If approved, this will replace the 1969 United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement and its annexes (a classified executive agreement) and will permit the United States to reopen its bases. The document was submitted to the Congress by the President accompanied by a draft joint resolution on June 16, 1976.6

The proposed new defense cooperation agreement between the United States and Turkey specifically notes that the "extent of the defense cooperation envisaged in this agreement shall be limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty," and that the installations shall not be used for, nor shall the activities serve, purposes other than those authorized by" the Government of Turkey. The agreement would restore to the United States the right to use, under mutually agreed guidelines, the intelligence collecting installations whose activities were suspended following the cutoff of military aid to Turkey in 1975, as well as insure the continued usage of the other U.S. military installations currently maintained in Turkey for a 4-year period."

The proposed new agreement stipulates that the United States shall furnish Turkey with $1 billion in defense support in the form of "grants, credits and loan guarantees" during the 4-year period, with the grant portion to be $75 million in the first year. Over the 4-year period the grant portion is to be "not less than" $200 million. During this same time period the United States commits itself, under the agreement, to make military sales to Turkey involving a variety of aircraft, naval vessels and related defense articles, components and services. Should the two governments agree, the proposed agreement could be extended for an additional 4-year period. The congressional role in such an extension is not specified by the proposed Turkish

agreement.

5 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Spanish Base Treaty, op. cit., p. 149. See Ex. Rept. 94-25, May 20, 1976.

U.S. Congress. House. Defense Cooperation Agreement With Turkey. H. Doc. 94-531, 94th Cong., 2d sess., June 16, 1976. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1976. ↑ Ibid.

Ibid.

On June 18, 1976, Senator John Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by request, introduced Senate Joint Resolution 204, which was to serve as the legislative vehicle for congressional approval of the proposed Turkish agreement. A single day of hearings was held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 15, 1976, at which administration officials testified. No further action was taken by the committee prior to adjournment by the 94th Congress, nor was a companion joint resolution introduced in the House. Therefore, the issue of the Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement carries over to the 95th Congress."

ANTICIPATED DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH GREECE

On April 15, 1976, representatives of the United States and Greece approved a statement outlining the principles which would guide future United States-Greek defense cooperation. This statement, which was transmitted to Congress on April 28, would seek to complete "as soon as possible" a new defense cooperation agreement that would replace the agreement on United States-Greek military facilities signed in 1953 and other related agreements. The statement further indicated that the new agreement would be designed to reflect the "traditionally close association" between the Greeks and the United States and the "mutuality of their defense interests in the North Atlantic Alliance." In addition, the new agreement, when completed, would "define the status and set forth the terms for operations of military installations in Greece where United States personnel are present."

Negotiations to conclude a new United States-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement based upon the above stated principles began in early May 1976. To date they have not been concluded. It is not anticipated that any agreement will be reached until sometime in 1977.

ANTICIPATED MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT WITH THE PHILIPPINES

On April 12, 1976, the United States and the Philippines formally opened negotiations on a new agreement to govern the use of two major U.S. military bases and associated facilities. Issues under review between the two governments may lead to the most fundamental redrafting of the United States-Philippine military bases agreement since the basic accord entered into force on March 26, 1947.10

In view of the many significant questions involved in the current negotiations between the two governments, talks have proceeded slowly and carefully. The date that the new agreement will be signed cannot be projected at this time. It is conceivable that the accord could be available for congressional review in 1977.

Should negotiations proceed successfully on both the United StatesGreek Defense Cooperation Agreement and the United StatesPhilippines Military Bases Agreement, Congress could find itself in 1977 considering three separate defense-related agreements, as the new United States-Turkish agreement is still pending on the congressional agenda.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. United States-Turkey Defense Cooperation Agreement. Hearing on S.J. Res. 204, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 15, 1976. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 10 11 U.S.T. [Bevins], 55-73.

