Britain should remain in the European Community on the basis of the renegotiated terms. His recommendation has been backed by the British Cabinet by 16 to 7. 9. The British public will be asked to vote, in a referendum to be held shortly, on whether or not Britain should remain a member of the European Community. 10. This question is a matter of international importance to Britain and to the community. To Britain it is a question of how its future is shaped. To the community it is important that a member state should not leave, particularly by unilaterally breaking a treaty commitment. III EAST-WEST RELATIONS (A) CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) 11. The paper I submitted to you at the most recent meeting between the two delegations in Washington contained details of the background and nature of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which has been held in Helsinki and Geneva over the past 2 years. Rather than going into elaborate detail it might be more useful, at this stage, to concentrate on the points that remain outstanding. 12. It will be recalled that the Conference is now in its second or committee phase in Geneva. The Soviet Union, and its Warsaw Pact allies have proposed that the Conference should end, with a third, ministerial phase, “at the highest level" at which a declaration and resolution might be adopted. The NATO participants have emphasised that a third phase should be conditional on the achievement of substantive results in the present second stage of the Conference. Some Progress Cited 13. Most recent indications, however, are that Western countries are moving, both individually and collectively, toward acceptance of the Eastern proposal. The United States, Britain, and France have all referred to a summit at "the highest level" in recent bilateral negotiations with the U.S.S.R. Further, the "Dublin Declaration" of the heads of government of the nine members of the EEC, of March 11, 1975, referred to "the conclusion of the Conference at an early date and at the highest level." In diplomatic circles it is considered likely that phase 2 of the Conference should end during the spring and that a third summit phase might be held in June or July. All this is still dependent on progress being made in committees I and III of the Conference. 14. What progress has been made in the three committees of the Conference? The first committee, or "basket" relates to security in Europe. In basket I the main point agreed so far has been that the "inviolability" of frontiers, along lines pushed hard by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies. 15. Among the points which remain to be settled are: (a) Confidence building measures; (b) peaceful change of frontiers; and (c) interrelationship of principles. Confidence Building Measures 16. First, confidence building measures. Here, although there has been agreement on the NATO proposal concerning the exchange of observers at "major military maneuvers," there are many problems of definition to be resolved. Whereas the West originally proposed that there should be 60 days prior notification of "major military maneuvers" this has been contested by the Soviet Union which wishes to have a very much shorter warning period. Whereas NATO proposes that the area to be covered for the exchange of observers should be a geographically wide one ("in Europe"-which in the NATO view would extend as far east as the Urals) the Soviet Union wishes to restrict the area in question. Whereas NATO proposes that movement of one division would justify the exchange of observers, the Soviet Union contests this and proposes that the minimum force justifying an exchange of observers should be larger. 17. As yet it is difficult to tell whether or not these differences of interpretation will be thrashed out by the end of the second phase. 18. Second, peaceful change of frontiers. Here, the NATO countries consider that it is necessary to conterbalance the Soviet interpretation of the principle of "involability of frontiers"-a principle already accepted in basket I for some time. In effect the NATO countries uphold an interpretation of this principle under which frontiers in Europe can be changed peacefully and according to the will of the peoples concerned. In particular, this attitude reflects NATO's support for the West German Government which, of course, has a continuing interest in the achievement of German reunification. Further, this interpretation would permit the nine members of the European Community to form a single political entity at some stage in the future. 