normalization of trade relations to U.S.S.R. cooperation. Congress acted to add a further link-Soviet concessions on emigration policy before U.S. trade benefits could be offered-by the Jackson-Vanik amendment to title IV of the trade bill.

Freedom of emigration became an issue because of Soviet restrictions on Jews wanting to emigrate. Nearly 100,000 have emigrated since 1970, when Soviet policy relaxed emigration bars. Sponsors of the trade-human rights linkage argued that the United States should not lose the opportunity, given Soviet interest in trade, to seek liberalization of the Soviet Union's emigration policy, which they considered necessary before better relations between the two countries could be established on a long-term bases.

These sentiments coincided with a view held by many in Congress that the Soviet Union was not offering enough for the benefits of improved relations with the United States. In addition, those opposed to the legislation saw support of the Jackson-Vanik amendment as a possible means for blocking the trade bill entirely.

During Senate Finance Committee hearings on the trade bill in March 1974, the administration stressed that first priority for U.S. diplomacy must be diminishing the threat of war with the U.S.S.R. Consequently, the administration maintained that the Jackson-Vanik amendment was not the proper vehicle to change the Soviet Union's society in view of its possibly jeopardizing other objectives of détente. At these hearings Secretary of State Kissinger said he would seriously consider recommending a veto of the trade bill if it included the emigration provisions.

Secretary Kissinger began seeking a compromise with the sponsors of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and with the Soviet Union, apparently encouraged by signs of Soviet willingness to satisfy Congress. Through the year pressure for such a compromise increased. Negotiations with the Soviets on arms limitations were lagging, and President Nixon's summit visit to Moscow in June provided no major advances for détente. Furthermore, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union was declining. Approximately 20,000 eventually left in 1974 compared to nearly 35,000 in 1973 and 30,000 in 1972. Finally, the United States could not enter important international trade talks without the authority granted by the trade bill, but the Senate Finance Committee delayed reporting it.

Finally, on October 18, 1974, Senator Jackson announced that an agreement had been reached which would permit Senate action on the trade bill. The legislation was to include the Jackson-Vanik provisions barring most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status and credits to non-market-economy countries that restricted emigration, but it would permit a Presidential waiver of the Jackson-Vanik terms. This agreement was based on "assurances" given by the administration based on an informal understanding reached through discussions with the Soviet Government. The agreement was embodied in an exchange of letters between Secretary Kissinger and Senator Jackson describing expected Soviet policy and guidelines to evaluate it.

According to the terms of the Trade Act of 1974 (January 3, 1975), the President has authority for 18 months to waive restrictions on credits and granting of most-favored-nation trade status to nonmarket-economy countries. To do so, however, he must be able to give assurances that the emigration practices of any country con

cerned "lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives" of the freedom of emigration provisions. In debate, Senator Jackson stated that he had personal assurances from President Ford that the President would in fact terminate trade benefits if a country did not live up to its assurances. The Trade Act also gives Congress the power to deny particular countries the trade concessions in question and to vote on extending the waiver authority for 1 year beyond the original 18-month period. Subsequent extension of the waiver authority for additional 1-year periods requires a report to Congress by the President. Upon submission of such a report, either House has 60 days to adopt a disapproval resolution to prevent the extension.

The Senate Finance Committee reported the trade bill on November 20, but stipulated that Secretary Kissinger testify on the compromise agreement before Senate debate on the legislation. The Secretary testified before the committee on December 3. Then on December 13, 1974, the Senate passed the Trade Act, 77 to 4. Senator Jackson's floor amendment establishing the Presidential waiver had been adopted unanimously 88 to 0. The conference report was approved on December 20.

The final version of the Trade Act included other restrictions on trade relations with Communist countries besides those connected with freedom of emigration. For the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to them it required bilateral trade agreements approved by a concurrent resolution of Congress. The act provided that previously signed agreements, such as that signed in October 1972 with the U.S.S.R., were subject to a congressional resolution of disapproval for 90 days from the date of enactment of the trade bill.

Other sections outlined procedures for protecting the United States from market disruption caused by import from Communist countries. Sections 410 and 411 provided for an East-West Foreign Trade Board and a monitoring system to oversee U.S. trade with Communist countries. The Senate and House also accepted an additional freedom of emigration amendment which bars trade benefits to those countries that deny their citizens the right or opportunity to join permanently through emigration a very close relative in the United States, or imposes more than a nominal tax or fee on such prospective emigrants.

