executive branch under the Executive order by which the security classification system exists. Efforts in the House to establish an intelligence committee were not successful. Decision on this matter may be an issue before the House in the 95th Congress.

The effort in the 94th Congress to gain more control over U.S. export of arms also produced mixed results. President Ford vetoed the first act passed in 1976 (S. 2662), which provided for congressional review and disapproval of specific arms sales, and this provision was eliminated from the law as finally approved. Language was adopted, however, by which Congress will be required to concur with the maintenance of military assistance advisory groups, and approval was given to the phased elimination of grant military assistance programs.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has been particularly concerned about U.S. arms exports, especially to Arab states in the Middle East, undertook in 1976 to block a proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia, but reversed itself after objections, including strenuous protests from the administration, that to do so would adversely affect U.S. diplomacy and could lead to higher oil prices. (It is worth noting that at the meeting of OPEC late in 1976 Saudi Arabia opposed the higher range of proposed increases in oil prices and declared that it would increase its oil prices by 5 percent rather than the 10 percent increase approved at the meeting, and increase its production to sustain its lower price.)

CONSIDERATION OF MILITARY AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS

8

The 94th Congress was also very active in the consideration of requests for authorization and appropriations for national defense and the support of foreign policy objectives. Consistent with trends in recent years, there was close examination of such requests, especially by the Senate Armed Services Committee, and there was also considerable debate, particularly in 1975, over the justification for and cost of proposed major weapons systems. The $7 billion appropriations cut in 1975 was followed by a $4 billion cut (from a larger request) in 1976, the smallest, both in percentage and amount, in recent years. Attempts to constrain the development and procurement of weapons systems appear to have been minimal, with the exception of a provision limiting production funding of the B-1 bomber until President Carter has had the opportunity to review requirements for the program.

Efforts to assure a closer connection between foreign policy goals and military activities and programs made limited progress during the 94th Congress. Opponents of increased U.S. military activity in the Indian Ocean succeeded only in passing the two amendments previously mentioned. This effort to define conditions under which the United States would establish a military base that is certain to affect U.S. foreign policy, was made in the context of decisions on military base construction and force deployment, where foreign policy considerations may be subordinated."

In 1975 Congress passed an amendment requiring the Secretary of Defense, in his annual "posture statement," to present a better

These trends are analyzed by Edward J. Laurance in The Changing Role of Congress in Defense Policy-Making, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 20 (June 1976), pp. 213-253.

explanation for and justification of the relationship between foreign policy and U.S. military capabilities and activities. The intent of this legislation was effectively weakened by the executive branch, as indicated by the fact that, as reported above (see p. 80), the 1976 posture statement "constituted a repudiation of the underlying premise" of the amendment.

The 94th Congress opted for few reductions in military authorizations and appropriations. Though efforts to require justification of those requests in terms of their support of foreign policy objectives produced few demonstrable results, the assertion of the role of Congress in this area seems to be gaining momentum. The size of the military budget and its impact on the economy, as well as the central importance of the Armed Forces in protecting the security of the Nation and in supporting foreign policy objectives, suggest that congressional activism in the defense field may continue.

OTHER MAJOR LEGISLATIVE INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES

In addition to its regular legislative activities in authorizing and appropriating funds for existing Government programs, the 94th Congress considered legislation dealing with significant foreign policy problems. It was especially active in three problem areas: nuclear proliferation, energy (primarily in the 1st sess.), and coastal and ocean legislation. In the latter case, consideration of domestic interests, coupled with the lack of consensus at the International Law of the Sea Conferences, resulted in enactment of the 200-mile limit bill to protect U.S. fishing and other offshore enterprises.

In the case of energy, the 94th Congress approved legislation to implement the executive agreement establishing the International Energy Agency (see Congress and Foreign Policy-1975, pp. 121–124), but action was not completed on the proposed U.S. contribution to the so-called "safety net" (OECD Financial Support Fund) by which to cushion the financial effects of increased oil prices (see pp. 152-153.) In the case of nuclear proliferation, various Members and committees of Congress attempted, with little success, to initiate more stringent controls over nuclear exports and related matters (see pp. 106-114), but these efforts may have established the basis for more successful legislation in the 95th Congress.