WEAPONS SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENTS

SIZE AND BUILDUP OF THE NAVY *

"Changes in relative naval strength," in the words of one analyst, "have always been closely watched in other nations on the assumption that the size of a country's conventional naval force reflects its willingness and ability-to affect political events." In 1976 the Congress debated the size and composition of the Navy because of uncertainty over its proper mission and disagreement among experts as to whether the U.S. Navy remains capable of prevailing over the Soviet Navy in a war after declining in size over 50 percent during the past several years. Specific issues in the debate concerned the size of the shipbuilding program to be sustained in fiscal year 1977, whether nuclear propulsion should be required for all surface ships intended to be a part of the striking force, and whether to replace conventionally powered aircraft carriers with large nuclear carriers as they retire at the end of their service lives.

Size of the shipbuilding program

The Armed Services Committees of both Houses of Congress, concerned with the decline in the number of ships and rate of acquisition of new ships as they affected U.S. Navy capability relative to that of the Soviet Union, had inserted a requirement in the 1976 Defense Department Authorization Act (Public Law 94-106) requiring the President to submit annually a 5-year shipbuilding program. In response, the President proposed in January 1976 that an average of 22 ships be built each year for 5 years commencing with fiscal year 1977, but called specifically for only 16 new ships to be built in fiscal year 1977. He later amended his request for the fiscal year 1977 program to 21 ships, based on preliminary findings of a National Security Council study of the size and composition of the Navy. However a large backlog of cost growth and escalation on ships funded by Congress in prior years raised an issue over whether to proceed with this accelerated progra n or to fund this backlog.

Nuclear power for surface ships

The President's budget requested funding for the first of a new class of conventionally powered guided-missile destroyers, and advance funding for the first of a new class of nuclear powered guided-missile cruisers, called strike cruisers, that would be capable of independent missions. Both classes would be fitted with the Aegis weapon system, an expensive fleet air defense system designed to be effective against

• Prepared by Alva M. Bowen, Jr., specialist in national defense.

1 Barry M. Blechman. The Control of Naval Armaments. Washington, the Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 1.

the kind of intense air and missile opposition expected in high threat areas.2

The request for a conventionally powered class of major combatant ships challenged a strongly held conviction by nuclear power advocates that aircraft carriers should all be nuclear powered and should be accompanied by nuclear powered escorts (destroyers and cruisers). Conventionally powered destroyers would presumably be assigned to conventionally powered carriers, and starting a new class of conventionally powered destroyers at this time implies a lack of commitment to replacing conventionally powered carriers with nuclear powered carriers as they retire for age.

Replacement of conventionally powered aircraft carriers on their retirement The key shipbuilding decision that must soon be made is how to replace the capability resident in 11 conventionally powered aircraft carriers as they reach the ends of their nominal service lives. Two large nuclear powered carriers are under construction as replacements for the Midway class carriers that were completed in 1946-47. Whether to extend the program to include replacements for the Forrestal class ships built during the 1950's and 1960's has been challenged on grounds that the ships are too expensive, that carriers are too vulnerable and our naval striking power should be more widely dispersed than in the 12-13 carriers we can afford to operate, and that the concept of a large carrier with its load of manned aircraft is obsolete and should be replaced by a more modern weapon system concept that would not require so large a ship. Carrier advocates point. out that the principal advantages the U.S. Navy has over the Soviet Navy is the striking power of its carrier air wings and strongly contend that the United States must maintain 12 or 13 carriers or surrender control of the sea in essential regions.

Authorizations

As finally passed by the Congress, the fiscal year 1977 shipbuilding authorization did not contain authorization for either the nuclear powered strike cruiser or the conventionally powered guided-missiledestroyer. However, Public Law 94-361, the Department of Defense Authorization Act 1977, approved on July 14, 1976 (H.R. 12438) included authorization for 17 new ships, advance funding for a nuclear carrier, and for conversion of the nuclear cruiser, Long Beach, to strike cruiser configuration.

Appropriations

The fiscal year 1977 shipbulding appropriation approved by Congress in Public Law 94-419, the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1977, contains only 15 new ships:

1 Trident submarine,

3 SSN 688 nuclear powered attack submarines,

8 guided missile frigates,

1 fleet oiler,

2 Both of these ships are encompassed by title VIII of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975 (Public Law 93-365) which provides that “All requests for authorizations or appropriations from Congress for major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy shall be for construction of nuclear powered major combatant vessels for such forces unless and until the President has fully advised the Congress that construction of such nuclear powered vessels for such purpose is not in the national interest."