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Congress has used foreign aid legislation in recent years as a means of setting out U.S. policy toward countries which violate human rights standards. Although in 1976 Congress proved willing to step back from a position it had taken regarding its control of human rights policy in legislation which was vetoed by President Ford, its legislative directives on this subject have consistently become stronger over the past several years.

U.S. policy on international oceans issues has been significantly directed by congressional action in 1976. By approving legislation to establish a 200-mile fishing zone, while not acting on proposals for unilateral U.S. action on licensing for deep sea mining, Congress has shaped the U.S. policy options at the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, which is attempting to draft an international Law of the Sea Treaty. Congressional impact on the development of U.S. policy toward the various regions of the world is frequently difficult to analyze very specifically. The impact of Congress is perhaps most visible in the case of the Middle East, where its positions have tended to be more sympathetic to Israeli Government requests for aid than has that of the executive branch. However, in other less volatile parts of the world, Congress function has generally been one of reviewing policy decisions which flow from the executive branch, rather than actually setting the directions of U.S. policy.

RELATIONS AMONG THE GREAT POWERS

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION*

GROWING CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST

Soviet-American relations remained a focal point of Congress foreign policy interests in 1976, as Congress considered nearly every aspect of this relationship during the year. Détente, Soviet-American trade, arms negotiations, military balance, human rights in the Soviet Union, and continued Soviet-American rivalry in the Third World were all subjects of congressional concern. Committee hearings and subsequent legislative actions indicated that previously expressed intentions that Congress play a more active role in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy were increasingly becoming a reality. As a result, congressional actions in 1976 affected many facets of SovietAmerican relations.

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DÉTENTE: CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

Détente was a central issue of public and congressional debate in 1976. Despite events of a potentially erosive nature, such as the Angola crisis, Congress continued to support détente though some members did express increased skepticism regarding Soviet commitment. Senate Resolution 406, introduced in March of 1976, expressed Senate support for improved Soviet-American relations as long as unilateral concessions on the part of the United States were not involved. This "sense of the Senate" resolution, while it did not call for specific legislative action, represented a definitive statement by the Senate of its position on détente. The major provisions in the resolution were: the conclusion of a balanced strategic arms limitation agreement, the demonstration by both the United States and the Soviet Union of mutual restraint and commitment to peace, and expanded relations through prudent initiatives. Although passage of the resolution was delayed as a result of controversial wording which some Senators felt was pointedly anti-Reagan, an amended version was passed on May 5 by an 86-7 vote.3

Later in the year, on August 31 and September 2, the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Political

*Prepared by William Inglee, research assistant in Soviet and East European affairs. 1 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Relations With the Soviet Union. Report, Apr. 23, 1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. 94-758. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, 4 pp.

2 Ibid., pp. 2-3.

Congressional Record (daily ed.) vol. 122, May 5. 1976, p. S6599. The language in question referred to "strident voices" critical of détente. Some members considered this an unwarranted attack on the Presidential campaign of Ronald Reagan. Therefore, this section was removed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which reported the bill back to the Senate on April 23. U.S.-Soviet Negotiations. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 34, No. 19, May 8, 1976, p. 1148.

and Military Affairs held hearings on the current state of SovietAmerican Relations. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, State Department Counselor and Secretary Kissinger's chief adviser on Soviet bloc affairs, and Paul Nitze, a well-known expert on international affairs were among the witnesses who testified before the subcommittee.*

Thus, in 1976, congressional actions illustrated continued interest in the state of Soviet-American relations and general support for détente.

MILITARY BALANCE

The Soviet-American military "balance" continued to be an important area of congressional concern in 1976.5 Many members of Congress were disturbed by the Soviet Union's growing military strength. Some members suggested that this growth might eventually lead to the U.S.S. R. surpassing the United States in military power.' Therefore, the Department of Defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 1977 was carefully considered by Congress in light of these perceived developments in the Soviet-American military balance. Special attention was given to the issue of defining the current status of the Soviet-American military balance. From the congressional perspective the answer to this question was fundamental for the full understanding of U.S. military needs."

Information on comparative Soviet-American military capabilities was solicited from the various U.S. intelligence agencies. Congressional testimony by George Bush, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Wilson, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, offered intelligence estimates of the current status of the Soviet defense effort.10

Congressional approval of the record-high 1977 military budget demonstrated the continued desire of Congress to maintain a strong military position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs. U.S.-USSR Relations and Strategic Balance. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Aug. 31 and Sept. 2, 1976. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, 53 pp.

5 For a more detailed discussion of this subject see pp. 77-79.

See debate on the Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977. Congressional Record [daily ed.] House, vol. 122, June 17. 1976, pp. H6059-H6136 (in particular see remarks by Mahon, Edwards, and Kemp); Congressional Record, Remarks in the Senate, vol. 122. June 17, 1976, pp. S13911-S13954 (in particular see remarks by Harry F. Byrd, Jr., Taft, and Laxalt).

Ibid., see also U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1977. Report. June 8, 1976. 94th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. No. 94-1231. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. p. 8.