It should also be noted that in one major problem area-economic relationships with developing countries-the 94th Congress was generally inactive. This low level of involvement in an international issue of growing significance reflected in some measure the inactivity of the executive branch and domestic economic distress. While there were expressions of concern about the need for responding to the interests of the developing countries, and members and staff attended several international conferences on aspects of international economic policy, there have been no significant new legislative programs under active consideration. The last substantial action was the approval by the 93d Congress of preferential tariffs for developing countries. This is only one of a long list of actions that those countries have requested. The United States has subsequently indicated it will address others of these issues, but they constitute a set of problems that has not yet

been given substantial attention by the U.S. Government, in part because problems of energy, domestic economics, and nuclear proliferation seem to be more urgent.

A conspicuous decline has set in with respect to foreign economic assistance for the developing countries. Although there is now greater congressional support for the general foreign aid bill, stemming in large measure from the fact that it is now more effectively directed toward implementing the kind of populist goals that inspired support for the Point 4 Program, the size of that program is quite small by comparison to previous years. The dollar weight of U.S. economic assistance remains heavily focused on the relatively sophisticated, though heavily strained, Israeli economy, which receives more support than is spent on the U.S. aid program in all of the developing nations combined.

Multilateral development assistance has continued at levels that are considerably below those of earlier years. Congress decision not to appropriate funds pledged to the International Development Association has resulted in a major shortfall in support for this principal international source for assistance to the most needy countries. As will be discussed below, however, this situation results in part from conflicts between the executive branch and Congress or its committees, as well as between various committees of Congress. It is perhaps the best illustration of some of the problems that will increasingly be encountered by the U.S. Government in its participation in international institutions.

ORGANIZING FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION

During the 94th Congress, there were continued efforts to make Congress a more effective and responsible branch of government. In the House, the reforms initiated in the 93d Congress resulted in increased participation by the House International Relations Committee in important aspects of foreign policy-especially in the food aid and trade fields-which are primarily in the jurisdiction of other committees. Despite the heavy emphasis which the reform proposals placed on oversight, however, there was no noticeable increase in oversight on the part of the House International Relations Committee or the Government Operations Committee.

In the Senate, changes proposed during the 94th Congress may help to strengthen Senate participation in the foreign policy field. Here, too, there is strong emphasis on oversight, but experience with House reform suggests that increased oversight by Senate committees may be difficult to effectuate.

The proposals of the Hamilton subcommittee in its report on "Congress and Foreign Policy" would give the International Relations and Foreign Relations Committees a more central role in relation to the foreign policy questions with which Congress must deal. These proposals are designed to correct some of the problems which result from profusion of committees and diffusion of authority over foreign policy. Viewed from the perspective of congressional jurisdictions

U.S. Congress. Senate. Toward a Modern Senate. Final report of the Commission on the Operation of the Senate, December 1976 (S. Doc. 94-278). Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. pp. 41-51.

and foreign policy overlap with domestic functions and authority, their acceptance may prove difficult to secure.

The perceived need for better coordination within Congress, as well as for an institutional mechanism by which congressionalexecutive consultation can be more effectively organized and Congress can play a stronger role in crisis decisionmaking, has prompted various suggestions for a Joint Committee on National Security. This was proposed by the Murphy Commission, and has been tentatively supported by the State Department. Senator Mansfield, then Senate Majority Leader and a member of the Murphy Commission, rejected the idea, as did the Hamilton subcommittee in its report on "Congress and Foreign Policy." On the other hand, Congressman Zablocki, also a member of the Murphy Commission, and new chairman of the House International Relations Committee, supports the idea, as does Senator Humphrey, and efforts to establish such a committee may be resumed in the 95th Congress. Reservations currently expressed in both the Senate and the House concerning the practice of joint committees, however, bode ill for the proposal.