19. It would seem to be a valid criticism of Western negotiating tactics in the Conference that the Western countries did not insist on acceptance by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states of Western ideas concerning the peaceful change of frontiers at the same time as they agreed to the Soviet doctrine of "inviolability of frontiers." Interrelationship of Principles 20. Third, interrelationship of the principles. In basket I a number of "principles" governing security and cooperation in Europe are under consideration. Western participants are trying to obtain recognition by the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries that these principles cannot just be referred to on an "a la carte" basis to suit their political needs of the moment but must be regarded as an interrelated and inseparable group of principles. Before these principles are agreed, balance must be achieved between them, notably through substantive progress being made on human rights in basket III. 21. But the most difficult problems are those still under negotiation under basket III on cooperation in the humanitarian cultural fields. Here agreement has been reached, on Western insistence, on the principle of reunification of families. Unfortunately, the agreed formula is extremely vague and merely amounts to agreement that "families can be reunited under certain circumstances." The proof of the pudding will be in the eating. It will only be when we see how far the Eastern European countries apply this agreement that we can tell whether it has any significance or not. "Freer Flow of Information" 22. Among the outstanding problems in committee III is "the freer flow of information." Here the aim of the West is to provide free access to information across frontiers, under as clearly defined conditions as possible. The Soviet Union and its allies, on their side, are trying to leave the conditions of access to information as undefined and vague as possible. Specific points covered by this principle include better conditions of work for journalists working in other countries, exchanges of television and news programs, of newspapers and of books, et cetera. 23. There have been less problems in committee II on economic and commercial relationships. Here, although progress has been modest, what progress has been made concerning East-West business contact and the provision of econòmic and commercial information has at least satisfied the Nine. Mr. Destremau, replying for the Council of the European Communities in the European Parliament on September 26, 1974, to a question put by Mr. Jahn, described the results so far obtained in committee II as being "quite positive and encouraging." It is interesting to note, at this point, that it is in committee II where the Nine have been most active at Geneva, even to the extent of representatives of the Commission actually participating in the work of the committee. Institutional Followup 24. One of the other main outstanding questions in CSCE is the question of institutional followup. Proposals have been made by the Eastern European countries to set up permanent East-West institutions to followup the work of the Conference. NATO's position is that there should be no followup institutions and, indeed, that followup should not itself be discussed at all during the second phase of CSCE but only in the third phase if satisfactory results are achieved in the second phase. To the extent that NATO has made suggestions concerning followup at all, this is envisaged as taking the form of a meeting of officials from all participant countries, in Geneva, after an interval of several years, to see what the results of CSCE have been in practice. 25. To summarize, it looks as if there is almost certain to be a summit level stage of CSCE this summer. But the West are still holding out for concessions in baskets I and III of CSCE before agreeing to this. As yet the U.S.S.R. is still clinging to its entrenched positions on the outstanding issues but diplomatic sources have it that there could well be rapid movement, even the "final trade-off" very soon. Any results of the Conference will not be in treaty form or binding, but merely bits of paper such as declarations and principles. Nonetheless, even limited success on confidence building measures would be a step in the right direction and any concessions that could be extracted from the Communist participants in basket III on human rights and freer access to information would be a bonus. Finally, CSCE has given the Nine a good opportunity, which they have successfully taken, of proving their solidarity and negotiating skills in East-West political as well as economic relations. (B) MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR) 26. In the paper discussed by the two Delegations in Washington last autumn I set out, in some detail, the background of MBFR and the Warsaw Pact and NATO proposals. Unfortunately there has been almost no progress at all at Vienna since our Washington meeting. 27. It is true that the Warsaw Pact participants put forward a new proposal on March 6, 1975. But in practice this proposal changes nothing of substance in the known position of the Eastern European countries. It is merely a refinement and a reordering of some elements of the Warsaw Pact reduction program. Like the October 1974 proposal the new Warsaw Pact proposal answers none of the major Western concerns. The Eastern countries still wish, in a first phase of reductions, to reduce not only Soviet and United States forces in Europe but also European forces. But NATO on its side has insisted that the first reduction should be limited to the two superpowers with further reductions being brought in a second stage. Also, whereas the Soviet Union still insists on bringing aircraft into the negotiations and hopes to discuss the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons and what are known as forward-based systems, NATO maintains its own position which is that initial reductions should be confined to conventional land forces and their weapons systems within the area of reduction. Most important of all, whereas NATO has always insisted that reductions negotiated should be “balanced”, that is, that greater cuts should be made by the Eastern side-which at present has a conventional superiority in the reduction area-so as to end up with similar numbers of armed men on both sides, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies refuse to shift from their basic position which is that cuts should be on a one-forone basis. 