Other highly controversial defense budget issues involving U.S. foreign policy which the Congress debated during 1974 were questions surrounding continued military assistance to South Vietnam and the proposed expansion of military facilities on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Military assistance funds for South Vietnam in fiscal year 1975 were authorized at $1 billion, of which only $700 million were appropriated by the Congress. In the case of Diego Garcia, some $18 million of the $32.3 million requested were authorized but were later deleted from the fiscal year 1975 military construction appropriations bill. The details of both of these issues are discussed below.

In 1974, defense budget legislation which had major significance for U.S. foreign policy included the 1975 Department of Defense Appropriation Act (Public Law 93-437), the 1975 military procurement authorization act (Public Law 93-365), the 1974 Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriation Authorization Act (Public Law 93-307), the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1974 (Public Law 93-305), the 1975 military construction authorization act (Public Law 93-552), and the 1975 Military Construction Appropriation Act (Public Law 93-636). This legislation is analyzed below.

Department of Defense Appropriations. In 1974, the administration requested $87.1 billion in the fiscal year 1975 Defense appropriations bill (H.R. 16243, Public Law 93-437). The House version of H.R. 16243, passed on August 6, 1974, provided $83.4 billion, compared to $82.1 billion provided in the bill passed by the Senate on August 21, 1974. As reported by the House Appropriations Committee, the bill would have provided $83.3 billion in new obligational authority and $410 million in transfers from other accounts, amounting to $83.7 billion in total obligational authority. The amount recommended by the committee was subsequently reduced by two floor amendments in the House which deleted $300 million for military assistance to South Vietnam and $5.8 million in funds for procurement of binary nerve gas. The House version of the bill made no substantial cuts in major weapons programs, with the exception of two Navy programs. It deleted all funds requested for the Sea Control Ship and the Navy/ Marine Corps Advanced Fighter Prototype (VFAX) aircraft.

The Senate Appropriations Committee report on H.R. 16243 recommended a total appropriation of $82.1 billion, including $514 million in transfer authority. Its recommendation was about $5 billion less than the administration's amended request of $87.1 billion and $1.3 billion under the House figure. The committee reduced funds for the S-3A Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft, the F-15, the F-111, the B-1, and the A-10 aircraft, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and Air Force and Navy cruise missile programs. It deleted all funds requested for the Sea Control Ship, the advanced tanker, and the Pershing surface-to-air missile. As passed by the Senate, its version of H.R. 16243 provided $81.6 billion in new obligational authority and $514 million in transfer funds, totalling $82.1 billion in total obligational authority.

The conference report on the bill which was passed by the Congress on September 23-24, 1974, and enacted into law on October 8, 1974, as Public Law 93-437, provided $82.6 billion in total obligational authority for the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1975. This figure was

$4.5 billion below the Defense Department's amended budget request. The largest reductions effected by congressional action were as follows. $2.6 billion for procurement, $1.7 billion for operation and maintenance, and $745 million for research and development.

Despite an overall reduction in procurement funds, no major weapon system was eliminated or sharply reduced. Specific provisions of the Defense appropriations act that were most directly related to U.S. foreign policy were those which (1) provided funds for some 2,130,000 active duty military personnel and 925,000 military reserves; (2) required the withdrawal of 12,500 overseas troops by May 31, 1975; (3) provided $700 million for military aid to South Vietnam; (4) barred the transfer of war materials to foreign governments without specific authorization under U.S. laws; and (5) provided funds for improving the accuracy and yield of strategic missiles.

Military Procurement Authorizations.-In 1974, the Defense Department asked Congress to authorize $23.1 billion in new appropriations for the development and procurement of weapons through the 1975 military procurement authorizations bill (H.R. 14592, Public Law 93-365), which also authorized the fiscal year-end personnel strengths of the Armed Services. On May 22, 1974, the House passed its version of H.R. 14592 authorizing $22.6 billion for weapons and reducing the strength of the armed forces by 2,810. On June 11, 1974, the Senate authorized $21.8 billion for weapons-$800 million less than the House and $1.3 billion less than the Defense Department request and cut the active duty military manpower requests of each of the Services by about 2 percent for an overall reduction in troop strength of 49,000.

The conference report on H.R. 14592 which was enacted into law on August 5, 1974, as Public Law 93-365 authorized $22.2 billion, of which $35.7 million was to come from reimbursements for foreign military sales. This authorization was almost a billion dollars less than the amount requested.

The major cuts in funds for weapons research, development, and procurement involved the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the B-1 bomber, the Sea Control Ship, the Patrol Frigate, and the improved submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system known as the SSBN-X. With respect to AWACS procurement funds, the Senate had approved the full amount requested ($548.9 million) for the proposed 12-aircraft program, while the House chose to limit the fiscal year 1975 purchase to 6 aircraft. The conferees decided to delete 6 aircraft, authorizing $328.7 million for an initial 6-aircraft purchase and an additional $42 million for advance procurement for the 6 aircraft tentatively programed for procurement in fiscal year 1976. As for the B-1 bomber, the Air Force had requested $499 million to buy 4 prototype aircraft. The conference committee authorized $455 million for the purchase of 3 prototypes, with the fourth to be procured after the first successful B-1 flight test.

The conferees agreed with the Senate decision to defer initial development work on an improved, small-scale, and less costly SLBM system known as SSBN-X, agreeing with the Senate view that "a delay of 1 or 2 years in the initiation of the SSBN-X program would also permit the lessons learned in developing the Trident system to be applied to the SSBN-X." The conference committee also eliminated funds for four of the seven patrol frigates sought by the Navy-a

reduction of about $250 million-and cut the $143 million request for the Sea Control Ship by $126.9 million, allowing an authorization of $16 million for this program.