The trade bill also requires a Presidential report every 6 months on the emigration practices of countries receiving nondiscriminatory tariff treatment under this legislation. During Senate debate on the trade. bill it was indicated that the Senate Permanent Investigating Committee of the Government Operations Committee, headed by Senator Jackson, would be given responsibility for monitoring Soviet emigration policy.

Congress also amended title VI of the Trade Act to include a limit on U.S. Government credits to the U.S.S.R. in excess of $300 million unless there was congressional approval for more. The Commodity Credit Corporation was exempted from this provision. A similar limitation was added to the Export-Import Bank bill. (See section on International Trade and International Economic Policy, and below.)

The Soviet Union has consistently decried trade restrictions tied to Soviet emigration policy as intervention in Soviet internal affairs. Nevertheless for a time the Soviet Union did evidence more favorable response to pressures from the United States and the international community over the emigration issue than might have been imagined several years ago.

In May 1974 a delegation from the Supreme Soviet led by politburo member Boris Ponomarev visited Congress to inaugurate interparliamentary relations and sound out Congress on détente. The delegation insisted there was no Jewish problem in the Soviet Union and asserted that the number of exit visa applications was decreasing. (American critics contended that increased harassment accounted for the drop in the emigration rate, and some analysts felt that new subtle restrictions were designed to show Congress that the Soviet Union could make support for the Jackson-Vanik amendment counterproductive.)

Later the Soviet reaction grew more adverse. Three days prior to Senator Jackson's October 18 press conference, Secretary-General Brezhnev warned Treasury Secretary William Simon in Moscow about "utterly irrelevant and unacceptable" conditions imposed by the United States on trade. Then on December 17, 1974, just before Congress was to take final action on the trade bill, the Soviet Union publicly released the text of a letter to Secretary Kissinger from Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko delivered on October 26, 1974, denying existence of any formal agreement on the emigration issue.

Although the administration has taken care to avoid implying that the October 18 letters represented a formal agreement with the Soviet Union, this was widely thought to be the case. Furthermore, the Gromyko letter may be seen as a dissatisfied response to the publicity given the accord, particularly that stemming from Senator Jackson's release of the October 18 letters at a White House press conference. The December release of the Gromyko note may also have been a final Soviet attempt to dissuade Congress from adopting the Jackson-Vanik provisions. Nevertheless, Congress did not alter the legislation. Sponsors of the Jackson-Vanik amendment discounted the Soviet Union declarations as face-saving, and held that the actual situation had not changed. Several of the trade bill conferees stated it would be up to the administration to "straighten it out with the Soviets" if any problem existed.

On January 14, 1975, Secretary Kissinger announced that the Soviet Government stated that it "does not intend to accept a trade status that is discriminatory and subject to political conditions and accordingly, that it will not put into force the 1972 Trade Agreement [signed with the United States]." Consequently under present conditions the Soviet Union will not receive most-favored-nation trade status and is ineligible for U.S. Export-Import Bank credits. The implications of this development for general U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations are not yet clear.

(2) Export Import Bank Act Amendments.-Soviet reaction to the trade bill was sharpened by the fact that Congress also restricted Export-Import Bank loans for the Soviet Union when it passed the Export-Import Bank Act (Public Law 93-646). (See section on International Trade and International Economic Policy.) The restrictions included a 4-year ceiling of $300 million on loans to the Soviet Union, with a higher ceiling subject to Presidential request and congressional approval; bans on loans to finance exports for Soviet fossil fuel resources production; and a limit of $40 million on loans for research and exploration of fossil energy in the U.S.S.R. The Department of State called the specific bans on the U.S.S.R. "grossly discriminatory," but Senator Adlai Stevenson denied that charge, saying the restric

tions were in keeping with a decision by Congress to review Bank activities more closely.

These restrictions resulted from concern about U.S. exports of scarce oil exploration equipment to the Soviet Union and fears of investment projects that anticipated Soviet payment in kind with energy resources. In addition, Members of Congress were critical of increasing U.S. dependence on an easily interruptible foreign source of energy.

