Although there was little formal congressional activity which had a direct bearing on SALT, the subject did not go unnoticed during the second session of the 93d Congress. The annual consideration of defense money bills usually has provided a forum in which arms control issues are raised. In considering these bills in 1974, the Congress examined the question of pursuing "counterforce" strategy, a new element in U.S. defense policy as enunciated in Defense Secretary Schlesinger's annual posture statement. There were several unsuccessful amendments in both houses which sought to eliminate funds for counterforce research, on the grounds that it might adversely affect the efforts in SALT.

There were various reactions in Congress to the Vladivostok accord. Senators Kennedy, Mondale, and Mathias introduced Senate Resolution 448, which supported the accord, but called on the President to attempt to negotiate lower ceilings in the final agreement. Though the resolution was introduced too late for action during the 93d Congress, the sponsors pledged to introduce it early in the 94th and to seek Senate approval. One critic of the agreement, Senator Jackson, announced his plans to hold hearings on the issues raised by the Vladivostok accord, and suggested that he might spearhead a movement to reject the final agreement, on the grounds that the ceilings are too high. Members of Congress also criticized the provision in the aide-memoire which stated that further negotiation should begin no later than 1980-81 on arms reductions after 1985, because it seemed to preclude the possibility of earlier reductions. Secretary Kissinger subsequently established that the wording has been changed to permit reductions to be negotiated at any time.

Hearings relating to SALT were held by a variety of committees during 1974. These included joint hearings on nuclear weapons policy by two subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and those of a special subcommittee on arms control of the House Armed Services Committee. The subcommittee issued a report in early December, which surveyed U.S. arms control and disarmament activities, as well as the U.S. policymaking machinery in this area.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty.-As noted above, this agreement came out of the July United States-Soviet summit meeting. Its terms prohibit underground nuclear weapons testing above a certain threshold (150 kilotons) of explosive power. There are provisions for exchange of technical data and for matters affecting verification. Its terms call for entry into force on March 31, 1976, and do not affect peaceful nuclear explosions, a subject of further discussions. These talks were held through October and November 1974 in Moscow, without resolving the question of limiting peaceful nuclear explosions. Senate approval of the pact was by no means assured.

Congressional interest in a comprehensive test ban goes back a number of years, with the most recent action being the favorable Foreign Relations Committee report in 1973 of a resolution calling on the President to seek a ban on all testing. Because the Congress and others did not react favorably to the threshold test ban, it was reported, the administration did not submit it to the Senate. Press reports indicated that in an effort to answer the treaty's critics the administration would aim for the terms of the ban to apply to peaceful explosions as well as those for weapons purposes, a goal the Moscow talks failed to achieve. In the meantime, the President requested a $73 million supple

mental authorization of appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Part of the funds were intended for an accelerated testing program in order to develop three new warheads before the scheduled entry into force of the threshold test ban. Consideration of the legislation set off a debate regarding the effect on the U.S. position of pursuing an active testing program and signing an international agreement such as the threshold test ban. Critics of the accelerated testing program succeeded in cutting the requested funds in half, to $22.25 million, in both the authorization and appropriations bills. (Public Law 93-576 and Public Law 93-554).

Chemical and Biological Weapons.-Questions have been raised in the Congress for several years regarding U.S. policies on this question, both in the arms control area, and in the area of their use in U.S. military operations in Indochina. As was the case with strategic weapons, the Congress had an opportunity to express its views on CB weapons during its annual consideration of the defense procurement authorization and appropriations bills. The funds in question were those earmarked for binary nerve gases. These employ the technique of storing two harmless gases which become lethal when combined during weapons use. Both the House and Senate approved modest cuts in the authorization bill for binaries, but eliminated the funds for them entirely in the appropriations bill. ACDA Director Ikle had voiced opposition to the Army development of binaries, and the Foreign Affairs Committee had recommended deferring procurement in its report on House Resolution 1258 (see below).

The House was active in the movement to influence U.S. policy on international efforts to control CB weapons. The National Security Policy Subcommittee conducted several days of hearings, which led to the favorable report of House Resolution 1258, urging a reexamination of U.S. policy and ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The issue of whether or not its prohibition included riot control agents (tear and similar gases) and herbicides had been a major obstacle to its approval. The administration position had been that it did not apply to these agents, and many Members of Congress disagreed. The resolution passed the House in August.

In December, the Foreign Relations Committee opened hearings on two CB treaties: the Geneva Protocol, which had been pending before it since 1970, and the 1972 Biological Weapons Ban, which prohibits the production and stockpiling of these agents. ACDA Director Ikle's testimony described a change in administration policy, which, although it did not address the scope of the Geneva Protocol, renounced the U.S. use of riot control agents and herbicides in war, except under very limited circumstances. The favorable committee report on the Geneva Protocol made note of this policy. Both treaties were approved unanimously by the Senate on December 16.

Nuclear Assistanee and Nonproliferation.-A major issue in the Congress arose over the offer of U.S. assistance in the field of nuclear technology to both Egypt and Israel, during President Nixon's visits there in June. The primary concern in Congress was the arms control implications: whether safeguards were adequate to prevent diversion to weapons use, and whether such moves might contribute ultimately to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These fears were reinforced by the peaceful explosion of a nuclear device in May by India, using nuclear material provided through an agreement with Canada for cooperation in peaceful uses.