28. Although there is no "linkage" between CSCE and MBFR, some diplomats consider that the Warsaw Pact might be prepared to get on with the Vienna talks more seriously once CSCE is finished. Some observers consider that in a mood of euphoria, détente and relaxation which might accompany a muchpublicized final summit stage of CSCE, the determination of the Western countries to maintain their defense budgets and force levels could be undermined, and that in such an atmosphere the Eastern Europeans might believe that they could score heavily in the Vienna talks. U.S. Policy a Question Mark 29, There is a further point which I wish to raise. For 18 months a question mark has been hanging over the general direction of U.S. policy in particular concerning the American commitment to European defense and the maintenance of U.S. force levels in Europe. Some Western observers consider that the Soviet Union has every interest in playing a waiting game in this respect. I should welcome the views of the U.S. Delegation on this point. IV MIDDLE EAST 30. Secretary of State Kissinger has made enormous efforts to obtain a peace settlement in the Middle East. That his most recent attempts have not been successful is not his fault, and some might consider that Israel should recognize that the Egyptian Government of Mr. Sadat went as far as it could, in the recent past, to improve Israel's position. 31. A real breakthrough could best be achieved through an understanding between Israel and Egypt, and the chances for peace in the Middle East would increase if Israel were to act on this assumption. 32. The assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia has added another factor of uncertainty to the Middle East situation. V SOME SECURITY QUESTIONS 33. It may be useful, briefly, to raise two or three security questions for discussion. 34 First, although other members of the Delegation are presenting special papers on different countries within the Mediterranean area, in this general paper I should like to raise one general security problem concerning the whole of the Mediterranean. 35. For a number of years the Soviet Union has maintained a sizable naval force in the eastern Mediterranean. For a number of years also, Britain and the United States have had the main responsibility for naval surveillance in the Mediterranean. The cuts announced in the new British defense white paper cause problems here, since they will lead to the reduction of Britain's naval surveillance role in the Mediterranean. For some years too, the political situation in the eastern Mediterranean has been a tense one, fraught with many dangers. But now that Portugal has moved away from a right-wing dictatorship is it in danger of sliding rapidly into a left-wing dictatorship? There is latent instability in Spain. All in all there is not just a single "Mediterranean crisis". There is a whole series of separate Mediterranean problems which add up to a highly unstable and dangerous problem for the West. 36. In the light of this reality it would be interesting to know why the U.S. Congress has decided to place so much emphasis on one single Mediterranean problem; why, in fact, it has taken action concerning Turkey? Perhaps members of the U.S. Delegation could tell us why? 37. The NATO alliance has already severely damaged its relationship with Greece. It is to be hoped that Turkey will not now leave NATO. 38. Finally, one general strategic point. Within NATO the emphasis has been increasingly placed, in recent years, on a rapid recourse to nuclear weapons in Europe in the event of a Warsaw Pact conventional attack which could not be held by purely conventional NATO forces. 39. A number of military experts have expressed concern about this policy. Some of them hold that a strategy of this kind is basically deterrent in purpose. But if there is an attack deterrence will have failed and, with too few conventional forces, we shall have no effective defense. With the miniaturization of tactical nuclear weapons, or "mininukes," and with technical developments which mean that small nuclear weapons can be "clean" with very limited fallout and radiation, NATO's strategy seems to be moving toward greater and greater dependence on the use of such weapons. Is this realistic? Because of our reluctance to pay for reasonable levels of conventional forces which are effectively equipped, are we just fooling ourselves? Do we have a strategy that neither deters nor defends?1 VI 40. It is difficult to discuss Spain in isolation from Portugal, but I have been asked to limit my comments to the Spanish part of the Iberian peninsula. 