The discussion thus far leaves unanswered the question of improving the ability to Congress to handle more effectively the major policy issues which largely lie outside the jurisdiction of the committees traditionally responsible for foreign affairs issues so broad as to crosscut a number of committees. Energy and nuclear proliferation are two excellent examples, as earlier chapters in this paper have documented. This question takes on new meaning given the increasing importance of economic factors in foreign policy. If the issues of the future are progressively weighted in the direction of economic problems, either the traditional agendas and jurisdictions of the committees dealing with foreign affairs will have to be changed, or greater coordination among committees will have to occur, or both, in order to prevent even further diffusion and fragmentation in the congressional process. One possibility is the use of "task forces" similar to the National Ocean Policy Study Group in the Senate. Chaired by Senator Hollings, this is composed of members of the Commerce Committee, with seven other committees represented ex officio, and serves as the focal point for developing research and legislative proposals on the subject, thus helping to coordinate and integrate activity in this important area. The Hamilton subcommittee has proposed a similar device, designed especially for anticipating and handling "crisis" situations, in its suggestion for "ad hoc" congressional groups consisting of members from various committees and from both the Senate and the House.10

IMPROVED INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION

There is widespread feeling in Congress, as well as among students and observers of Congress, that in addition to the need for legislation which will more effectively define the roles and relationships of Congress and the Executive, as well as provide appropriate control over the Executive consistent with our constitutional framework, ways must be found to provide Congress with better current information, and to increase Congress participation in decisionmaking through improved executive-legislative consultation.

10 Congress and Foreign Policy, p. 7.

Access to information is viewed by many as the key to effective participation. When Congress lacks information, or when it is in the position of accepting only the executive branch perspective, it has difficulty participating knowledgeably and effectively in decisionmaking. Even the most extensive consultation, if based on inadequate information, can lead to faulty perceptions, and hence to flawed participation.

It is useful to note that in a study made in 1976 by the General Accounting Office at the request of the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, the response of Members of Congress surveyed by the GAO was that information about crisis situations is generally inadequate, and that mechanisms and procedures should be established by which to insure more adequate information. Respondents also strongly favored a more active role by Congress in crisis decisionmaking."

The information problem has been addressed repeatedly in recent years, and during the 93d and 94th Congresses there have been numerous proposals for improvements. On the one hand, there have been a number of proposals for strengthening and augmenting Congress information resources, as well as establishing or improving such institutional devices as the proposed questioning of Cabinet officers before the Senate and House, providing more briefings for members, and the like. On the other hand, there have been a number of suggestions for increasing congressional access to classified information by establishing a system of classification within Congress, and by defining Congress right to gain access to such information and to decide for itself what shall remain classified. The Hamilton subcommittee asserts that a statutory system for handling classified information would "guarantee Congress access to classified documents." The State Department takes the position, however, that although "there is a patent need to improve the flow of foreign policy information to the Congress," "approaching the problem of Congressional need for foreign policy information through the adoption of a classification statute seems to us of doubtful promise. It is difficult to envision how such a statute would provide a guarantee of Congressional access to classified materials." 12

The problem of information is directly linked to the problem of consultation. Both are functions of attitudes and expectations (or role definitions) in Congress and the Executive, as well as being affected by partisan political factors. Tensions produced by the Vietnam war, and the collapse of the post-World War II foreign policy consensus, have created conflict between Congress_and_the Executive which many observers predict will continue, even when Congress and the White House are controlled by the same party. This is based on the assumption that Congress will continue to assert itself, and that future Presidents will have to contend with Congresses which are determined to play a stronger role in foreign policymaking.

Growing demands placed on the U.S. Government as a result of increasing involvement in international rulemaking organizations add

11 Executive-Legislative Communications and the Role of the Congress During International Crisis, GAÖ Rept. ID-76-78, Sept. 3, 1976.

12 Congress and Foreign Policy, p. 11, and hearings on Congress and Foreign Policy, p. 303.