8 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on the Department of Defense. Department of Defense appropriations for 1977. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., pts. 1-8. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., pts. 1-5. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., pts. 1-4. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1976.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Fiscal Year 1977 Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., pts. 1-13. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

See floor debates and hearings on the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for 1977 for both House and Senate.

10 U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1976. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., May 24, and June 15, 1977, pt. 2. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, 122 pp.

ARMS CONTROL

1976 was a disappointing year for U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control talks." Both SALT II and the Mutual Balance Force Reduction talks stalled as a result of the uncompromising positions of the participants. In SALT II, the Soviet Backfire bomber and the U.S. cruise missile remained the major stumbling blocks. While many members of Congress voiced their disapproval at this lack of progress, they also made it very clear that congressional approval for any new SALT agreement would be forthcoming only if it was determined that the agreement was not detrimental to U.S. national security interests.

The necessity of congressional approval of a new SALT agreement made it likely that the position of Congress on any proposed agreement be taken into careful consideration by the negotiators. The administration's awareness of this condition was illustrated when it was reported that an unnamed administration official had stated quite bluntly that the Soviet Backfire bomber must be included in any new agreement without special concessionary provisions or "Congress would not ratify such an agreement." 12

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Trade between the Soviet Union and the United States remained an important issue in 1976. The increased politicization of this trade was viewed by many Members of Congress as a positive development in U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's perceived need for trade with the United States was seen as a weakness, and many observers felt that Soviet economic needs could provide the United States with leverage to obtain political concessions from the Soviet Union. Some Members of Congress suggested that since Moscow had shown a strong interest in American grain and high technology, the withholding of these two items would have the greatest utility in any "quid pro quo" situation. Thus, Soviet-American trade was seen as an important area of congressional involvement in foreign policy. As a result, despite administration protests, Congress, continued to tie political considerations closely to the overall development of Soviet-American trade.

Of particular interest to Congress was the Soviet-American grain trade. A staff report prepared by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations examined Soviet interest in purchasing grain from the United States in the future, possible Soviet motivations for such purchases, and policy alternatives for the United States.14

Another area of congressional concern was technology transfer to the Soviet Union. Hearings held in March of 1976 on "Export Licensing of Advanced Technology" dealt primarily with the question of technology transfer to Communist countries.15 The focus of these

11 For a detailed discussion of this subject see pp. 104-105.

12 Aviation Week and Space Technology. SALT 1-2 (Special Issue), 1976, p. 114. 13 For a more detailed discussion of this subject see pp. 131-134.

14 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. U.S.S.R. and Grain, Committee print, 94th Cong., 2d sess., April 1976. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, 33 pp.

15 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce. Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 11, 15, 24, and 30, 1976. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, 276 pp.

hearings concerned establishing effective export control criteria which would prevent the transfer of defense related technology to Communist countries while at the same time allowing for increased technological trade.

Congress also held related hearings on the extension of the Export Control Act of 1969.16 However, congressional action extending this legislation was not forthcoming, leaving the act inoperative as of September 30, 1976.17

No major initiatives were taken by either Congress or the President in 1976 to grant the Soviet Union most-favored-nation (MFN) status or to allow Government-sponsored credit extensions to the Soviet Union (Eximbank). The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act continued to block either of these trade facilitating mechanisms. Yet despite these inhibiting factors, Soviet-United States trade continued to grow in 1976.18

THE "SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE"

In early 1976, a published report of a statement by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, State Department Counselor and Secretary of State Kissinger's chief adviser on Soviet bloc affairs, concerning Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe disturbed many Members of Congress. In essence, the so-called "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" suggested that it was in the U.S. national interest to encourage a more "organic" relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since this would eliminate what Sonnenfeldt described as a very unstable political situation in Eastern Europe. Public as well as congressional reaction to this published report was largely negative. Congress, which had long publicly supported East European independence, found the Sonnenfeldt doctrine in direct contradiction to its own policy position. Congressional hearings on this issue were held in April of 1976.19 In response, the State Department denied that the Sonnenfeldt statement was a departure from existing policy, and reiterated the commitment of the United States to East European independence.

THE GREAT POWER TRIANGLE

The triangular relationship of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China, was still another area of congressional interest in 1976. The House International Relations Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development continued hearings begun on this subject in late 1975.20 Experts from

14 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., June 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, and 16; Aug. 10, 24, 26, and 31; and Sept. 1, 1976, pts. 1 and 2. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

17 Currently Export Administration Act programs are being continued under the authority of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917. For a more detailed discussion of this subject see pp. 131-134.

18 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of East-West Trade. U.S. Trade Status With Socialist Countries. (Washington) Aug. 18, 1976, p. 1.

19 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. United States National Security Policy Vis-A-Vis Eastern Europe (The "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine"). Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 12, 1976. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, 67 pp.

20 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Oct. 21, Nov. 5, 19, Dec. 15. 1975; Mar. 10, 23. April 6, May 27, and June 23, 1976, pts. and II. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, 344 pp.

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