One of the most controversial issues taken up in conference was a Senate-approved reduction of 49,000 in the strength of the active duty components of the armed forces by the end of fiscal year 1975. The House conferees were adamant that reductions of such magnitude "could not be made without seriously affecting the capabilities of our forces." After considerable debate over this issue, the conferees agreed to the strength authorizations provided in the House bill, which reduced military manpower by only 2,810.

While both the House and the Senate again defeated efforts to legislate substantial cutbacks in the number of U.S. military personnel stationed overseas, the conferees agreed to a Senate provision which stipulated that the noncombat component of U.S. military strength in Europe be reduced by 18,000 by June 30, 1976. However, at the same time, the legislation authorized the Secretary of Defense to increase the combat components in Europe by an amount equal to reductions made in noncombat personnel.

The largest single reduction was in the administration's $1.6 billion request for military assistance to South Vietnam. The conferees agreed on an authorization ceiling of $1 billion for support of the South Vietnamese armed forces in fiscal year 1975. The House bill had originally recommended $1.1 billion, while the Senate version would have provided an authorization of $900 million in this category. Only $700 million of this authorization was appropriated, however, in the Defense Appropriations Act, as was noted above.

Supplemental Authorizations and Appropriations.-The fiscal year 1975 defense budget request was accompanied by a $6.2 billion supplemental request for fiscal year 1974. Of the $6.2 billion in the supplemental request, $3.4 billion was for increases in pay and retirement benefits. The balance of $2.8 billion was justified by the Defense Department as needed to improve the readiness of U.S. forces in the aftermath of the Middle East war, to cover fuel price increases, and to replace weapons and equipment given as emergency assistance to Israel. Readiness measures included improving U.S. airlift capacity, stepping up production and procurement of certain weapon systems which proved to be particularly effective in combat, and expediting force modernization of both the general purpose and strategic forces.

Only $1.3 billion of the $6.2 billion supplemental request required new authorization through Department of Defense supplemental authorization bill (H.R. 12565, Public Law 93-307). On April 4, the House authorized $1.1 billion, while the Senate version, passed on May 6, provided only $415.5 million, with an additional transfer authority of $155.8 million, making a total obligational authority of $571.3 million. The final version of the bill as enacted into law on June 8, 1974, authorized $769 million in supplemental funds for fiscal year 1974. This figure was $488 million less than requested by the Department of Defense.

The funds authorized in H.R. 12565 were appropriated through the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act (H.R. 14013, Public Law 93-305), which like the authorizing legislation was passed by Congress on June 4-5 and enacted on June 8, 1974. This supplemental appropriation act provided an additional $4.7 billion for the Defense De

partment in fiscal year 1974. This figure was $1.5 billion less than the request. Nevertheless, the annual Defense Department appropriation combined with this supplemental appropriation totalled $78.9 billion for fiscal year 1974, compared to $77.3 billion which the administration had originally requested.

The most controversial aspects of the supplemental request were the proposal to expand facilities on Diego Garcia and the request to raise the ceiling for Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) obligations for South Vietnam and Laos. The Departments of the Navy and Air Force requested an authorization of $32.3 million for the expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia, a program that was aimed at increasing the island's logistic capabilities to the point where the facility could support limited U.S. military operations in the Indian Ocean area. This request was approved by the House but was subsequently denied by the Senate. With the understanding that the project would be given careful consideration by the Senate during its review of the 1975 military construction bill, the House conferees accepted the Senate's recommendation.

The administration had also requested that the Authorization and Appropriations Acts for fiscal year 1974 be amended to increase the authority for MASF for South Vietnam and Laos by $474 million, from $1.126 billion to $1.6 billion. The Congress denied this request. The conference report stated: "It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the statutory ceiling of $1.126 billion enacted in fiscal year 1974 remains unaltered and shall not be circumvented by accounting adjustments."

Military Construction.-As a result of the decision to fund the proposed expansion of Navy and Air Force facilities on the British-owned Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia through military construction legislation, the controversy surrounding the Diego Garcia proposal focused attention on a part of the defense budget which is usually of less apparent significance to foreign policy. The Defense Department maintained that expanded communications and logistics facilities on the uninhabited, coral atoll were needed to support U.S. Naval operations in the Indian Ocean, where the Soviet Union already had the use of three major naval bases. Opponents of the Diego Garcia proposal argued that it would trigger a naval arms race in the Indian Ocean and might be a destabilizing influence in the Middle East.

On August 9, the House passed the military construction authorization bill for fiscal year 1975 (H.R. 161361, Public Law 93-552) authorizing almost $3 billion of the $3.3 billion requested by the Department of Defense and including the $32.3 million requested for Diego Garcia, after efforts to delete these funds had been defeated on the floor. The Senate version, passed on September 11, authorized a larger total figure for military construction but included only $18.1 million for Diego Garcia. The Senate bill also contained language prohibiting use of these funds until: (1) the President "has advised the Congress in writing that he has evaluated all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for these facilities and has certified that this construction is essential to the national interest," and (2) both Houses of Congress have approved the matter by a joint resolution.

The conference version of the $3 billion military construction authorization bill enacted on December 27, 1974, authorized $18.1

million for Diego Garcia but limited the use of these funds. The authorization act included language prohibiting their allocation until 60 days after the President had certified to the Congress that the expansion was of vital national interest, during which period either House of Congress could vote to nullify the authorization. The Military Construction Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1975 (Public Law 93-636) enacted on January 3, 1975, did not provide any funding specifically for Diego Garcia; however, this legislation permitted the Navy and Air Force to use any available construction funds for the Diego Garcia program, provided it were allowed under the conditions set by the Military Construction Authorization Act. (See section on Asia.)

1