The Bank's credit for the Soviet Union had also come under congressional scrutiny in 1974 in connection with the Jackson-Vanik amendment and the trade bill. Sponsors of the amendment wanted the Bank to halt such credit until Congress completed consideration of the trade legislation. During March 1974, the Bank did halt credit authorizations pending a decision whether each transaction required a Presidential determination saying it was in the national interest. The halt was prompted by a Government Accounting Office (GAO) study requested by Senator Richard Schweiker. When the Bank's authority expired on June 30, 1974, it ceased extending further credit to the Soviet Union. Continuing resolutions passed later by Congress expressly prohibited such credits pending final action on the trade bill.

Critics of the Bank's lending activities made the following points in favor of restricting the Bank's operations.

(1) The Soviet Union was benefiting from cheaper credit than that available for U.S. citizens.

(2) The United States was subsidizing cheap exports and technology transfers to a rival power that would thereby become stronger. (3) Uncontrolled bank financing might permit export sales paid for by energy imports, a condition leading to U.S. dependency on the Soviet Union.

(4) The Bank was exporting U.S. jobs by facilitating export of U.S. manufacturing capability.

(5) A relatively rich country like the U.S.S.R. should not require subsidized loans.

Those in Congress who supported the Bank and its activities pointed out that increased exports benefited the U.S. international payments position and provided jobs for Americans. They also noted that the Bank paid for itself, returning yearly dividends to the U.S. Treasury. Others were concerned about the negative effect on détente of severe investment curbs on the Soviet Union.

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The final legislation was approved on December 19, 1974. (3) Trade Relations and Security.-Congressional concern risks in technology transfer through trade with the Soviet Union was expressed in amendments to the Export Administration Act of 1969 (Public Law 93-500). (See section on International Trade and International Economic Policy.) The act as finally passed authorized the Secretary of Defense to review proposed exports of goods or technology to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. to determine the effect on the military capabilities of the countries concerned. Upon the Secretary's recommendation that a proposed export would significantly increase the military capability of such a country, the President was authorized to disapprove it. The administration's response to criticism on the issue was that the administration was balancing the strengthening of the Soviet economy "against advantages of drawing the Soviet Union into more normal international relations."

OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN THE

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CONDUCT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1

Resignation of the President.-The effect of the Watergate events on U.S. foreign policy caused much concern in the 93d Congress. Senate Resolution 200, agreed to November 9, 1973, expressed the sense of the Senate that other nations should not consider domestic events to be adversly affecting the American resolve to uphold the vital national interests of the United States, nor be tempted to seize upon the domestic events as an opportunity to undermine the security of the United States.

On Feburary 6, 1974, the House adopted by a vote of 410-4 a resolution authorizing the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate whether sufficient grounds existed for the impeachment of President Nixon. This action prompted several Members of Congress to call for restrictions of the President's foreign policy activities during impeachment proceedings. For example, three concurrent resolutions, which were introduced in the House in April, asked that foreign policy information be provided to the Vice President and the Congress, that the President be prevented from making or signing international agreements, and that he be prohibited from official travel abroad or the reception of foreign heads of State. These resolutions were not enacted.

After intensive study, the House Judiciary Committee on July 27, 1974, by a vote of 27-11 adopted the first article of impeachment charging the President with obstruction of justice in the investigation of the Watergate break-in. In the following days the committee voted for two other articles. Among the articles of impeachment which were rejected by the committee was one charging the President with concealing from Congress the facts concerning the American bombing of Cambodia in derogation of the congressional power to declare war. Before the articles of impeachment could be debated by the full House, President Nixon resigned his office. On August 9, 1974, Vice President Ford became the 38th president of the United States.

The transition in administration from President Nixon to President Ford did not appear to cause major changes in U.S. foreign policy, or related congressional action during 1974. Continuity was provided by the continuing role of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State, and the stated intention of President Ford that the foreign policy of the Nixon administration would be continued.

Ambassadorial Nominees. Following the disclosure of information tying the appointment of some ambassadors to political contributions, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in consultation with the Department of State, composed a set of rules which it hoped would guide the selection of ambassadors by the President, and which the

1 Prepared by Lois McHugh, Analyst in International Relations.