41. After a period of increasing economic prosperity in the 1960's and early 1970's, when internal political problems were relegated to the second level because of the interest of the Spanish people in increasing their living standards, the past year or two has seen a dramatic change. 42. With a slowing down of emigration of workers, with a slowdown of industrial output, reduced tourism, and with a 20-percent inflation rate, the lure of economic prosperity no longer works with the Spanish people. 43. The present situation is, therefore, a combination of economic (recession) and political unrest. The Prime Minister, Mr. Arias Navarro, promised democratic reforms in February 1974 but the Head of State has not permitted such reforms. The result is, as a journalist has recently commented, that: "The structure built up under Franco is not so much crumbling as decomposing; the odor of decay rises even before the body has been certified dead." Similarly, Mr. 1 For any questions concerning "burden sharing" see the IISS paper which has already been used as a working document at the Florence meeting in 1974. "How Long Till the Explosion in Spain?" by Harold Sieve, "Daily Telegraph," March 4, 1975. Fraga Iribarne has attempted to put togther a Center-Right political group with a program including the introduction of universal suffrage and free trade unions. These proposals, once again, did not meet with the approval of the Head of State and nothing has come of them. Polarization Evident 44. In this situation, politics are polarized between the extreme right and, with no democratic center or moderate left, inevitably, the extreme left. 45. Those attempting to criticize the regime or to introduce reforms fall into the category of "subversion". Even the primitive stirrings of collective labor activities can lead to imprisonment. 46. So we are left with question marks for the future. Will Spain explode into a new civil war when the Caudillo dies? Is it possible for interim moves toward a democratic system to be introduced before this happens? Will a Communist takeover be inevitable after General Franco's death? If so, will the Soviet Union be able to complete its grip on both ends of the Mediterranean? POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. AND EUROPEAN RELATIONS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1974 Paper by Paul Findley My assigned topic is: "Political developments in American and European relations since September with emphasis on the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, the force reduction talks, and other aspects of political and defense cooperation." It is a welcome assignment. It deals with matters vital to western civilization. The topic is to be considered in the ancient capital of Bavaria in central Europe, only a few miles from the well-guarded border which separates governments which rule their people from governments in which the people do the ruling. Our proximity to this border should be a constant reminder that the stakes in our various efforts at trans-Atlantic cooperation are high indeed. Our governments seek to speak with one voice at Helsinki and Vienna, and to coordinate our word and action in other enterprises for a very basic reason: We prize, above all else, our heritage of individual liberty and human dignity, and we know that the existence of well-armed tyranny anywhere is a threat to liberty everywhere. We must keep up our guard, in spirit as well as in steel. We will talk here of battlements and guns and soldiers, but we know that without spirit and will, military forces are nothing. My most famous constituent, Abraham Lincoln, once put it this way, "Our defense is the preservation of the spirit which prizes liberty as the heritage of all men in all lands everywhere." My task is to review briefly what is happening at Helsinki, Vienna, Brussels, and Washington; give you my appraisal of these trends; and finally suggest what, in my view, should be done to enhance prospects for effective cooperation in the future. ATLANTIC COHESIÓN SUSTAINED From the outset, the conference at Helsinki (CSCE) and Vienna (MBFR) have been fraught with peril to Atlantic Community interests. The risks are especially high at Vienna. It is gratifying, therefore, to report that Atlantic cohesion has been substantial and sustained. At Vienna, a NATO caucus meets regularly, formally and informally, to coordinate common positions on the issues under discussion. Similar discussions occur regularly at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The result has been solidarity throughout this long and complex conference. The CSCE meetings had little prospect for success from the beginning, but prospects became even worse as the result of the Mideast war and the oil crisis. Both factors weakened the bargaining position of the West at the conference, and therefore reduced substantially the prospect that the Soviets will make any major concessions on human rights. About all the Soviets at this stage seem willing to do is permit the reunion of married couples divided by the Iron Curtain. In the security realm, the Soviets wish to use the conference to sanctify pres ent borders in eastern Europe through a declaration of “frontier inviolability.” |