Congressional concern was expressed through a number of different pieces of legislation. One was S. 3698 (H.R. 15582), which sought to amend the Atomic Energy Act with the provision that any proposed agreements or amendments to an agreement with another country regarding U.S. nuclear cooperation would not become effective if within 60 days the Congress passed a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it did not favor such an agreement. Previously, pertinent legislation only required the President to submit the text of the agreement to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee for 30 days prior to its entry into force. There appears to have been no method provided by law by which the Congress could approve or reject an agreement for cooperation. The bill became law on October 26 (Public Law 93-485).

Related legislation included the following: (1) An amendment to S. 2665, the bill for increased U.S. participation in the International Development Association, which requires a U.S. vote against a loan to a country which had developed a nuclear explosives device, but was not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Public Law 93373); (2) Atomic Energy Omnibus legislation (S. 3669), with provision for congressional review of any increase in nuclear material being transferred to a group of nations (Public Law 93-377); (3) an amendment to the Export Administration Act (S. 3792) requiring a Presidential report on the adequacy of safeguards for nuclear material (Public Law 93–500); (4) H.R. 16609, the supplemental authorization of appropriations for the AEC (see threshold test ban section, above), which increased the requested $18 million for improving safeguards to $23 million (Public Law 93-516, however, the appropriations bill alloted only $12.4 million for this purpose, Public Law 93-554). In a related move, the AEC proposed stricter regulations for the transport of plutonium, to prevent sabotage or nuclear theft; (5) an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibits the use of foreign assistance funds for activities relevant to the operation of a nuclear powerplant in Egypt or Israel (Public Law 93-559); and (6) the requirement for an annual report to each House from members of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee on the development, use, and control of nuclear energy for the common defense and security (Public Law 93-514).

The arms control issues raised by the offers of nuclear assistance were sharpened by the fact that the Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), as provided in Article 8 of that document, is scheduled to convene in May 1975. Two preparatory conferences were held in 1974. In addition, at a meeting of the members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which administers safeguards under the NPT, the United States received assurances from India that American nuclear assistance to that country would not be used for nuclear explosions.

In two separate resolutions, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the idea of establishing nuclear free zones in the Middle East and in South Asia.

Other Arms Control Issues.-The question of the need to limit the transfer of conventional arms arose during 1974. Early in the year, the House Foreign Affairs Committee published the ACDA report to the Congress on "The International Transfer of Conventional Arms," watch had been required by previous legislation. In addition, an amandment to the Foreign Assistance Act (Public Law 93-559) urges

the President to propose to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that it consider the question of limiting conventional arms transfers and requiring a report from the President 6 months after enactment on steps taken to carry out the provision.

U.S. weather modification activities were the subject of hearings released in May by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Primarily cloud-seeding to increase rainfall had been used in 1967 and 1968 as an adjunct to U.S. military activities in Indochina. In 1973, the Senate passed a resolution which called for the conclusion of a treaty which would ban the use of weather modification as a weapon of war. The House Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on similar resolutions in September 1974. One of the joint communiques of the Moscow summit in July included a United States-Soviet pledge to seek a ban on weather modification. The U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution in December which urged the conclusion of such a ban. This was one of 21 separate resolutions dealing with arms control and disarmament which were adopted by the General Assembly.

49-667-75 - 5

THE DEFENSE BUDGET 1

One of the major ways in which Congress helps shape national security and foreign policy is through its action on the defense budget. Viewed as a whole, the defense budget requests which were submitted to Congress in February 1974, represented a sharp accentuation of trends that have been apparent for the last few years, but there were also several new considerations arising from the Middle East conflict, renewed concerns over Soviet military capabilities and intentions, and the state of the U.S. economy. The fiscal year 1975 Department of Defense budget request came to $92.6 billion in total obligational authority, including military construction and military assistance funds, and Department of Defense supplemental requests for fiscal year 1974 totaled $6.2 billion.

Some continuing trends highlighted in 1974 were the following:

(1) The rising cost of personnel and weapons accounted for a substantial part of the defense budget.

(2) Despite the fact that U.S. forces have been drastically reduced in number since 1968, the cost of national defense in 1974 was the highest in history when measured in terms of current dollar outlays, although measured in dollars of constant value national defense funds were sharply reduced in real terms.

(3) U.S. strategic air defense forces, which have been cut by 80 percent over the last decade, were to be virtually eliminated in fiscal year 1975-76 owing to a reevaluation of the overall strategic situation and a reappraisal of the threat posed by enemy bombers.

At the time, three important new elements had a major impact on the defense budget during 1974:

(1) The effect of the Middle East conflict was manifested primarily in the supplemental request for 1974. About half of the funds requested were earmarked for programs to improve the readiness of U.S. forces-i.e., to correct deficiencies that became apparent during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and to replenish stocks of weapons and equipment which were drawn down to assist Israel.

(2) One of the most controversial aspects of the 1975 defense budget involved an apparent shift in strategic policy when Secretary of Defense Schlesinger declared a need for strategic weapons capable of striking selected military targets in the Soviet Union. Statements by Secretary Schlesinger outlining this strategy and stressing the need to develop missile warheads of greater yield, improved accuracy, and greater maneuverability provoked considerable debate in Congress and the press.

(3) Just as the fiscal year 1975 Federal budget represented a reversal of economic policy on the part of the administration in order to head off increasing unemployment, so the defense budget included certain items which Department of Defense witnesses stated in congressional hearings were expected to stimulate the economy.

1 Prepared by Bert H. Cooper, Analyst in National Defense.